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ABSTRACT
This PhD thesis presents a longitudinal study of the dynamics of the innovation
process of a standardised technology. The study addresses the factors that shape
technology decision-making along the entire technology life cycle - from design to
implementation - within the context of a complex socio-technical setting.
The development of the Internet led to acceleration in the diffusion of Inter-
Organisational Networks and Systems (IONS), particularly of portals. Portals are
defined as linked electronic platforms with a single point-of-entry, independent of
time and space, and that enable collaboration through access to multiple sources from
different organisational information systems. Organisations develop and implement
portals to respond to market pressures, for example in order to rationalise
procurement.
The thesis attempts to expand the understanding of the socio-technical dynamics
patterning both the decision-making process and the outcomes of complex ICT
innovation projects. The thesis seeks to overcome the shortcomings of existing social
and economic research on inter-organisational standardisation by redressing the
limitations in terms of empirical scope and analytical frameworks of, on the one
hand, studies of standard setting processes which neglect the wider and subsequent
context of implementation and, on the other hand, of 'diffusion of standards' studies
which ignore the way in which standards evolve in their implementation. This study
specifically answers theoretical and practical questions of ICT innovation dynamics
in a complex multi-spaced setting, combining economic, technical and sociological
theories. The research draws on the Social Shaping of Technology (SST) perspective
by explaining ICT innovations as historical and contexted actor-focussed
technological change processes. The thesis develops a Multi-level Space of
Innovation Dynamics (MSID) framework to capture the dynamics of standardised
portal technology development and its outcomes on two levels: at a micro level,
focusing on individuals and groups in the adopting organisation (zoom in), and at the
meso level, addressing the effects that the dynamics have in the broader context of
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the sector (zoom out). Jorgensen's concept of 'arena' is used to analyse the way in
which the actors involved at the company and the industry level are configured
together. The turbulent dynamics are analysed as the outcome of complex processes
of change involving the configuration and re-configuration of the various arenas and
networks in which the array of involved organisational actors are embedded.
The contribution to existing knowledge is based on the development of the MSID
framework and its application to a complex multi-layered and longitudinal case study
based in the automotive industry. The researcher's unique extensive access as a
participant and analyst to the complex setting of the portal development was essential
to develop the framework and to illustrate the ways in which theoretical concepts can
be grounded in real empirical cases. The research finds that ICT innovations are
shaped by history and context of the adopting organisation and the actors involved.
The extremely complex organisational politics of decision-making processes were
patterned by the configuration of the project and the management of expertise.
Interactions and realignments amongst this complex set of socio-technical factors led
to a drift in the subsequent outcomes. This study supports the socio-technical
analysis of supply chains as mutually shaped by technology and the adopting user
organisation. Finally, the study also provides organisations with rich sociological
insights that could translate into the planning of similar technology-driven projects.
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
This thesis presents a longitudinal study of the dynamics of the innovation process in
a case of a standardised technology - portals. During the last 20 years the business
world has undergone significant changes. For some organisations, doing business
globally has become critical to their survival, while others discover new
opportunities by focusing their business at their local environment. In this process of
change, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) plays a significant role
in enabling and triggering the re-organisation of business activities. ICT has become
ubiquitous, invading all aspects of the business domain. The fast development of the
Internet technologies in the last 15 years has considerably accelerated the diffusion
of Inter-Organisational Networks and Systems (IONS), and has intensified the
collaboration (Venkatraman, 2000) between all kinds of companies, regardless of
their size and type. Today, virtually all organisations' ICT systems are
interconnected. IONS enables and organisation to arrange routine business
transactions with all kinds of exchange partners ranging from suppliers and
customers in the same value chain, to strategic partners and even competitors in the
same or a related market (Turban et al., 2000).
Business-to-Business (B2B) Electronic Commerce (e-commerce) is often used
interchangeably with the term generic term 'e-business'. Davydov (2000), for
example, defines e-business as an all-encompassing concept of enabling the
exchange of information and automation of commercial transactions over the
Internet. Open technologies like XML were among the main drivers of the success of
B2B e-commerce. Following Christiaanse and Rodon (2006), the real benefit of
adopting XML-based technologies is grounded in a networked approach across
companies and possibly industries. However, this inter-organisational integration
calls for interoperability and therefore for compatibility standards (Markus et al.,
2003).
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Despite interoperability issues, increasing B2B e-commerce developments have
triggered a massive increase in the number of IONS in the industry. Portals are one
of the most prominent types of contemporary IONS (Turban et ah, 2000). Definitions
of a portal vary considerably in the existing literature; they range from the definition
as an electronic platform with a single point of entry that enables collaboration
through access to multiple sources of information (Turban et ah, 2000), to portals as
electronic gateways or access points and content aggregators, to hypertext links or
other web pages collecting information (Neumann et ah, 2006), to online hybrid or
integrative business models integrating content, context, communication and
commerce into one comprehensive business model (Bauer et ah, 2004; Afuah &
Tucci, 2001). Finally, according to Gounaris and Dimitradis (2003), portals can be
characterised as integral problem-solvers following an augmented service concept.
Internet-based business portals are good examples of an increasingly globalised and
networked world where ICT and e-business standards aim to ensure interoperability
between different IT systems both within and between organisations. As ICT-enabled
collaboration is becoming a decisive tool in the struggle for competitive advantage,
interoperability has become a strategic necessity in all industries. Consequently, for
seamless communication and integration of data and information, standardisation and
harmonisation of ICT/e-business systems are required. They have gained strategic
significance. However, in practice the development and implementation ofportals
and related processes and services turned out to be a challenging endeavour.
In this context, this thesis aims to contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of
inter-organisational ICT innovations. This study specifically tries to answer
theoretical and practical questions of ICT innovation dynamics in a complex multi-
spaced setting, combining economic, technical and sociological theories and insights.
In this study, the role of the socio-technical dynamics of a selected complex ICT
innovation - a portal - is analysed following a 'social shaping of technology' (SST)
approach. Such dynamics is viewed as patterning both the decision-making and the
outcomes of complex ICT innovation projects. Attention is particularly drawn to the
processes of aligning inter-organisational as well as intra-organisational interests of
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key players. The overall goal of this thesis is to apply the SST to systematically
analyse technological change of a complex inter-organisational ICT system while
adopting a historical, contextualised actor-focussed explanation.
More detailed, the goals of this thesis are:
1. First, to explore the dynamics of a complex setting of electronically mediated
business relationships supported by IONS. Analysing the dynamics during
planning, development and implementation of a supplier portal, this study
aims achieve a better understanding of the complex relation between a new
technology and the adopting organisation. I also address the fact that changes
occur across the entire life cycle of standardised technology when a
technology emerges in a particular setting and when it is diffused and further
adapted to company-specific characteristics - Williams (1997) called this a
'biography of technology'.
2. Second, to explain and explore how these dynamics shape the outcome of a
concrete innovation project, locally (between the organisations involved) and
in the broader context of the industry sector. The strategic decision of a
number of industry players to adopt a particular standardised technology may
have important consequences for any organisation in that particular industry;
for example, it might affect its boundaries by enabling interactions with a
network of other participants. Thus, adoption of a particular standardised
technology can generate complex interactions between the technology and the
participating organisations, influencing their flexibility. In addition, there is
evidence that outcomes of standardised technology projects deviate
significantly from original plans and that such unexpected outcomes occur
due to the particular dynamics of standard setting.
The established frameworks in the literature of ICT innovation do not adequately
capture the phenomenon of dynamics of ICT innovations and of complex socio-
technical setting. Therefore, a new analytical framework is called to offer a better
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understanding of these dynamics. To this end, a multidisciplinary approach has been
chosen that integrates different theories in order to develop an analytical framework
to overcome the shortcomings of the respective perspectives of each of the individual
disciplines.
1.2 Motivation behind the study and research journey
The previous subsection provided an overview of the objective of this thesis. This
subsection will explicitly describe the motivation and the research journey of the
study.
The motivation behind this study is rooted in two major observations: first, the
importance of analysing the dynamics of ICT innovations that shape the entire life
cycle of standardised technology. A second observation is to overcome the
limitations of existing literature regarding the analysis of the dynamics aspect as a
significant component of the standardisation process. Therefore, the thesis seeks to
develop theoretical explanations and to reach practical goals. The research is
embedded in the interdisciplinary context of SST, organisational studies, and IT
systems engineering. Driven by practical goals and a long professional experience in
the automotive industry, my aim is to investigate the evolution of standardised portal
technology, thus filling a gap in the research of the dynamics of ICT innovations.
1.2.1 Standards and standardisation
In an increasingly globalised world, corporations are focusing on closer collaboration
within supply chains. As a result, development processes tend to become
increasingly complex (Hanseth & Braa, 2000). Internet-based business portals are a
good example of such an increasingly networked corporate world where e-business
standards aim to ensure interoperability between heterogeneous IT systems.
Frequently, such portals have been initiated by large buyers to improve interaction
with their network of suppliers. Examples include General Electric's Trading Process
Network and Boeing's PART marketplace (Turban et ah, 2000). Other large user
organisations have emerged as private consortia aiming to develop and implement de
facto standards.
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The major initial idea was to investigate ICT standards that underpin the emergence
and diffusion of IONSs. From both an academic and a practical point of view,
standards seemed to be a highly relevant topic. This view was reinforced through
participation at the 3rd IEEE Conference on 'Standardization and Innovation in
Information Technology' (SIIT) in 2003. Standards are a fundamental part of ICT,
and are also playing a crucial yet dramatically underestimated role in daily life.
Moreover, standards have opened up the field of technology and have thus enabled
further innovation. Hawkins (1995) even claimed that throughout human history, the
invention and application of technology has been accompanied by the development
of standards.
Standards and standardisation are at least as complex in their own way as the
technology to which they refer (Hawkins, 1995: 1). For the automotive industry,
standardisation and harmonisation of infrastructures became ofmajor importance in
order to achieve the goal of a "networked industry". Standards and standardisation
are at least as complex in their own way as the technology to which they relate
(Hawkins, 1995: 1). For the automotive industry, standardisation and harmonisation
of infrastructures became ofmajor importance in order to achieve the proclaimed
goal of becoming a "networked industry". Hence, the process of standardisation is an
integral part of networked organisations. Therefore, I subsequently started to study
ICT standards and standardisation related to IONSs, and tried to link it to the vast
array of existing socio-economic literature and their related analytical frameworks.
Within this context, a definition of a standard and of the standardisation process is
necessary to put the study in the right perspective. First, in a broad sense, a standard
can be defined as "a set ofspecifications to which all elements ofproduct, processes,
formats, or procedures under its jurisdiction must conform " (Tassey, 2000: 588).
David and Steinmueller (1994) differentiate between four categories of standards:
reference standards, minimum quality standards, technical interface design standards,
and compatibility standards. This study focuses on the latter category, i.e. standards
that "assure the user that a component or sub-system can successfully be
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incorporated and be 'inter-operable' with other constituents ofa large system of
closely specified inputs and outputs" (David & Steinmueller, 1994: 218).
Compatibility standards are addressed in relation to ICT as crucial enablers of
information exchange between components within a particular system or between
inter-organisational information systems.
Second, the standardisation process itself - the creation of a standard - includes the
activity to establish and record a limited set of solutions to actual problems directed
at the benefits for parties involved, balancing their interests and to be expected to be
used over a certain period of time (De Vries, 2003), deliberately accepted by those
parties having common interests based upon a quantifiable metric and influencing
their behaviour and activities by permitting a common interchange (Cargill, 1989).
Therefore, the development and implementation of compatibility standards does not
only technically define a method of interoperation between the different components
in a network, but most importantly represents a proposal for the future of complex
socio-technical systems, i.e., the shape of inter-organisational networks. According
to Graham et al. (1995), the standardisation process also represents an attempt to
align interests, business practices and expectations of an array ofpeople with an
interest to develop and use the system to be standardised. Therefore, standardisation
is not only about providing workable solutions but, most importantly, it refers to
articulating and aligning expectations and interests (Williams, 1997).
As a result of these deliberations, during the course of the research its focus shifted
from ICT standards to the standardisation process and its key actors who are situated
in an arena of standardisation with different intertwined levels of analysis. The
standardisation process turned out to be a process of intra- and inter-organisational
alignment, shaped by the socio-technical dynamics of an ICT innovation.
1.2.2 Analytical frameworks to explain the standardisation process
A number of different analytical frameworks have been used in the existing
standardisation literature to address the development and, less frequently, the
implementation and use of standards. Thompson (1954) saw standards from an
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engineering point of view. Standard setting was seen as neutral, and the actors were
seen as "interest free" engineers who collaborate in order to develop the best
technical solution to a technical problem. In contrast, researchers such as Farrell and
Saloner (1985, 1988) focused on a simple interest model where standard setting was
seen as a game of power and dominance between the participants. The framework
usually attempts to model the interplay between the interests of the actors (Farrell &
Saloner, 1985, 1988; Cohen, 2003; Park, 2003).
The problem with these frameworks is the strong economic focus. Therefore, other
researchers have used more sociologically-oriented frameworks to uncover the
interactions between the social actors involved in the standard development. One
example is the Social Shaping of Technology (SST).
The theory of SST conceptualises technology in general and standardisation in
particular, as being shaped by an array of factors and actors. It aims to unveil the
interactions between them and the way in which they shape the dynamics of a
standardisation process and the respective outcomes (Jakobs et ah, 1998). There are a
number of SST empirical studies and analytical frameworks available; for example,
the social shaping model of standard setting by Schmidt and Werle (1998). Standard
setting is conceptualised as an actor network, and the focus of the analysis is on
mapping the different relevant groups involved in the process (Schmidt & Werle,
1998).
Another theory investigating emerging standards is the Actor-Network Theory
(ANT). The various interests of the actors involved are seen as negotiated constructs,
forged in the process of alliance building. The actors involved (which, according to
ANT, include humans as well as non-humans) try to translate their interests into the
standard. Hence, the outcome of standardisation is seen as the result of a negotiation
process. The process of technological change and its outcomes, and in particular the
development of standards, is seen as locally constructed, negotiable and contingent.
However, the framework has difficulties in accounting for the influence of prior
history, and in taking for granted relations, routines and the broader context and
structures (Graham et ah, 1995; Spinardi et ah, 1996; Monteiro & Hanseth, 1995).
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In the area of standardisation, the 'development arena' is a concept that has emerged
to theorise these interactions (Jorgensen & Sorensen, 1999). The development arena
concept has enabled a multi-level analysis that encompasses the interactions between
various actor networks involved in standards development (Williams & Edge, 1996;
Sorensen & Williams, 2002; Jorgensen & Sorensen, 2002; Hwang, 2003).The
development arena is a re-conceptualisation of the social shaping approach. The
debates around the influence of the role of action versus structure, and that of
particular actors, communities and the broader social milieu shaping technological
innovation have provoked a rethinking of the social shaping perspective to better
cover the complex interactions between a wide range of players in innovation, and
across diverse settings (Sorensen & Williams, 2002).
Though often portrayed as a narrow technical matter, harmonisation and
standardisation, especially in the realm of inter-organisational collaboration via
standardised portal technology, are complex social processes shaped by an array of
factors and embodying social relationships between the actors (Graham et al 1995;
Egyedi 1996; Jakobs 2000, Egyedi &Loeffen, 2002). In this study not only are ICT
standards ensuring interoperability of particular interest, but so too are "best practice'
standards incorporated in standard packaged solutions ofweb-based platforms such
as portals (these are known as 'best practice industry standards'). As B2B e-
commerce standards embody models of business processes they become process
standards, extending beyond dyadic transactions into a choreographing of the
interaction between the systems of business partners.
However, shortcomings were identified with regard to integrating multiple aspects of
standardisation (Graham et al., 1995; Monteiro & Hanseth, 1995) such as the
analysis of the entire standardisation life cycle. Many studies employ a static
perspective and address the development process in isolation from the context of
standards use. The challenge in fully analysing the standardisation process is to
produce an adequate evolutionary account of the complex dynamics surrounding the
entire life cycle of a standard.
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SST-oriented theories and studies guided my research to unveil the interaction
between the socio-economic factors that shape the standardisation process.
Nevertheless, I still had to take into account the specific context within which the
process took place (i.e., the fact that the case was based in the automotive industry
which has long been characterised by mounting pressure for collaboration and cost
reductions). The context turned out to be important in two ways: first, at the
company level where political issues were surrounding the standardisation process,
the nature of the technology and the social characteristics of the context within which
the standardised technology was developed and implemented. Secondly, at the
industry level within which the organisations investigated were embedded and linked
through their supply chains or as IT service providers or vendors.
The setting of the case seemed to comprise two levels: the company and, secondly,
the industry level where actors were driving the dynamics of the standardised
technology. The case was initially located at the micro (company) level. However,
the company was embedded into the industry context, the macro world. The portal
technology represents the bridge between these worlds in a standardised way. From
an IT vendor's or a technology provider's perspective, linking different actor worlds
simplifies the need to offer a global solution. In practice, global solutions do not
capture all local needs. There is no "one size fits all" solution. Consequently,
tensions occur when global solutions are implemented in local environments.
Analysing socio-economic studies in standardisation, and particularly spaces or
locales ofwhich ICT innovations were part, I frequently came across the dichotomy
of the 'micro' - 'macro' aspect of different theories. One of the strengths ofANT is
its ability to address the dynamics of actor-driven scenarios in a micro environment;
however, history and context are not considered. At the macro level, context and
history-based studies included the broader meso aspect, but were limited to capture
only key participants and the negotiation of their interests.
I felt that the diversity of the subject required an inter-disciplinary research approach,
to understand the economic, social and technical aspects of the process. Hence, a
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literature review was conducted, with a focus on existing works in the sociology of
technology and inter-organisational networks and systems, organisational studies,
and economics and sociology of standardisation.
1.2.3 Unique access to a large project and personal expertise
This study is the result ofmore than six years of research in the area of e-business,
and particularly in standards and standardisation. The longitudinal and contextual
single-case study approach was chosen as it turned out to be an exceptionally
detailed case with lots of information. During the project, I occupied a dual role as
both actor and a participant observer. This had its benefits as well as its downsides.
On the one hand, it offered a unique chance to get access to rich and valuable
information and data. On the other hand, as an actor I was part of the system which
framed my writing. For example, it was difficult to track some of the information
sources. I cited sources wherever it was possible but had to carefully interrogate my
commitment and position.
In addition, the long history of personal professional experience acquired in several
large organisations as well as in management and IT consulting shaped a particular
viewpoint. Since 1997, my expertise gained in procurement and logistics was
complemented by electronic commerce and electronic business projects in various
companies and industries. In most of these projects, standards and standardisation
turned out to be an issue. Furthermore, standardisation issues occurred regardless of
the life cycle phase the standard was in1.
Within a standardised technology's life cycle, phases of stability and instability
alternate. Moreover, interactions between the different phases can be observed, and
different levels of standard dynamics can be identified. The characteristics of the
context of use can be reflected in the approach to standard setting. For example, the
development of standards is significantly influenced by the company-internal context
of their use. It is a fact that a standard is not a static artefact but subject to change is
'A standard's life cycle can be characterised by different standardisation phases, starting with
standards strategy, development, the implementation and use of a standard. During all phases, a
standard changes, either it is developed further, e.g. in terms ofnew versions, appropriation, etc. or it
is replaced by other standards (Williams et al., 2004).
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termed 'dynamics of standardisation'. This dynamics is influenced and challenged by
different groups of actors in the different standardisation environments.
1.2.4 Research questions
The Internet accelerated the diffusion of IONS, particularly electronic platforms such
as portals to support the entire supply chain. Those platforms allow for
communication and collaboration between organisations. However, to communicate
and collaborate seamlessly, interoperability and harmonisation of systems are
absolutely essential. Consequently, e-business standards and standardisation are part
of every inter-organisational project and appear to bear a peculiar dynamic with
major effects on the outcome of the project. Therefore, the thesis attempts to expand
the understanding of the socio-technical dynamics patterning both the decision
making and the outcomes of complex ICT innovation projects. It seeks to overcome
the shortcomings of the existing body of social and economic research on inter-
organisational standardisation.
To address the theoretical and practical goals of the study the following research
questions were formulated:
1. What are the factors that shape the emergence of an inter-
organisational portal strategy?
2. What causes the dynamics in developing and implementing a
standardised supplier portal?
3. How do these dynamics pattern the outcomes? And how does local
change take part in the wider context of the sector?
Those research questions initiated the study but changed slightly during the research
towards a more sophisticated wording. In addition, the review of existing literature of
different disciplines gave me a better understanding of the theoretical background.
The subject under study itself did not change, and neither did the underlying meaning
of the research questions. However, I gradually realised that the course of the
research took a direction different from the one originally intended. At a certain point
in time, the case revealed a dimension that I had not taken into consideration when I
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had started the study. First, there are the complex socio-technical setting and the
context of the case, including the standardisation effort with an array of companies
involved, supply chain relationships, a number of existing technologies in place,
complex relations between technology supply and user organisations, and the
complexities of inter-departmental and intra-organisational politics.
Secondly, in the very beginning I was not aware of the huge effects the socio-
technical dynamics of the unfolding standardised portal technology would have on its
outcome. The dynamics shaped and moderated the processes of its entire life cycle,
its evolution and the outcomes of the project. Finally, the complexity of the case
forced me to rethink theoretical frameworks of the different strands of existing
literature that I had reviewed, and in the end I started to develop a new framework
that helped me to present a simplified - yet still complex - picture of the world I
found in practice. Additionally, it helped me to identify the different levels where
socio-technical dynamics occurred and showed clearly that those levels are tightly
intertwined. The Multi-level Space of Innovation Dynamics (MSID) framework
developed can be seen as a theoretical contribution to research.
1.3 Research setting and approach
The case presented is an interdisciplinary and longitudinal study in the automotive
sector comprising a combination of social, technological and economic theories. The
different strands of research are linked together in order to achieve a deeper
understanding of the dynamics of standards development and implementation of
inter-organisational networks and systems.
Both external and internal triggers have driven car manufacturers to use standardised
Internet technology to collaborate with component suppliers. Cost considerations led
to scalable and consistent IT infrastructures with global access to all key
infrastructure components, and to the reuse of technology across multiple projects
and the replication of common solutions worldwide. Furthermore, the reduction
of risks associated with the use of legacy technology (e.g. no updates available) and
system crashes (out time) was also very much in the focus. The integration of all
portal activities worldwide into one single portal was intended to reduce multiple
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sign-on as well as redundant data entries. Integration and the sharing of internal and
external applications were seen as improving supply-network efficiency through
system-driven workflows and alerts. Another goal was to provide a single user
interface to the supplier community, and to gain access to a wider number of
suppliers through the use of a standardised technology with the benefit of a shared
marketplace infrastructure.
The automotive industry is a very interesting sector to look at. Typically,
manufacturers here react to market pressure at an early stage, and can therefore be
seen as a trend-setter in the manufacturing industry. The automotive industry is
reshaped by tremendous technological changes, by enormous market pressure
(McKinsey, 2003), and by extreme cost cutting. Constantly changing market
requirements redefine the relations between original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs) and their suppliers. The traditional arms-length relationship has been
replaced by ever tighter collaboration.
In this increasingly globalised world, corporations are focusing on closer
collaboration within supply chains and, subsequently, global processes have tended
to become increasingly complex (Hanseth & Braa, 2000). According to Hanseth and
Braa (2000), "as corporations become more global, they become more integrated
with each other and with distant local contexts" (ibid: 50). This exactly describes the
dichotomy. On the one hand, organisations aim for seamless global collaboration, but
on the other hand the same organisations struggle to accept the global approach and
ultimately adopt their existing local environment to a global solution.
Hence studies from a socio-technical perspective on the dynamics of ICT innovations
are required to shed light on all aspects and processes projects that aim to ensure
inter-organisational collaboration. Top managers and project managers of large-scale
projects need a better understanding of the interplay between the technical and the
social components, and to adequately do their project planning. For example, longer
project times should be planned in order to permit alignment of actors' needs (e.g.
functionality) or to allow for a better understanding of the management of expertise
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in terms of project staffing. Finally, project managers can interpret why original
project goals might gradually move to slightly different ones or even to unexpected
outcomes.
The review of existing literature was shaped by an interdisciplinary approach,
integrating different strands of theory. A first overview of SST and organisational
studies literature pointed to two basic concepts: Jorgensen's (1999) concept of 'arena
of development' and the 'firm-in-sector' approach of Whipp and Clark (1986). Due
to the course of the intellectual journey outlined above, these concepts were
complemented by a third one: Ciborra et al.'s (2000) concept of drift. As this
research also intends to contribute to theory, the idea emerged to overcome the
shortcomings of the individual concepts as well as to explain the dynamics aspect by
integrating established frameworks discussed in literature in order to build a new
theoretical framework.
The theoretical framework developed applies the SST perspective to an analysis of
the entire standardisation life cycle. This life cycle is characterised by a high
complexity of the socio-technical setting, with a diversity of initiatives, and a variety
of economic and social factors. The MSID framework attempts to analyse the
dynamics of standardisation taking into account both the interaction between the
actors involved and the context within which they operate. It consists of two
components, the arena of standardisation and the dynamics within the arena. The
former analyses the actors involved at two levels, the project level and the sector
level. The latter is understood as a process of change resulting from the interactions
of the actors across three dimensions: the context in which they operate the networks
into which they are embedded, and the politics that characterise their actions. The
framework seeks to shed light on the different stages of standardisation and on the
issues of standardisation in the context of inter-organisational process integration.
The framework developed has been applied to a longitudinal large-scale single case
study including the planning, the development and the implementation of a
standardised portal in the automotive industry. The application of the model is
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intended to illustrate the way in which the abstract concepts of the model can be
grounded in practice.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
The structure of the thesis shown in figure 1 is based on the research objectives and
the research questions.
© !!© Theoretical Background ®
Intro¬
duction
■ Sociology of Technology
1 Organisational studies
1 Economics and Sociology
of Standardisation



















Figure 1 Overview of the PhD thesis
As illustrated in figure 1, the thesis will be subdivided into eight chapters. The first
chapter 'introduction and motivation' defines the scope of the thesis and the research
objectives.
The second chapter addresses the relevant theoretical background which comprises
SST literature, studies of the sociology of technology and of IONSs, organisational
studies and the economics and sociology of standards. Subsequently, in the third
chapter the methodology that guided the research is described, and the basics of a
new analytical model are suggested.
The next three chapters describe the case study in detail. Chapter four is laying out
the context into which the case study is embedded. In chapter five, the pre-project
phase that saw the emergence of the portal strategy is outlined, followed by a
discussion of the development and the implementation of the standardised supplier
portal, which is given in chapter six.
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In chapter seven the analytical model is developed. It is based on the ideas outlined
in the 'methodology' chapter and applied to the case. Subsequently, the research
findings are analysed. Finally, in the last chapter the findings of the study are
reflected upon, theories used and limitations of the research design are identified. A
list of areas of further research concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews a range of existing literature relevant to the study. The
relationship between technology and organisation and the associated negotiations can
be conceptualised in many ways. Mainstream literature ofManagement of
Technology underpins the widely shared belief that IT is the crucial factor of
organisational transformations. However, this is not sufficient to explain
transformations and their outcome because there is a need to exactly analyse how
IONS shape, enable and constrain organisational changes (Monteiro, 2000).
The theoretical background covers existing literature from different strands of
research in order to ensure the necessary multidisciplinary approach. This chapter is
structured as follows. In the next section, two key strands in Sociology of
Technology analysing the 'Technology - Sociology' relationship are briefly
presented: the concepts of Social Shaping of Technology (SST) and Actor Network
Theory (ANT). The subsequent section about organisational studies looks at research
in technological innovations and work organisations, and how technological change
meets organisational processes and politics. The sociology of standardisation section
starts with existing research on standardisation, followed by a definition and
taxonomy of standards by the standard setting and then identifies the shortcomings of
existing research. In the last section, socio-economic research on IONS is reviewed.
Based on business relationships, an overview of IONS is given and the role of portals
as IONS is discussed. The final subsection concludes this theoretical background
chapter with a discussion of standardisation issues of IONS.
2.2 Sociology of Technology
2.2.1 Social Shaping of Technology
The Social Shaping of Technology (SST) perspective taken in this thesis emerged
from a shift in social and economic research on technology that explores and
analyses both the content of technologies and the processes of innovation
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(MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985; Bijker & Law, 1992; Williams, 2004). During the
1980s, the study of technology was undergoing an expansion and transformation: the
relation of technology and society was reconsidered and the conventional assumption
that technological change is subject to a purely technical logic or economic
imperative was argued (Dierkes & Hoffmann, 1992: 9).
9 • • • •
SST has emerged through a critique of the dominant rhetoric of technological
determinism which portrayed technology as a vehicle for achieving organisational
change, without taking into consideration the difficulties in implementing
technologies, as well as their frequent failures to deliver predicted and desired
outcomes. More precisely, technological determinism is characterised by the notion
that (1) the nature of technologies and the direction of change is without problems
and pre-determined and (2) that technology has a determinate 'impact' on work and
economic life and the entire society. Consequently, technological change is
responsible for social and organisational change (Williams & Edge, 1996: 868).
Mainstream literature ofmanagement of organisations or of technology tends to take
technology for granted and as an instrument precisely defined (Clausen & Koch,
1999). In contrast, SST studies focus on the choice and decisions, in defining
features of the technology as a process, 'spanning occasions and spaces' (Clausen &
Williams, 1994; Clausen & Koch, 1999). SST includes different approaches and
concepts that attempt to demonstrate and analyse the political, economic and cultural
interests and values that influence the direction of technological change (Russell &
Williams, 2002; Sorensen, 2002).
In this context, MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985) pointed out that, "[technology has
at least three different layers ofmeaning: if refers to physical objects and artefacts
embracing material and non-material components, to systemized and tacit
knowledge, and to activities and processes" (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985: 3-4;
Dierkes & Hoffmann, 1992). The concept of'choices' is central to SST. These are
not necessarily conscious choices, though; they are inherent in both the design of
2 Williams and Edge (1996) reviewed some of the differences within this broad church, for example
ANT and social construction of technology (SCOT). It is not the primary goal of this thesis to explore
the different claims of these various schools.
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individual artefacts and systems, and in the direction or trajectory of innovation
programmes (Williams & Edge, 1996: 866). Those choices occur at every stage
during the development and use of a technology or a standard; a number of technical
choices are available to the actors involved. The way in which the stabilisation
process occurs through interest alignment and translation, and the gradual limitation
of the technology's interpretative flexibility until it reaches the point of closure
depends on the particular choices that actors make during negotiations. Such choices
depend on a number of social, technical, economic, organisational and political
factors. SST studies aim to unveil the interactions between these factors, the way in
which they shape the technology and their outcomes on the innovations processes
(Jakobs et ah, 1998; Williams & Edge, 1996).
Technology does not emerge in a pre-determined way; different routes are available
and might lead to different technological outcomes with different implications for
individuals or the society (Williams & Edge, 1996). Thus, SST research investigates
the ways in which social, institutional, economic and cultural factors have shaped (1)
the direction and the rate of innovation, (2) the form of technological artefacts and
practices and (3) the outcome of technological change (Williams & Edge, 1996:
868). Researchers in the SST field argue differently when analysing social influences
over different technological routes taken and their respective impacts in terms of two
sets of questions:
(1) The negotiability of technology and the respective 'technological' and
'societal' outcome (Cronberg, 1992), and
(2) Questions about irreversibility; the extent and the way in which choices may
be foreclosed (Collingridge, 1992; Callon, 1993). Certain new technologies
may displace established ones or 'lock-in' to established solutions (David,
1975; Arthur, 1989; Cowan, 1992). SST also points to closure, the way in
which innovations become stabilised (Pinch & Bijker, 1984), or the
possibility to reverse earlier choices (Latour, 1988), (Williams & Edge, 1996:
867).
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As illustrated in the paragraphs before, different approaches have influenced SST.
These approaches stressed that both form and content of technology are important
and require social analysis (Williams & Edge, 1996: 873).
(1) They focus on, and discuss from different angles, the problems of the
innovation process. It is claimed that innovation is a contradictory and
uncertain process not just about the rational-technical problem-solving, but
also including economic and political processes. Alliances of interest are built
up between potential users and suppliers around certain visions of unrealised
technologies. Examples of frameworks have been described as building of
socio-technical systems (Hughes, 1983), socio-technical constituencies
(Molina, 1989), or socio-technical ensembles (Bijker, 1993, 1995), or as
creating and mobilising an actor network (Law & Callon, 1992) (Williams &
Edge, 1996: 873).
(2) The innovation process is typically characterised by imperfect knowledge and
bounded rationality (ibid). Technological success is not depending
exclusively on money but also on the flow of information between experts
and other groups who have differing perspectives and knowledge bases that
are needed to create new technologies (Fincham et al., 1995). To enrol other
actors such as competing suppliers, for example, can cause problems and has
to be balanced between cooperation and competition (e.g. Howells & Hine,
1993). It is also claimed that the shaping process starts with the early stages
of research and development which consequently leads to the fact that
inventions at least are partially an unpredictable process (Williams & Edge,
1996: 873-874).
One of the important notions of SST is the idea that technologies are situated in an
organisational environment. In this micro setting, technology is directly shaped by
the actors involved as well as by the players situated on the meso level, such as the
sector. SST claims that:
20
■ Technology is produced and used in particular social contexts, and the
processes of technological change are often social rather than simply driven
by technology
■ Technology consists of an immediate setting of knowledge, use practices,
skills, meanings and values, problems and purposes
■ Technology often operates in socio-technical systems or configurations
■ Technological change is always part of a socio-technical transformation
which means that technology and social arrangements are co-produced in the
same process (Russell & Williams, 2002: 48).
A distinction in terms of features and categories and their applicability in
organisations is useful in order to differentiate the deployment of technology that is
situated in different organisational environments and to avoid 'over-generalisation'.
Fleck (1988) distinguishes categories of discrete, component, system and
configurational technologies. This kind of distinction facilitates an analysis in
identifying differences, for example between specific systemic or configurational
applications that is of importance when studying complex technologies such as
portals.
Strongly related to the socially situated notion of technology as systems or
configurations is the study of appropriation and use of technological innovations
when these systems or configurations have been implemented in organisations and
are used in the daily work. However, the SST research was simultaneously inspired
by the early accounts ofActor Network Theory (ANT).
2.2.2 Actor network theory
Another analytical tool is the Actor Network Theory (ANT). ANT is rooted in the
interdisciplinary field of science and technology studies (STS) (Monteiro, 2000) and
was developed by Callon, 1993; Latour, 1991; Law, 1991; and Akrich, 1992. ANT is
an approach to overcome the shortcomings ofmodern social science. Core elements
of early ANT accounts include strategies and actions of a central actor, a system
builder or a heterogeneous engineer (Russell & Williams, 2002). Those central actors
"attempt to marshal resources necessaryfor a project, particularly by enrolling
other actors - locking them into appropriate roles - and appropriating the right to
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speakfor them " (ibid: 41). An actor network is an emerging and increasingly
stabilised network consisting and linking both technical and non-technical elements
(Monteiro, 2000). It takes shape by negotiation of the interests of involved actors.
Heterogeneous in nature, an actor network is free of hierarchies and has developed a
particular vocabulary to describe the negotiation processes (Russell & Williams,
2002; Monteiro, 2000).
One of the strengths ofANT is its ability to analyse the dynamics of actor-driven
scenarios. In this respect, Callon's concept of irreversibility of an aligned network
describes the strengths of competing inscriptions in terms of the durability of an actor
network (ibid). Within ANT, the 'black boxing' perspective impliess to neglect to
distinguish a priori between small and large networks. Consequently, there is no
distinction between micro, meso and macro level of analysis: ANT offers one
uniform framework regardless of the unit of analysis by "providing a uniform
framework in connecting the local and the global to identify the local in the global
and vice versa" (Monteiro, 2000: 81). Analytically, it is difficult to apply the ANT
framework to examine case studies related to the 'local-global' discussion is the
approach ofANT to use micro structures (for example an R&D laboratory) due to
the fact that ANT extrapolates micro structures to macro environments. This
theoretical approach has been criticised for its one-way bottom-up modelling of
society (Russell & Williams, 1988:1), failing to acknowledge that not every macro
environment can be explained by micro processes.
In their TSR2 study, Callon and Law (1991) have acknowledged this shortcoming
and attempted to bridge the gap between the micro and macro levels using an actor-
network template. Although the template vocabulary includes concepts such as
'global' and 'local' network and the 'obligatory point passage' linking them, it does
not incorporate the actors' decision-making processes. Yet, these processes are often
shaped by the pre-existing history and the context into which the networks are
embedded (Russell & Williams, 1988). Callon and Law (1991) also suggest that the
network itself can be expanded unlimitedly.
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ANT has been increasingly used by IS researchers to examine IS in a case study
setting (for example Graham et ah, 1995; Bowker et ah, 1996; Hanseth et ah, 1997;
Monteiro & Hepso, 2000; Fomin, 2001). However, it has been recognised that
information infrastructures consist of both local and global characteristics (Monteiro,
2000). Information infrastructures consist at the same time ofmicro constructs such
as detailed formats or patterns of local use, and ofmacro aspects such as the existing
infrastructure or the fact that it is cutting across local contexts (Monteiro, 2000: 80).
Consequently, flexibility in the granularity of analysis is required to describe and
analyse information infrastructure (ibid).
In summary, ANT accounts have been helpful in uncovering the role that micro
social processes play in shaping specific technologies. However, this focus meant
that ANT studies have been trying to explain society by extrapolating from micro-
processes, and have rejected work that deals with broader social structures (Russell
& Williams, 1988:1). Likewise, these studies have neglected pre-existing history and
context, which they see as emerging from the actions of actors within the network.
To address these shortcomings we argue that a new theoretical framework is needed.
This new framework builds upon ANT, while also incorporating concepts of the
broader SST research and organisational studies in order to analyse the case at hand
by integrating the local and the global level, the pre-existing history as well as the
industrial context (see section 3.3.2).
The micro - meso aspect had been the focus of attention and led to developments in
Social and Technology Studies (STS).
2.2.3 Developments in Social and Technology Studies (STS)
The locus of technology innovation - the 'micro' - 'meso' - has received a much
attention in recent social studies of technology. For example, Clausen and Koch
(1999) are talking about social spaces and a complex array of players with different
perspectives and resources to describe important locations of transformation. Clausen
and Koch (1999), in their study of the social shaping ofERP systems in Danish
manufacturing, examine the role of "spaces and occasions" in technological
transformation of IT. From an SST perspective, they focus on decisions and choices
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that have to be made to shape technology. Accordingly, decisions and choices are
made through negotiations among diverse and heterogeneous players who are
involved in the relevant social processes.
However, Clausen and Koch claim that a comprehension of technological choice as
being 'social' is not enough. There is a need for understanding how, where, when
and under what circumstances the choice is taking place (Clausen & Koch, 1999:
463-464). Consequently, the authors attempt to identify contexts and frameworks as
spaces or occasions within which a technology is negotiated and choices are made.
Additionally, Clausen and Koch also emphasise the political character of these
negotiations as the heterogeneous players involved pursue diverse interests.
Therefore, they argue that a space for shaping implies a social context, where socio-
technical ensembles can be addressed and politicised (Clausen & Koch, 1999: 465).
By examining the social choices involved in the development and transformation of
ERP systems in the Danish context, Clausen and Koch identify and examine three
spaces and occasions that emerge as important in terms of shaping of the technology.
These also reflect different occasions in the transformation of IT systems. Their
analysis showed very useful results regarding actors' strategies, the instability or
stability of their relations as well as the dynamics of the market in relation to the
process of shaping of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems (Clausen &
Koch, 1999:479-480).
One instance of the 'SST-ANT' dialogue is the concept of the 'arena' developed by
Jorgensen (1999) that is applied as part of the framework developed in the thesis (see
chapter 3). The overarching concept of "development arena" proposed by Jorgensen
and Sorensen (1999) aims to capture key participants and features of particular
contexts of innovation. This concept of a special innovation development space is
characterised by a population of actors and artefacts, and by the relationships
between them. As the 'arena of development' is part of the framework, a more
detailed description is available in section 3.4.1.
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After the review of SST and ANT, another strand of existing research -
organisational studies is briefly presented.
2.3 Organisational Studies
Parallel discussions within organisational theories led to an array of organisational
studies seeking to analyse the technology - organisation relationship more
specifically. In the context of ICT, Inter-Organisational Networks and Systems
(IONS), together with the Internet, have emerged as perhaps the key technological
developments of the twentieth century (McLoughlin, 1999). In this context, the
account of the broader term of IONS has gained importance as it comprises not only
the technological but also the socio-political aspects. Those socio-technical
ensembles or socio-technical configurations (Bijker, 1993) are shaping intra- and
inter-organisational processes of companies, and are understood as 'electronic
mediation of human interaction and the embodiment of business communication and
activity in the realms of cyberspace' (McLoughlin, 1999: 1). Moreover, it has to be
recognised that IONS increasingly underpin the transformation of organisations
(ibid) and enable, for example, concepts such as 'lean production' (Womack et al.,
1990) or 'business process reengineering' (BPR) (Hammer & Champy, 1993) and
'business network redesign' (Short & Venkatraman, 1992). Portals are IONSs and
technological innovations that enable organisations to mediate their relationships
with business partners electronically. Accordingly, those work organisations extend
their boundaries with the help of technological innovations and are part of larger
networks.
2.3.1 Technological innovation and work organisation
The term 'technological innovation' has been defined in many different ways (Roy,
1986; McLoughlin & Harris, 1997), and studies of innovation have focused on
different levels of analysis (Slappendel, 1996) depending on the school of thought
and the purpose of the analyst. Burns and Stalker (1961), for example, understood
innovation or invention, and new technology-based product or production processes
synonymously (Burns & Stalker, 1961). Economists or innovation theorists, such as
the frequently quoted Freeman (1982), have defined technological innovations as an
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event when the innovation is commercially applied in a new process or product
(McLoughlin & Harris, 1997).
Technological innovations are inextricably intertwined with the relationship between
The new technology' and its adoption in organisations or, more precisely, the nature
of the process of technological innovation and the organisational change which is
related to the new technology. The attempt to review and develop an analytical
understanding of the relationship between technology and organisation has to
struggle with the issue of the independent influence technology has in shaping
organisational behaviour and the organisational outcomes of technological change
(McLoughlin, 1999: 4).
Depending on the school of thought (i.e., organisational theory, innovation studies,
evolutionary economics or the social shaping of technology, etc.), topics surrounding
innovations, particularly the ways of evaluating the interaction between technology
and organisations, are framed and understood differently (McLoughlin, 1999).
However, each of these concepts has its strengths and weaknesses in framing the
relationship 'technology-organisation'. The common topic in most of the literature,
especially amongst sociologists of technology, is the 'overriding concern' of
'technological determinism'. Therefore, the critique of technological determinism
can be seen as the starting point to re-define technology in the sense of including the
social context and the effects technology has on organisations and outcome during
the adoption.
However, Orlikowski (1992), with an ANT-centred approach, found that research on
how to model the relationship between technology and organisation remains
'ambiguous and conflicting'. Furthermore, she noted that "the divergent definitions
an opposing perspective associated with technological research have limited the
understanding ofhow technology interacts with organisations. What is needed is a
reconstruction ofthe concept oftechnology, which fundamentally re-examines the
current notion of technology and its role in organisations" (Orlikowski, 1992: 398).
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Strongly related to the relationship between technology and organisations is the area
of organisational politics and processes.
2.3.2 Organisational politics and processes
Organisational politics and the processual understanding of organisations
Organisational politics and a processual understanding of socio-technical innovations
started when Simon (1957) criticised normative management for its perfect and
rationalistic view and suggested to replace the classical theory by a model of
bounded rationality which begins to emerge when situations are examined involving
decision making under uncertainty and imperfect competition (Simon, 1978).
The political dimension is understood as another driver of change. In adopting this
perspective, change is viewed as a complex dynamic process shaped by powerful
conditions, by the nature of the change programme and by the history and context
within which change takes place (e.g. Burns & Stalker, 1961; Clausen & Koch,
1999). Burns and Stalker (1961) introduced the concept of structure and
organisational politics. Their innovation research, "The Management of Innovation"
(1961), was a study of large established Scottish firms. In their study of 20 British
firms operating in the electronics and fibre industries, Burns and Stalker (1961) have
found that a particular type of "organic" organisation outperformed the mechanistic
type's capacity to innovate. In contrast, mechanistic organisations are characterised
by formalisation, job specialisation, hierarchy, and top down communication.
Whipp and Clark (1986) introduced the notion of the 'organisational repertoire'. This
consists of the company-specific knowledge to coordinate everyday activities,
activities associated with change and activities undertaken in response to special
situations (Clark, 1987; Edwards, 2000: 451). Depending on the situation, an
organisation will adopt differing 'poses'. For example, when an organisation orients
its adaptive capability towards future problems, it is likely that this organisation will
adopt an innovation pose in conjunction with its basic operating pose (Clark &
Staunton, 1989: 185). The introduction of an innovative product or process may
transform the existing basic operational pose of the repertoire. However, change in
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the repertoire through innovation is uncertain and is not guaranteed (Edwards, 2000).
New practices may be compromised due to resistance, or may be problematic
because of the absence of necessary knowledge. Consequently, transformational
change is dependent on showing how the existing features of the repertoire expressed
through a particular operational pose embedded in the organisations social and
economic context provides the means to undertake these new activities (ibid: 452).
Thus, it depends on how an organisation can deal with uncertainty, which skills,
normative frameworks and knowledge exist, and to which extent innovation is
unpacked. 'Organisational innovation and the transformation reflect the
appropriation of an innovation 'template'. The notion of template is used to
incorporate a special case of situated practice (ibid). Clark and Staunton (1989)
understood those templates as the embodied knowledge of a company. They are
playing a significant role in the evolution of innovations as dynamic configurations
dealing with the appropriation of administrative innovations (Clark, 1996).
In the context of a dynamic interactive process perspective, Clark (1987) moved
away from the technical rationalistic model ofmoment to a processual view and
noted that individuals are influenced by pre-existing structures which empower them
to interpret events in the future. He further stated that structure and agency presumes
that individuals learn a collective repertoire of cognitions, normative frameworks and
behavioural patterns (Clark & Staunton, 1989). In this context, innovation is
understood as a reflection of continuity and a modification of the rules and resources
that mediate the outcome of human conduct in an organisational setting (Edwards,
2000). Hence, the innovation process represents the intersection of structures of
signification, legitimacy and domination which are part of a network and social
relations within organisations. These, in turn, are also part of the environment of a
historical and cultural system, as well as part of a broader political context (Jones,
1997: 17).
As a response to Fordist and Post-Fordist models of technological and organisational
change, Child (1972) offered an alternative framework including the notion of
strategic choice (McLoughlin & Harris, 1997). Child linked an actor-centred account
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with the context in order to better understand organisations decisions. The
framework highlighted the key role that is played by organisational politics and
different actors' interests in shaping the organisational outcome of technological
change. External factors were regarded not as influencing, but rather as contextual
referents for decision makers (McLoughlin & Harris, 1997: 9). Apart from Child,
other researchers such as Wilkinson (1983), Boddy and Buchanan (1983) or Dawson
(1994) conceptualised technological change as a process.
However, this approach has been criticised insofar as the process perspective is
preoccupied with processes. It therefore separates the technical-organisational
change issues from the broader structural context and, as a consequence, outcomes
tend to be explained in highly localised 'idiosyncratic' terms (e.g. Reed, 1985;
McLoughlin & Harris, 1997: 10). The management of change driven by
technological innovations thus plays a key role within organisational studies.
The management of change in organisations
Despite the criticism, processual models of change aim to explain the political nature
ofmanagement decisions, and include the history of the decisions taken and their
social construction by those who took them (Dawson, 1994). In contrast, Buchanan
(1994) argued that process models are failing to improve our understanding of the
management of change. The complexity of change cannot be explained by what
Buchanan and Storey (1997) called 'listology', due to the complexity of the
organisational change itself and its outcome. However, the process perspective
provides the opportunity to reconsider the role of change agents and the effectiveness
of change management programmes (McLoughlin & Harris, 1997).
In the area of key elements guiding successful management of change, a number of
researchers such as Schon (1963) or Rothwell and Robertson (1973) have focussed
on the particular role of change agents, product champions, sponsors or business
innovators. Rothwell and Robertson (1973) even distinguished different roles in
different stages of a change project such as technical and business innovators, chief
executive or product champion. Along the same lines, Tidd et al. (2005)
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distinguished key players in the entire process who hold several different roles, for
example technical champion, organisational sponsor, or technological gatekeepers.
The technical champion is the inventor or team leader with a deep technical
understanding of the technology behind the innovation (Tidd et ah, 2005: 479).
Organisational sponsors believe in the potential of the innovation, but they do not
posses detailed technical knowledge. Instead, their role consists of attending to
resource requirements along with placating sceptics and hostile critics of the project.
They require the power and influence to 'pull the various strings of the organisation
(Tidd et ah, 2005: 482). The technological gatekeeper collects information from
diverse sources and passes them to the relevant actors in an organisation who might
be interested to use the information (Tidd et ah, 2005: 483). This is not always
formal, and may well also take into account the political dimension.
Political processes of change management include different types of power, e.g.
overt or covert in nature, or power of expertise (Dawson, 2000; French & Raven,
1993). Murray (1989) noted that decision-making around the use of a technology
involves mobilisation of organisational power (Dawson, 2000). Accordingly,
outcomes are rather reflecting the battle of interests of the different social groups
than rational behaviour (Dawson, 2000). Change programmes implemented in a
given context need to coordinate resources and therefore fit in the flexible
organisational form of a project. A project is defined as a temporary endeavour
undertaken to create a unique product or service. 'Temporary' means that the project
has a definite end date, while 'unique' means that the project's end result is different
than the results of other functions of an organisation (Kitz, 2004). In this context, the
creation of a project team is a specialised exercise in matching expertise as well as
personalities to deliver a service or design or improve a product (Bryson & Rusten,
2004). Project-based teams are usually involved with new knowledge creation or the
application of existing knowledge to a particular situation.
Interpretations are playing a key role in communication and collaboration in socio-
technical projects, depending on the power and the positions pursued by different
social groups. In order to secure a preferred outcome, they try to mobilise different
'configurations of power'. During the course of socio-technical projects, actions and
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interactions contribute to the evolution of an outcome. Therefore, the concept of
'boundary objects' is useful to incorporate a multiplicity of meanings and to facilitate
communication and collective work in a project (Garrety & Badham, 2000).
The conceptualisation of the political process of change, including elements of
conflict, resistance, decision or non-decision activities, processes of negotiation, and
the internal and external mobilisation of power sources by social groups or
individuals, allows for the pursuit of preferred outcomes. Design and use of
technology are likely to be modified and challenged collectively by participant actors
involved in the implementation (Dawson, 2000). Based on competing histories, 'the
process of change is continuously shaped by an interplay and conflict between
historical reconstructions, current contextual conditions and future expectations'
(Dawson, 1996: 26), depending on the power and the situation of the different social
groups. Consequently, the political process of change is accompanied by the
management of expertise gained for example by individuals from change projects
who hope to develop further their individual career.
The management of expertise and individual career development
In social sciences, the concept of expertise has been studied by researchers on a more
general level ofmanagement of expertise (e.g. Fincham et al., 1994; Fleck &
Tierney, 1991) and on a more detailed level of individual career development (e.g.
Williams & Procter, 1998); Heimer, 1984). Fincham et al. (1994), for example,
attempted to reassess existing approaches in single disciplines such as technology
management, computer sciences or organisation theory. The objective of this
research was to develop an integrated account in order to enhance the understanding
of companies and their industry context linked with the character of IT, and the
methods by which IT is designed and implemented. Existing studies on
organisational politics and decision-making tend to focus on networking and
knowledge utilisation (Elislop et al., 2000); or on the management of expertise both
in terms of power and on its knowledge aspects (Fleck & Tierney, 1991).
Fleck and Tierney have already pointed out that expertise is the intersection of
individual career trajectories and institutional structures such as the job position an
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individual hold within a department. In their study (1991) they reviewed the concept
of technical expertise and its management in terms of power and knowledge. The
authors claimed that expertise is situated and embodied, continually renegotiated
amongst social groups. Its representation is done by the intersection of individual
career trajectories with institutional structures such as for example specialist
technical commitments (Fleck & Tierney, 1991: 2). The authors draw attention to
different knowledge levels where expertise is operated and how those sets of
knowledge may be carried by groups who use this expertise to increase their power.
Related to the management of expertise and to project work, some researchers have
analysed individual career development. Heimer (1984) specifically explored the
issue of individual control over career development in project work because in these
settings, control over careers is particularly problematic. According to Heimer,
control over a career means control over a series of elements determining whether
individuals' abilities are developed, if this development is noted and recorded, and if
this person has access to external job information and potential employers have
access to information about the person in question. In her study she analysed how
individual's capacity for human capital development is constrained by organisational
policies and larger forces. She claims that no one can control a career as such and
that career development depends on a series of factors, some ofwhich facilitate
individual control and others ofwhich facilitate organisational control (Heimer,
1984). Williams and Procter (1998) found that the patterns are not only the result of
individual's functional roles or ofmanagement strategy. Moreover, it found that roles
are constructed both through bottom-up and top-down strategy as individuals pursue
their own occupational and organisational interests. Expertise is not only constructed
but also validated through a two-way interaction in hierarchies and may lead to an
expert reputation or higher status as well as to conflicts of access to power and
resources (Williams & Procter, 1998: 197).
The next area of existing research reviewed is based in the field of economics and
sociology of standardisation.
32
2.4 Economics and Sociology of Standardisation
2.4.1 Existing research on standardisation
Some of the earliest accounts of standardisation are made by economic historians.
Thompson's (1954) study, for example, describes the evolution of technical
standards in the automotive industry up to the 1930s. He attempts to explain the
relationships between economic conditions and technological evolution by
identifying the economic advantages that have encouraged the standardisation efforts
in the industry as well as the economic and technical considerations that have
deterred the process. Standard setting is seen as neutral, and the actors are seen as
"interest free" engineers who collaborate in order to develop the best technical
solution to a technical problem.
However, the dominant perspective in the social science analysis of standardisation
has been economic. The choices for users between competing standards and the
choices between alternative standardisation processes have both been fertile areas for
academic economists. Economic models have been used to study the process and
effects ofmarket-driven standardisation (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; 1986; David,
1987; Katz & Shapiro, 1986) to compare different forms of standard settings (Farrell
& Saloner, 1988; Genschel, 1997) and to analyse the factors affecting the firm's
choice between the standard settings available (Besen & Farrell, 1994).
The economic literature has extensively applied Arthur's (1989) analysis based on
network externalities, increasing returns, switching costs and lock-in to explain the
effects of standardisation - particularly market driven standardisation - and the
danger of lock-in into an inferior standard (David, 1985; Farrell & Saloner, 1985;
Katz & Shapiro, 1986). However, Farrell and Shapiro (1988) find that switching
costs can promote entry as they encourage entry to serve unattached users. David and
Steinmueller (1994) and Swann (2000) provide a comprehensive review of the pro-
and anti-competitive effects of standardisation including lower transaction costs and
entry barriers and but restriction on innovation and inducing predatory pricing
behaviours.
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Economic research conceptualises the process of standard creation within standard
setting bodies as an "interactive co-operative behaviour of learning agents within
clubs" (Antonelli, 1994, 197). The focus is on the firm's choice between alternative
forms of standard settings which is based on efficiency criteria and it is analysed
employing game theory (Belleflame, 2002; Besen & Farrell, 1994; Farrell & Saloner,
1988; Genschel, 1997). In general, the economic argument goes that committee
standardisation, i.e. standardisation within standard bodies, is more efficient but
slower than market standardisation (Farrell & Saloner, 1988). Standard setting is
seen as a game of power and dominance between the participants. The framework
usually attempts to model the interplay between the interests of the actors.
With the significant increase in the number of standards bodies during the mid 1980s
and 1990s, the focus has moved towards the analysis of the different types of
standard settings outside the market realm. Similar to the technocratic ideology
account, the participants in the standardisation process are seen as collaborating
towards the development of the best technical solution. However, standard setting is
seen as following specific rules and procedures in order to ensure that standards
emerge through a democratic process (e.g. due process, fairness, transparency and
openness, consensus, voting system).This body of research suggests that the formal
official Standards Developing Organisation (SDOs) are characterised by a number of
principles that support a technocratic approach to standardisation (standards are free
from the political interests of the participants and represent the best solution to a
problem), but lead to slow and cumbersome standardisation (Besen & Farrell, 1991;
David & Shurmer, 1996; Swann, 2000). In contrast, such studies maintain that
private consortia are more flexible and faster as their membership, internal
procedures and rules can be tailored to specific tasks (David & Shurmer, 1996;
Hawkins, 1999).
Political theory researchers have adopted the economic arguments and have analysed
the evolution and characteristics of the various forms of standard setting bodies. Such
studies suggest that choice between different forms of standardisation has to take into
account standard settings bodies' characteristics such as the cost of vote recruiting,
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number of actors and procedural mechanisms (Austin & Milner, 2001; Weiss, 1993).
Political theory has also been applied to understand the political process through
which standard setting emerge (Nicolaodis & Egan, 2001; Pelkams, 2001). The
economic account has also pervaded the law literature that focuses on the
connections between standardisation and intellectual property rights (Smoot, 1995).
While undeniably relevant for the analysis of competing platform standards, for
example the legendary standards wars between video formats, the economic analysis
is less relevant to (the implementation of) e-business and e-government standards.
This is also evidenced by the lack of references to the economic analyses of e-
business standards in two thorough overviews of the economics of standards (Blind,
2004; Swann, 2000). For example, an economic analysis can contrast the benefits of
an e-government system over no system, but it struggles to explain why the
implemented standards took on the form they did. All the economic models of
standardisation are based on the fundamental assumption that the actors involved in
the standard setting process are seeking economic benefits. A critical variable in the
game theory and governance decision analysis models is the payoff for the firms
involved, where payoffs represent economic returns (Besen & Farrell, 1994).
The crucial role that standards play for ICT development, especially in relation with
technological innovation processes, has been documented in the socio-economic
literature on standard development. Standardisation has been found to have a major
impact on technology innovations (Jakobs et ah, 1998), to represent an endogenous
factor that shapes technology development (Egyedi, 1996), and to affect the rate and
direction of innovation (David & Steinmueller, 1994). A growing body of literature
has thus emerged investigating the factors shaping the standards development
process and its outcomes.
Flowever, there are some analytical challenges and shortcomings evident in this
literature. For methodological, practical and theoretical reasons, many socio¬
economic studies of standard development have involved case-studies of particular
instances and fora for the agreement for a particular standard, and focusing on the
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interplay between the various interests involved in relation to a particular standard. I
argue that such a static focus has restricted the ability of existing socio-economic
analytical frameworks to conceptualise and fully investigate the ongoing relation
between the various stages in the standard life cycle and dynamics between those
stages including their evolution during development and implementation.
The reasons for these shortcomings in existing studies of standardisation are various,
and include practical considerations (for example resource constraints mean that
direct investigation of standard setting contexts is limited in time and
social/geographical space) as well as the prevalence of actor-centred accounts within
many contemporary technology studies (which, with their concern to explore the
influence of actors on standard development, have tended to focus on the immediate
locales of standard setting) (Williams, 1997). I suggest that the framework of
analysis has to be enlarged in order to account for a dynamic evaluation of standard
development and implementation.
The aim of the thesis is to define a more complex conceptual framework that can
address the dynamics of standards as they evolve over time.
Compatibility standards are addressed in relation with network ICTs where they are
crucial in that they enable data exchange between components within a particular
system or between different inter-organisational information systems (Bunduchi, et
al., 2004). Therefore, compatibility standards such as ICT standards are the focal
point of research. There is a great volume of literature focusing on ICT standards and
standardisation, quite often economically or technically driven, and only sometimes
addressing the social perspective.
In general, standards serve to reduce diversity and to create a certain order and
compatibility, but there is usually a complex matrix of standards at different levels:
in ICT, standards are embedded in applications, systems or platforms and thus
provide a mixture of constraint and autonomy. A standard often relates to one
component only, or describes a particular interface between systems in order to
ensure interoperability. A standard typically permits different ways of building
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technologies around it and influence in a distinct way the application and use of ICT
(Russell & Williams, 2002). Standardisation is claimed to be an important form of
'alignment and stabilisation' and can be seen as a constant competition among
visions and interests of different actors (e.g. Law, 1986; Fleck, 1988; Cowan, 1992).
The social processes that underlie the standardisation process are excluded from the
analysis. Economic theory explains why standardisation takes place within
committees rather than other forms of standard settings, and why such committees
exist. However, the exclusively economic focus restricts the ability to explain how
these committees are organised and how actors are enrolled. To address the rich
social processes that characterise the standardisation process and which cannot be
captured in an economic account, standardisation researchers have increasingly
adopted social constructivism and institutional theory (Schmidt & Werle, 1993;
1998) or social theories such as social shaping of technology (Graham et al., 1995).
SST conceptualises technology as a social product, which develops not according to
an inherent technical logic, but is patterned by the conditions of its creation and use
(Williams and Edge, 1996). Technology is produced and used in a particular social
context, becoming a social construct with its meaning and existence established
through a dynamic relationship between the artefact and the specific social practices
within the context (Bijker & Law, 1992). Consequently, from a SST perspective,
standardisation is understood as socially shaped, i.e. (Sorensen & Williams, 2002;
Williams & Edge, 1996)
■ The standard is a device for alignment and is understood as socially shaped
process as well as an outcome of SST
■ The standard is socially constructed resulting from the interplay between
different social groups with different interests and different meanings
attached to it. Through negotiation, interests align and this flexible
interpretation of the standard is narrowed down
■ A range of choices are possible at every stage of the standardisation process,
and these choices depend on a range of factors within the broader socio-
technical setting
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The locales in which standardisation (standards development and implementation)
take place are populated by different kinds of actors - differing widely in their
expertise, context, commitments, and perceived interests: software providers,
business consultants, technical experts, market intermediaries, and their suppliers.
Often the same actors or actors from the same industry/sector are involved in
competing standard setting processes, e.g. suppliers often have to accommodate
different customers with different standards requirements.
ICT standardisation is to a large extent influenced by technological innovations, i.e.
systems and applications. In practice, the standardisation processes takes place in,
and the success and failure of a standard are determined by, complex socio-technical
settings that are shaped by a variety of factors and a multitude of actors. As a result,
industry structures in many areas of technology are much more complex than it is
usually captured in existing studies which depict a simple image of suppliers, users
and markets (Russell & Williams, 2002). For example, some technologies are
complex to configure and adapt for use in different contexts. Additionally,
implementations are approached differently by developers and users. To reconcile
their differences, intermediaries are needed who shape a basic technology provided
by the suppliers and configure different technological components from a variety of
suppliers to meet the users' needs. In this process, universal technical knowledge and
local knowledge of the organisational and cultural context of use are combined by all
the actors, such as intermediaries, IT developers, managers, and end users within
adopting organisations. They not only adopt and allow the diffusion of the
technology, but also help users to understand the possibilities and to formulate the
requirements, and mediate between users and suppliers (Russell & Williams, 2002;
Williams et al., 2000; Windrum, 2000). As a result, the development of technology is
a complex and socially shaped process, which results from the interaction between
different actors, interests and requirements.
The complexity of standard setting is increased by the multiple level of
representation of the actors involved in standards development. There are at least two
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levels of representation of the actors in standardisation bodies: every actor can be
seen to represent their employer on the one hand and their individual professional
interests on the other (Schmidt & Werle, 1998). Sometimes, for example informal,
official SDOs, a third level of representation is added, the national representation. As
a result, a complex web of interests characterises the standardisation arena.
The sociological literature on standards has been less voluminous than the economic
literature, but has far more closely addressed the negotiation and implementation of
e-business standards. A significant insight from the sociology of science and
technology relevant to the study of standards is the critique of technological
determinism: it is not necessarily the 'best' standard that will emerge as the dominant
technology. The standard which becomes accepted as a dominant design (Abernathy
& Utterback, 1978) cannot be seen as a function of technological determinism
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990) as often rival designs may be technologically superior
(as in the case ofQWERTY, see David, 1985). The sociology approach sees the
emergence of dominant design as a result of the actions of individuals, organisations
and the networks of organisations. The process is thus contingent on the social and
organisational context (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). Additionally, the dominance of
dominant designs also provides a template for competing solutions: a standard may
therefore exert mimetic influence over apparently competing standards
developments. For example, the HTML standardisation was used as an exemplar for
the development and diffusion ofXML standards (Egyedi & Loeffen, 2002).
Technology, and hence standards, can be seen as being 'socially constructed', with
the technological choices "explained as the outcomes of the interactions between
intentional actors" (Schmidt & Werle, 1998: 16). Co-ordination is difficult in such
circumstances since large technical systems rely on the co-ordination of autonomous
action by a multitude of individuals and organisations. The analysis of e-business
standards is problematic because the standards extend beyond the technologies for
exchanging data to encompass the semantics of the information and the underlying
business processes (Soderstrom, 2002). Both artefacts and institutions are
channelling, framing and contextualising the actions and interactions of these
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'intentional actors' involved in standard creation. Schmidt and Werle (1993), for
example, argue the standardisation environment provides standard organisations with
institutional rules that determine their "general procedure, the decision process,
sometimes the legitimacy of arguments, and the value of consensus" (Schmidt &
Werle, 1998: 19). These institutional rules influence the way actors co-ordinate
standards development. Along a similar line of argument, Egyedi (2000) argues that
standard setting is shaped by the beliefs, values and assumptions embedded in the
standard organisational procedure. This 'standardisation ideology' (Egyedi, 2000)
regulates the committee process and shapes the rules that govern the standard
creation process.
The standardisation field is highly institutionalised (Schmidt & Werle, 1998; Werle,
2001) and many of the standardisation organisations, whether consortia or quasi-
juridical bodies such as ISO, share similar institutional features such as negotiation in
committee, voluntary participation, consensus rules, and inclusiveness of committees
(Werle, 2001). Institutional studies of standardisation have found that SDOs have
developed both mimetic and coercive isomorphism (Lawrence, 1999; Werle, 2001),
which explains their peaceful coexistence even when they share the same jurisdiction
(Werle, 2001).
In this context, the social shaping of emerging standards is explained with the simple
interest model from an actor-centred perspective. The various interests of the actors
involved are seen as negotiated constructs, forged in the process of alliance building.
The actors involved (humans and non-humans) try to translate their interests into the
standard; hence the outcome of standardisation is seen as the result of a negotiation
process The process of technological change and its outcomes, and in particular the
development of standards, is seen as locally constructed, negotiable and contingent
(Williams et ah, 2004). Elowever, the framework has difficulties in accounting for
the influence ofprior history, and for taken for granted relations, routines and the
broader context and structures. This has not been satisfying in terms of a theoretical
account because it only describes the outcome and does not include a broader
analytical approach. Jorgensen and Sorensen (1999) have build upon this and
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introduced their enhanced framework of 'arena of development' (Jorgensen &
Sorensen, 1999).
The development and implementation of compatibility standards not only technically
defines a method of interoperation between the different components in a network,
but most importantly represents a proposal for the future of complex socio-technical
systems, i.e., the shape of an inter-organisational network. According to Graham et al
(1995), the standardisation process also represents an attempt to align interests,
business practices and expectations of an array of people with an interest to develop
and use the system that is to be standardised. Therefore, standardisation is not only
about providing workable solution, but also refers to articulating and aligning
expectations and interests (Williams, 1997).
A major focus of a study on standards dynamics is unavoidably the processes in
which actors negotiate the content of standards. A secondary interest is, therefore, the
dynamics of these processes as they co-evolve with the standards they are
developing. As illustrated in figure 2, the study focuses on the dynamics of IT
standards. The area of literature surveyed is limited to texts which provide insights













Figure 2. Dimensions of literature review on the dynamics of standards
This narrower literature relevant to a study of the dynamics of standards comes in
two clearly defined canons: the generic study of technology, where standards may be
viewed as being a particularly interesting sub-set, and the explicit study of the
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dynamics of standardisation. Orthogonal to this categorisation we may distinguish
between literature addressing the formation of standards and literature considering
the implementation of standards.
2.4.2 Definition and taxonomy
During the last 20 years, the business world has undergone significant changes. For
some organisations, doing business globally has become critical to their survival, and
others discover new opportunities by focusing their business in a local setting. In this
process of change, ICT plays a significant role both enabling and triggering the re¬
organisation of business activities. ICT became ubiquitous, invading all aspects of
business domain.
The Internet has considerably accelerated the diffusion of inter-organisational
networks, and has intensified the collaboration between organisations. Regardless of
company size and type of business, today virtually all organisations' ICT systems are
interconnected. In such an increasingly networked world, ICT and e-business
standards aim to ensure interoperability between both different IT systems within and
between organisations. As ICT-enabled collaboration has become a decisive tool in
the struggle for competitive advantage, interoperability within and between
organisations has become a strategic necessity in all industries. To communicate and
collaborate, interoperability is absolutely essential. However, seamless
communication and integration of data and information is not possible in the absence
of common standards - standards and the standardisation process have gained
strategic significance.
In the world of ICT one can find a variety of ideas and definitions ofwhat a standard
is. This research follows Tassey, who defines an ICT standard as "a set of
specifications to which all elements ofproduct, processes, formats, or procedures
under its jurisdiction must conform " (Tassey, 2000: 588). 'Standardisation' is used
in the literature to address the process of standard setting that is the process leading
to a standard. David and Steinmueller (1994) differentiate between four categories of
standards: reference standards, minimum quality standards, technical interface design
standards, and compatibility standards. Compatibility standards are addressed in
42
relation with network ICTs where they are crucial in that they enable data exchange
between components within a particular system or between different inter-
organisational information systems (Bunduchi, et ah, 2004). Compatibility standards
are dealing with issues such as lock-in and path dependencies. Another issue
analysed in research is the belief in critical mass (e.g. Granovetter, 1984; Graham et
al., 1995).
Common ICT standards are required in order to reduce interfaces' complexity and to
take full advantage of the Internet's potential for supporting ubiquitous connectivity,
while at the same time reduce costs and increase efficiency, (Schildhauer &
Holtkemeier, 2003). Studies of the adoption of Internet technologies have found the
lack of standards as the primary reason that explains the reluctance of organisations
to adopt Internet based systems (Threlkel & Kavan, 1999). In such an increasingly
networked world, ICT standards aim to ensure interoperability between different
information systems within and between organisations. Such standards have to
address not only the technological dimension of the Internet network such as network
protocols, message transport protocols and security standards, but also the content of
the data exchanged and the business processes that are facilitated through this
network. ICT standards play a crucial role not only in enabling the exchange of
information across companies and governments boundaries, but also in facilitating
transaction between connected business partners and their IT systems (Berlecon
Research, 2003).
A taxonomy of standards
David (1987) proposed a three level taxonomy of the function of standards: reference
standards, similarity standards and compatibility standards.
■ Reference standards as standards for units and definition
■ Similarity standards as standards for minimum acceptable attributes
■ Compatibility standards as standards for interfaces allowing interoperation.
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However, as the agreement on the meaning of complex data in e-business
standardisation is important, this leads to an extension ofDavid's model by two
further categories - semantic and process standards - into a more functional-oriented
classification. Additionally, other attributes of standards influence the dynamics of
the standards development and implementation, specifically the processes assessing
compliance with the standard, compatibility with earlier versions and the intellectual
property regime embedded within the standards. Therefore, an extended taxonomy
for e-business standards includes:
■ Function - based on reference standards defining a quantity; all e-business
standards are built upon reference standards. The second group of functional
standards are semantic standards. This refers to the standardisation of the
meaning of information and representations of information. The importance
of semantic standards has grown with the rise of inter-organisational IT
systems, for example the definition of data dictionaries for EDI messages.
The third group of standards are compatibility standards, ensuring inter-
working between system components. The fourth group of standards are
process standards, the standardisation of how things should be done.
Increasingly, as e-commerce standards embody models of business processes
they become process standards, extending beyond dyadic transactions into a
choreographing of the interaction between the systems of two partners.
Exemplary of this evolution from pure compatibility towards the convergence
of business processes are the RosettaNet Partner Interface Processes (PIPs)
developed for supply-chain integration in the electronics sector. As standards
become more closely embedded in the context of their use we would expect
the role of users to become more significant in standards development. These
four categories of standards form a logical hierarchy, with process standards
embedded in technology building on compatibility standards, compatibility
standards building on semantic standards, and semantic standards building on
reference standards.
■ Compliance assessment - includes functional testing, comparison to a
reference standard or audit
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■ Compatibility - backward compatibility to an established or new standard
■ Intellectual Property - intellectual property embedded within the standard
Historically public standards were seen as being public goods and could be
contrasted with proprietary technologies where the owners of Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR) sought a return on there investment through licensing,
with the possibility that the proprietary technology would become recognised
as a de facto standard. In recent years this distinction has become
progressively less clear as the locus of standardisation has moved into
consortia and the developers of open standards realise that in areas such as
image processing it is difficult to develop standards which do not impinge on
existing patents (Blind et ah, 2002).
E-business and ICT standards
E-business would not be possible in the absence of communication protocols. Such
technical standards play a crucial role in shaping not only the future form of the
technology (Williams et ah, 1993) but also nature and functioning of the organisation
and the relationships between organisations (Tapscott, 2001). Consequently, the
standards affect the way in which organisations interact and do business
electronically. Today, existing ICT standards enable e-business and facilitating the
integration between organisations by interoperability. Generally, as illustrated in
Figure 3, ICT standardisation is characterised by addressed at different layers.
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Figure 3. Taxonomy of ICT standards
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Most existing research usually includes the two standardisation layers: the
framework/business process integration standards, and the business documents
specification, in the category of'e-business' standards (Berlecon Research, 2003;
Schildhauer & Holtkemeier, 2003). Examples of e-business standards of the first
level are RosettaNet PIP standards and ebXML. Such standards aim to help
standardise business processes in order to enable B2B interactions between different
organisations.
The organisations that supply such standards are private consortia, either global,
cross industry organisations such as OASIS, or industry specific such as RosettaNet
for IT and semiconductor industry, and Covisint for the automotive industry. OASIS,
for example, attempts to help companies and government users to implement open e-
business standards by implementing a service-oriented architecture. OASIS
understands e-business/ICT standards as part of IT developments that allow public
institutions and companies to develop interoperable systems by establishing common
specifications and protocols for e-business. They help their members to implement e-
business standards built upon consensus. Such standards benefit both public and
private organisations and provide stable targets to which IT vendors can build their
products. In contrast, vertical industry consortia aim to establish a standard for use
within that particular industry, rather than attempting to develop global, cross
industry standards.
Jakobs (2000) collected a number of other classifications proposed in literature, such
as for example:
■ public vs industry distinguished between standards published by SDOs
whereas standards emerged from single powerful companies or consortia are
referred to as industry standards
■ voluntary vs statutory which defines the different natures of the underlying
processes and the legislative status of its results
■ 'de facto' and 'de jure' standards, which have emerged through the market,
and de jure standards, which have been ratified by some legitimate body
(Jakobs, 2000: 13-14).
46
However, the classification of standards as 'de jure' and ~de facto'' is a classification
of the processes that developed the standards rather than a classification of the
standards themselves (Jakobs, 2000: 14). The process of standard setting and
standard setting organisations (SSB) are subject of discussion in the next sub-section.
2.4.3 Standard setting: process and standardisation bodies
The process of standardisation is an integral part of the world of networked
organisations. In literature, different versions of standard life cycles have been
identified. Figure 4 depicts an example including six stages of a standard life cycle.
Figure 4. The stages of the standards life cycle (Reilly, 1994)
The stages of the standard life cycle operate in very different socio-technical settings.
The locus of standardisation, as well as the actors involved in the process, and their
attributes are different in the two stages. For example, in the case of official SDOs or
even for private consortia, standards are developed within the standards
organisation's technical committees, whereas the implementation is done in the
entire market that those standards address. Precisely because of this reason, the
existing socio-economic analysis has looked at standard development in isolation
from standard implementation. However, to understand the standardisation process
"in making", i.e. how it evolves and how it is shaped and structured over time, these
different socio-technical settings must be considered together under the umbrella of
one concept.
Such an approach allows identifying not only the factors that shape each of the two
stages, but also the links that are formed between them as a result of the interaction
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between these factors. For example, the level of formality of the standard setting may
depend on the organisational culture in which standards are to be implemented, as it
was the case for clinical standard messaging in the Scottish health service (Bunduchi
et ah, 2005). In this way, the development process can be informed by
implementation issues such as the organisational nature in which implementation
takes place, the requirements of the users, the size of the potential market, the
willingness of the players to align with it, and the existence of competing proprietary
standards. At the same time, the success or failure of a standard implementation may
depend not only on factors pertaining to the implementation context, but also on the
nature of the setting in which the standard has been developed. For example, the
extent to which the standard setting process allows for the involvement of the users
may influence the extent to which the emerging standards fit such users'
requirements, hence facilitating the implementation process (Bunduchi et ah, 2005).
Moreover, an approach which brings together the implementation and development
stages highlights the role that the various types of intermediaries, such as technology
suppliers and user representatives, play in linking these domains of development and
use more or less effectively. As a result, the approach allows identifying the complex
interaction between the two domains.
Throughout the past thirty years there have been considerable changes in the world
of standards setting. Back in the seventies, there was a clear distinction between the
T
. . .
then 'monopolist' CCITT , a division of the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU), on the one hand, and the remainder of the world of ICT standards on
the other. CCITT were in charge of standards setting in the telecommunications
sector. Basically, they were operated by the national PTTs, which still enjoyed a
monopoly situation in their respective countries. ISO was in charge of almost all
other ICT-related standardisation activities. The various national SDOs developed
their own specific standards, but also contributed to the work of ISO. Over time, two
trends contributed to an increasingly complex ICT standardisation environment: the
growing importance of ICT and the globalisation ofmarkets.
3 CCITT: Comitee Consultativ International Telegraphique et Telephonique
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In a way, these were coupled, and further accelerated, by the Internet, which was
'discovered' for commercial use in the mid-nineties. Further complexity was caused
by the liberalisation of the telecommunications markets and the associated
emergence of regional bodies, such as ETSI in Europe, and ATIS in the US and TTC
in Asia. This was re-enforced by the still ongoing merger of the formerly distinct
sectors of telecommunications and IT, which caused considerable changes in these
markets (David, 1995). These processes affected primarily SDOs and the relations
between them. In addition, and as 'external' competitors, standards consortia
emerged as a new phenomenon. Well-known examples today include, for instance,
the W3C (the World Wide Web Consortium), OASIS (the Organization for the
Advancement of Structured Information Standards), or OMG (the Object
Management Group). At times, such consortia emerged an amazing rate (Cargill,
1995). This rise of consortia was largely in response to the enormous speed of
technical development in ICT and e-business systems. 'Traditional' SDOs were
widely considered as not being capable of coping with this speed (Besen, 1995;
Cargill, 1995).
Until the mid 1980s, standardisation was virtually exclusively dominated by the
formal SDOs such as ISO and CEN. However, in the late 1980s the slow and highly
bureaucratic processes that then characterised formal SDOs was seen as inadequate
to deal with the challenges that resulted from the increasingly shorter life cycles of
ICT products. As a result, the number of private standards consortia saw a massive
increase during the 1990s, when in less than a decade more than 140 ICT standards
consortia were created (Jakobs, 2000).
The emergence of such a huge number of Standard Setting Bodies (SSBs), often with
overlapping coverage, caused a fragmentation of the market for standards
development. This fragmentation raised the problem of how to co-ordinate the
organisations involved in the process. The economic literature has modelled
extensively the co-ordination strategies of the players, which represent alternative
forms of standards setting (i.e. market versus committee based standardisation).
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However, as a result of the supply fragmentation, this also needs to consider the
organisations' choice between competing standards setting bodies.
Coordination in standard setting
Standardisation is basically a mechanism for coordination (Werle, 2001; Shapiro,
2001; Jakobs, 2000). Not unlike the research sector, standards setting serve as a
platform for cooperation between companies which are otherwise competitors. This
function of standardisation is largely independent of the nature of the actual
platform; that is, it does not make a big difference whether negotiation and co¬
operation occur within a formal SDO or an industry consortium.
According to (Werle, 2001), a company has different options concerning standard
setting:
■ to try and bypass organised standardisation and set a de facto standard in the
market
■ to participate in the work of an official or a private standards organisation
■ to set up a new consortium or forum to deal with the standards project
Assuming an organisation decides upon one of the latter alternatives, standards
setting work will eventually commence within a working group. Here numerous
stakeholders convene and try to come to a solution that meets their needs.
Within such a working group interests of the various stakeholders may differ.
According to Besen (1995) four distinct situations are possible. Firstly, common
interests where no competing proposals exist and consensus is reached. Secondly,
opposed interests where competing proposals exist. Third, overlapping interests
where each opponent prefers his own proposal to be adopted, but would rather have a
competitor's proposal adopted than have no standard at all. Finally, destructive
interest where at least one player prefers not to have any openly available standard at
all and accordingly tries to slow down the process. An aspect which needs to be
taken into account in addition to the rather more strategic aspects discussed above
and which has been largely ignored so far, is the role of the individual in standards
50
setting. After all, at least open standards are made by the members of a working
group, not by companies.
Obviously, the above alternatives all come down to the question of competition
versus co-operation. The path towards competition may eventually lead to a
company's dominating market position with a product or service based on their own
proprietary specification. Yet at the same time the virtual absence of other players
may render this particular market insignificant. On the other hand, co-operation
establishes a broader market for products or services based on open specifications,
created through, and capable of accommodating, a number of different players. As
Swann (1990) has shown, for instance, a product that succeeds in creating an
environment in which other vendors consider it beneficial to produce compatible
products will prove considerably more successful than its competitors.
Competition in standard setting
The easiest way to achieve co-ordination would be what van Wegberg (1999) calls
the 'Grand Coalition'. This represents the most centralised solution, supported by all
stakeholders. The level of co-ordination would assure that a single standard would be
established. That is, technologies in use would be fully compatible and positive
network externalities could be realised (Van Wegberg, 1999). In practical terms, this
would imply that all standardisation work on a given topic would be carried out by
one working group.
In practice, however, the process is fragmented in many cases. This may be due to
several reasons. For one, different stakeholders may consider different SSBs as
optimal for their specific individual needs. Stakeholders (or one individual
stakeholder) are dissatisfied with the work of an SSB, and feel that their own
consortium would better promote their ideas and technologies. However, the
fragmentation of the standards setting world does not necessarily lead to competition.
Fragmentation may, for instance, occur based on the geographical scope of an SSB,
the industry sector within which it is active, and its 'formal status' (accredited SDO
or consortium) (Werle, 2001). Whereas all these distinctions are blurring, the former
two do not necessarily lead to competition or conflicts. In 2001, Werle observed that
"Conflicts between standards organisations (as opposed to conflicts within one SSB)
over their claims of competence or their involvement in overlapping areas of
standardisation have been rare" (Werle, 2001). This does not necessarily hold any
more today.
Reputation and legitimacy of SSBs
According to Cash et al. (2002), "Legitimacy refers to whether an actor perceives the
process in a system as unbiased and meeting standards ofpolitical and procedural
fairness." Orlikowski & Robey (1991) note that "...human action is guided by
cultural notions of legitimacy ...". For SSBs, this implies that they need to establish
an adequate level of legitimacy. At least for formal SDOs, this is typically based on
government endorsement which, in turn, requires that a "... voluntary consensus
standards body is defined by the following attributes: (i) Openness; (ii) Balance of
interest; (Hi) Due process; (vi) An appeals process.; (v) Consensus, ..." (Bukowski,
2003).
Older international SDOs, i.e. ISO did not enjoy any governmental endorsement
when they were founded. Even today, any 'authoritative' source of their legitimacy
(i.e., why they are referred to as 'formal') seems to be unclear. A widely held belief
is that this status was 'earned' basically by tradition - i.e., by having done beneficial
standardisation work over decades. People now seem to trust these institutions
(which may be to a lesser degree the case in the ICT sector, which is comparably
young and where many SDOs were not really fully fit for the job at hand). Typically,
consortia do not enjoy the benefit of government endorsement. Thus, they need to
explore other routes towards legitimacy. Van Wegberg notes that popular means to
establish an SSB's legitimacy include (Van Wegberg, 1999):
■ Participation of key players
■ A track record in a certain field
■ IPR assets
■ Co-operation with other SSBs
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2.4.4 Shortcomings in existing standardisation research
Typically, the standards literature adequately addresses the development of (initial)
standards. Some other studies solely address standardisation implementation whereas
very few studies look at the complete life cycle of standardisation, from development
to implementation and the further evolution of it. Few studies address what happens
to standards subsequently and issues that result from the dynamics of standards
implementation have rarely been studied. Some studies have looked on the diffusion
of standards but they did not analyse at development (nor included implementation).
Others have seen standards as fixed and not changeable.
A study of standards dynamics recognises that standards are not static artefacts
which are created fully-formed and diffused as users adopt them. Rather, a dynamic
perspective sees standards as being created through a rich social process within
which they evolve from loose requirements into defined specifications embedded in
documentation though a process of negotiation between interested actors. Once
published many standards are not static: they are adapted and interpreted by users.
As pointed out by Egyedi (2001), such deviations occur as a result of competitive
actions of implementers which aim to lock-in customers, or due to genuine reasons
such as the lack of relevance of some of the features of the standard to specific
contexts of use. The existence ofprocesses in which standards are reviewed and
revised also assumes that standards are dynamic.
Over the years, the literature on standardisation has shown an evolution of the
analytical frameworks employed to study the process of standards development.
However, as discussed during the introduction to the thesis, most of these
frameworks employ a static perspective and address the development process in
isolation from the context of standards use. The challenge in analysing the
standardisation process is to produce an adequate evolutionary account of the
complex dynamics surrounding the standards, an account which includes both the
standard development and use settings.
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The two areas of standards dynamics that are relatively under-represented in the
literature are the dynamics of standards within the organisations developing them,
both as they are developed and during use, as users adapt standards to suit a local
context. The co-evolution of the standards and the standards development
organisations themselves have not been widely described in the literature because
there have been few ethnographic studies of the negotiation of standards in standards
development and implementation in organisations. To overcome the above
mentioned shortcomings, this research is looking at the complete standardisation
cycle from standards development to implementation and the further evolution over a
full life cycle, including the dynamic aspect of the entire standardisation process and
the subsequent outcomes.
2.5 Sociology of Inter-organisational Networks and Systems
2.5.1 Business relationships in networks
Apart from being described from the social perspective, Inter-Organisational
Networks and Systems (IONS) are based on technical and business relationships. To
complete this theoretical review it is necessary to engage in a brief overview of
management and technical-related aspects of business relationships. The inter-
organisational network of an organisation consists of different actors (or
organisational entities) such as suppliers, customers, competitors, unions, etc. Every
organisation interacts within this network with other actors. Interaction can occur, for
example, with suppliers in order to purchase goods and services or with customers to
sell a product or a service.
Inter-organisational relationships are a complex web in which the organisation is
embedded. As business-to-business relationships are becoming closer across a
number of industries, a particular type of relational norm is gaining importance
(Spekman et al., 1998): the buyer - supplier relationship. According to Wilson
(1995) buyer and seller relationships have become an integral part of business-to-
business strategies. Further, Hakansson (1989) claims, that a more in-depth
understanding of industrial markets can be achieved by studying buyers and sellers
simultaneously. It involves simultaneous analysis of the attitudes and actions of both
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parties and emphasises the essential similarity between the purchasing and marketing
tasks in relationships. It sees relationships both as important in themselves and as
predictors of individual transaction behaviour which is formed by successive
interactions and is reviewed in detail in Hakansson (1989). A relationship can be an
interdependent process of continuous interaction and exchange between at least two
actors in a business network context (Holmlund & Tornroos, 1997). Furthermore,
relationships evolve over time and can be considered to traverse a series of stages
characterised by increasing mutual adaptation, reduced "distance" and increasing
commitment (Ford, 1982). According to Morgan and Hunt (1994), commitment and
trust are key components of a relationship because they encourage the participants:
■ to make investments into the relationship
■ to resist taking advantage of alternatives which provide short-term benefits
and
■ not to behave opportunistically with regard to the relationship (Morgan &
Hunt, 1994).
The number of involved participants may increase into larger entities such as
networks. Hakansson (1989) defines a network as an arena in which a company
operates. In the industrial context, a network consists of companies linked together
by the fact that they either produce or use complementary or competitive products.
Consequently the network always contains an element of both co-operation and
conflict.
As illustrated in Figure 5, in theory an industrial network consists of actors, activities
and resources: actors are linked together by their performance of complementary or
competitive industrial activities which imply that certain resources are processed as a
Figure 5. Network model (According to Hakansson (1989: 17)
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result of other resources being consumed (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975; Hakansson,
1989: 16).
2.5.2 Inter-organisational networks and systems
The economic and political pressure for collaboration in a global and increasingly
interconnected world forces global actors to deploy IONS in an effort to create and
sustain a flexible network (Tapscott, 2001; Venkatraman, 2000). IONS refer to the
computer and telecommunications infrastructure developed, operated and/or used by
two or more firms for the purpose of exchanging information that support a business
application or process. These firms are suppliers and customers in the same value
chain, strategic partners or even competitors in the same or related market
(Cunningham & Tynan, 1993; Li & Williams, 1999). Through IONS, business
partners arrange routine business transactions. Information is exchanged over
communication networks using prearranged formats. In the past, IONS were
implemented over proprietary communication links. Today, many IONS have moved
to the Internet (Turban et ah, 2000) due to the huge benefits promised by research
companies and consultancies (own experience). The most prominent types of IONS
are for example (Turban & Lee, 2000):
■ Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) - providing secured B2B connection
over Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) (Emmelhainz, 1993; Sokol, 1995)
■ Extranets - providing secured B2B connection over the Internet
■ Supply chain management - cooperation between a company and its
suppliers
■ Portals - electronic platform providing various types of electronic
services
The term "electronic commerce" (e-commerce) appeared in the mid 1990s when it
was used to refer to the deployment of information technologies to support
exchanges with trading partners (Bailey & Bakos, 1997; Klein, 1995; Benjamin &
Wigand, 1995). In 1995, for.example, Klein identifies four areas that he argues will
be affected by electronic commerce: the electronic commerce platform, customer
relations, procurement and inter-organisational relations, and internal adjustments.
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Such early electronic commerce systems were based on the EDI systems using
EDIFACT or X-12 standards. Elowever, as the Internet technologies have pervaded
the commercial arena during the mid 1990s, electronic commerce has started to be
used exclusively to refer to web based applications (Hoffman & Novak, 1996).
Most of the early uses of the term "e-commerce" in an Internet context referred to
companies engaged in buying and selling over the World Wide Web (Hoffman &
Novak, 1996). Such a definition reflected some of the earliest uses ofWeb
technologies which moved from only presenting information on the Web to enabling
simple transactions between businesses and end customers, which was later named
B2C (The Economist, 2000). With the advances in web technology, the application
spectrum increased considerably. Businesses were now able to use the Internet to
support inter-organisational exchange (B2B), to develop employee portals to support
human resources applications, while governments were using the Internet to inform
their citizens. Fingar et al. (2000) define e-commerce in two ways: technical and
process-oriented. Technologically seen "eCommerce is the use of inter-networked
computers to create and transform business relationships" (Fingar et al., 2000: 46).
Reflecting the wider applications of Internet technologies, the term e-commerce was
re-defined as doing business electronically (Kalakota, 1996), or 'commerce enabled
by Internet technologies' (Seddon, 1997) referring to the use of Internet technologies
both within and outside the organisational borders (Riggins & Rhee, 1998) rather
than the simple matter of buying and selling over the web. E-commerce is often used
interchangeably with the term e-business. Davydov (2000), for example, defines e-
business as 'an all-encompassing concept of enabling the exchange of information
and automation of commercial transactions over the Internet.
Today, e-business is seen as a significant part of the strategy ofmost companies in
their pursuit of cost reduction, efficiency and better performance (Van Hooft &
Stegwee, 2001; Venkatraman, 2000). Specifically, it is supposed to "enable business
process efficiencies in all aspects of enterprise activities". That is, e-business is one
means of implementing business processes and thus, ultimately, business strategies.
Yet e-business services are not provided by stand-alone artefacts. Rather, they are
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embedded in, and part of, a larger system, which also comprises the underlying ICT
infrastructure.
Electronic Markets
An electronic market (e-market) is an electronic network of interactions and
relationships where information, products, services and payments are exchanged
(Turban & Lee, 2000). Buyers and suppliers meet to exchange information about
prices and product and service offerings, and to negotiate and carry out business
transactions. They are not only at different locations but seldom even know one
another. The means of interaction varies between the participating parties and can
change from event to event (Turban & Lee, 2000).
E-markets typically involve buyers and sellers who negotiate or execute a transaction
in both the B2B and B2C case whereas IONS are used exclusively for B2B
applications. An IONS involves information flow among at least two organisations.
The major objective is the execution of efficient transaction processing (Senn, 1996;
Turban & Lee, 2000) where all relationships are electronically fixed in advance
(Turban & Lee, 2000: 8).
2.5.3 Portals as part of e-business
One of the most prominent types of contemporary IONS are portals (Turban et al,
2000). A portal is defined as a linked electronic platform with a single point-of-entry,
independent of time and space that enables collaboration through access to multiple
sources of information. Sadtler et al. (2004) differentiates between three different
types of portal: employee portals, customer portals and business portals. Employee
portals are platforms designed to facilitate internal activities of a company, whereas
customer portals present information in a structured way to end customers. Business
portals focus on business partners, for example, they provide suppliers with
information and, or access to, the buyer's internal systems. The functionalities
incorporated in a business portal facilitate the buyer - supplier relationship and
ensure tighter collaboration (Sadtler et al., 2003). In this section, the focus is on
business portals that integrate content, applications and processes between different
business partners in order to:
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■ Improve communication and collaboration
■ Provide real-time access to information held in disparate systems
■ Personalise user interaction and provide a unified interface
■ Integrate relevant data, applications and business processes
Portals have been widely deployed within and between different companies.
The one's which operate between business partners are to a large extent based on
existing supplier contracts. Accordingly, the use of a supplier portal by a supplier is
another form of collaboration between the buyer and the supplier. However, the
success of a portal depends on the functionality and the user acceptance.
Additionally, portals are susceptible to issues of technical security. Functionality,
acceptance and security are the three key topics which can encounter active or
passive resistance for reasons of trust. The process of building trust is heavily based
upon past experiences that serve to prove and then reassure trustworthiness (Selin,
2006). However, apart from trust there are other issues surrounding standardisation
of IONS.
2.5.4 Standardisation issues of IONS
The development, implementation and use of IONS and related standards are a socio-
technical process of negotiation. Its open-ended character, similar to large
information infrastructures, raises theoretical questions and may lead to practical
problems in terms of adoption. Primarily, the reason for this is that decisions about
the technology and the standards have to be shared among a group of actors of
different organisations. As those organisations differ in their IT applications, systems
and business practices, IONS pose multilayered problems of harmonisation and
standardisation (Graham et ah, 1995). Particularly supply chain standards may call
for a convergence of business practices (e.g. change in organisational setting of the
individual organisations, etc.) in a user community and have to be agreed upon.
The issues of IONS with regard to standardisation are manifold and not particular
new, as contradicting factors shaping IONS were already identified during the
development and implementation ofElectronic Data Interchange (EDI) in the past
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decades (Graham et al., 1995). IONS and the Internet have emerged as perhaps the
key technological developments of the twentieth century (McLoughlin, 1999). From
a simple technical point of view, IONS are ICT-based systems bridging across
organisational borders (Bakos, 1991; Konsynski, 1993). These systems have
redefined the roles of and relationships between business partners, allowing new
ways of value creation and inter-organisational arrangements and process designs
(Riemer et al., 2001). However, the company-bridging aspects of IONS imply the
shift of boundaries of the organisations participating in a network. IONS consist of
different levels of relationship structures oscillating between the extremes of
competition and collaboration, far beyond traditional business relationships usually
existing between independent organisations in the market (Kumar & van Dissel,
1996).
In an increasingly globalised world, corporations are focusing on closer collaboration
within supply chains and subsequently, global processes tend to get increasingly
complex (Hanseth & Braa, 2000). According to Hanseth and Braa (2000), "as
corporations become more global, they become more integrated with each other and
with distant local contexts
According to Ciborra and Hanseth (2000), the arena of the development of large
information infrastructures is shaped by an increasing globalisation and strategic
alignment of actors. Whereas globalisation opens an organisation's doors to others,
the process of strategic alignment is increasingly long and difficult, fragile at the
same time and has to include a variety of actors and resources which try to influence
each other to constitute the socio-technical order. Consequently, forces, feedbacks
and self-reinforcing actions are at all play in shaping an outcome that is hard to be
predicted (Ciborra & Hanseth, 2000: 5).
In studying the dynamics of corporate information infrastructures, Ciborra and
Hanseth (2000) unveil unintended "management games" that govern the adoption of
infrastructures in large bureaucratic corporations as well as "the assessment of the
role technology played in reinforcing existing power structures" (Ciborra & Hanseth,
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2000: 1). The aim of the research particularly focused on the gap between initial
goals and plans and current outcomes (ibid). Moreover, another aspect of attention
was the various "initiatives taken by management, specialists and users to cope with
deviations and variance in outcome" (ibid).
However, IONS require interoperability of the different systems in a network. This is
not possible in the absence of common standards. Standards are necessary because
the formerly individual organisations had built up independent IT solutions.
However, the tension between standardisation and flexibility in IT implementation
has been highlighted by Hanseth et al. (1996). Standards rarely exist in hermetic
isolation and may be combined by users to create innovative constellations.
Technological choices were influenced by local vendors and prevailing national
communication standards, resulting in a lack of integration in both hardware and
software (Hanseth & Braa, 2000). However, as already analysed in the case ofEDI,
networking organisations tend to build local/national communities with locally
influenced standards first because they start collaborating on a vertical supply chain
level within their sector or within their national environment (Webster, J., 1995).
Although often portrayed as narrow technical matter, the development and
implementation of standardised IONS - such as portals - is a rich social process, and
is subject to wider and more complex influences than only those of a strict
technological nature (Williams, 1997). According to David and Steinmueller (1994)
and Jakobs (2000), IT standard development tends to be dominated and controlled by
major producers, with limited user involvement. For example, IT standard consortia
such as OASIS are dominated by large IT vendors' representatives who have the
financial resources as well as the technical expertise to participate (Jakobs, 2000).
However, in the case of IONS standards such as data exchange standards, large users
are often in the position to impose their own standard into the market, by-passing
standard setting bodies (Bunduchi et al., 2005). As suggested by current EDI
research, the explanation is often related to the power relationships between the
relevant actors (Ratnasingam, 2000; Webster, J., 1995).
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Not only social shaping of technology literature, for example Webster, J. (1995), but
even mainstream economic literature, for example Kumar and van Dissel (1996),
identified economic, technical and socio-political arguments as areas of potential
conflicts in alliances of IONS.
Within organisations, interactions between various groups can be observed in
adopting a new technology (e.g. between strategic and functional departments).
Additionally, a constant tension may be observed between the need to enforce
standard practice and flexibility and the need to involve user groups in getting the
technology to work through local adaptation (Russell & Williams, 2002: 71).
In a study of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) systems, Graham et al. (1996) noted
that EDI had evolved from being seen as a technology which could provide
developers with competitive advantage into a technology where the benefits to a
trading community from sharing an agreed standard outweighed the advantages from
differentiation. This realisation led UK retailers to co-operate through the Article
Numbering Association to develop e-business standards. The costs of two competing
standards led standards organisations to clearly define their areas of competence, as
seen in an agreement between ANSI and EDIFACT and sectored or local initiatives
avoiding encroaching on the domains of other bodies (Graham et al, 1995). This
same process of SDOs actively eschewing conflicts is seen today in the
memorandum of understanding between ISO, IEC, ITU, UN/ECE and OASIS in e-
business standardisation. If there are standards wars in e-business and e-government
standards, they are very cold wars.
The costs to a user sub-community of being locked into an inefficient standard are
mitigated by the flexibility of e-business standards allowing local dialects to emerge
(Damsgaard & Truex, 2000). The focusing of technology development on problems
widely accepted as barriers to use, termed by Hughes "reverse salients" (Hughes,
1983), is a useful insight into the dynamics of standards. In the early stages of the
development of a technology standards may be subsidiary to performance and even
feasibility, but once the technology has been demonstrated efforts may be redirected
towards standardisation.
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This chapter has reviewed a large number of existing literatures of sociology of
technology, organisational studies, economics and sociology of standardisation and
the sociology of IONS in order to ensure the interdisciplinary approach as well as to
get a better understanding of the single theories and their analytical frameworks used.
In the subsequent methodology chapter, this knowledge will be used to develop a
new model.
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Chapter 3. METHODOLOGY and RESEARCH
DESIGN
3.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the methodology used and the research design applied.
Empirical research is guided by the underlining philosophy of the research design.
The research philosophy helps to configure the overall research and to identify
different avenues or limitations of particular approaches (Easterby-Smith et ah,
1991). One of the key choices in methodology at research design relates to the
dichotomy frequently drawn between the two main research paradigms: positivism
and phenomenology (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; Miles & Huberman, 1994;
Creswell, 1994; Yin, 1994; Punch, 1999).
The basic beliefs of the positivist paradigm are that the world is external and
objective, the observer is independent and science is value-free. A researcher should
therefore focus on facts, look for causality in formulating hypothesis and test them.
Preferred research methods are operationalising concepts to allow measurement of
sample that, ideally, are large. In contrast to the positivist view, the basic beliefs of
the phenomenological perspective are hang on the fact that the world is socially
constructed and subjective, that the observer is part what he observes and that
science is driven by human interests. Thus, the researcher is interested to explore the
focus on meanings and tries to understand what is happening. Ele looks at the
completeness of each situation and develops ideas through induction from the data
gathered. Consequently, multiple methods are employed to establish different views
of phenomena, and small samples are investigated in depth or over time (Easterby-
Smith etal. 1991: 27).
The main strengths of the positivist paradigm are the wide coverage of the range of
situations as well as the economic statistics that can be derived from large samples.
However, this concept seems to be inflexible and artificial in terms of the
understanding of processes or the significance that people attach to actions (ibid).
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Strengths and weaknesses of the phenomenology paradigm tend to be
complementary. Whereas the disregard of processes is a weakness in the positivist
perspective, this is a strength in terms of being able to look at change processes over
time, understand people's meanings and adjust to new issues and theories that
emerge in the phenomenological approach. However, the positivist approach requires
significant time and resources for data gathering and the analysis and interpretation
of data (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991: 32).
The choice of a research paradigm is important because it influences the empirical
research in terms of research strategy. Techniques for data collection and methods
for data analysis are based on the philosophical assumptions of the research
paradigm chosen at the conception of the study (Easterby-Smith et ah, 1991; Hussey
& Hussey, 1997). For this reason, the research paradigm needs to be based upon
criteria that match the research strategy with the research questions of the study
(Hussey & Hussey, 1997). Such criteria include: (1) the nature of the problem
studied (Creswell, 1994), (2) the context of the research and the researchers personal
preferences (Easterby-Smith et ah, 1991) and (3) the research problem (Hussey &
Hussey, 1997).
This research is approached from a phenomenological perspective. The adoption of
the research methodology is guided by the author's preference and the research
objective to link the in-depth practical experience of a six-year project with the
relevant theories.
After an introduction into the research methodology, the research questions are
described in detail. Subsequently, the research design with a focus on case studies is
illustrated as well as the frameworks used to draft a new model. Finally, the detailed




The thesis seeks to analyse, from an SST perspective, the factors leading to the
approach of developing and implementing standardised technology as well as the
effects of them on cross-company processes and buyer-supplier relationships in
automotive networks. According to Berg (1995), the purpose of research is to
discover answers to questions through the application of systematic procedures
(Blaikie, 2003: 59). In the literature about research methodology, the importance of
research questions is illustrated differently, as can be observed across Yin (1993),
Miles and Huberman (1994), Creswell (1994), Marshall and Rossmann (1995) or
Fleck (1998). Whereas Yin has linked research questions to types of research designs
such as experiment, survey or case study (see next section), Fleck insists upon the
importance of the formulation of research questions in terms of "the central step that
essentially determines success in qualitative research" (Fleck, 1998: 47). According
to Blaikie (2003), the research objectives determine the research questions and both
are strongly linked with the research topic and the research strategy (Blaikie, 2003:
61).
Based on the existing theory and in-depth practical project knowledge and industry
background, a conceptual model was developed to answer the following research
questions. The research topic is reflected in the research questions. Therefore, the
results of the research questions contribute to both theory and practice. Due to high
pressure in the automotive industry to collaborate closer and integrate business
partners, an inter-organisational portal strategy is needed. Thus, the first research
question is:
(1) What are the factors that shape the emergence of an inter-organisational
portal strategy?
The emergence of an inter-organisational portal strategy will be analysed from the
perspective of a car manufacturer (Original Equipment Manufacturer, OEM).
However, this also involves other actors such as suppliers and intermediaries or
consultants. External market pressure and internal requirements to reduce cost and
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risk as well as to optimise processes are the main triggers for an OEM to develop an
inter-organisational portal strategy. Another trigger is to take advantage of Internet
technology to reduce costs. Therefore, the inter-organisational portal strategy has to
take into consideration not only the already existing business relationships with
suppliers but also any existing IT strategy and the IT infrastructure that has to be
integrated with internet-based solutions. Moreover, political issues might occur
within the OEM and with suppliers in terms of different strategic alternatives.
The second research question to be answered is about the dynamics of standards:
(2) What causes the dynamics in developing and implementing a standardised
supplier portal?
The existing empirical literature in standardisation has adopted a static approach
towards the study of the standardisation process and the interaction between the
various stages of a standard's life cycle. Its influence on the evolution of standards
over time has been largely ignored. Thus, the approach attempts to study the
standardisation process in a dynamic way that covers the different phases such as
strategy, development, implementation and use phase, as well as taking into
consideration the standardisation setting context and the actors. The analysis will
also look, from a stability perspective, into the previous history of a standard and
how earlier versions may affect future development. This involves the reasons that
cause dynamism, for example in terms of the realignment of a standard.
Finally, the third and fourth research questions focus on the outcome of
standardisation and on role the dynamics aspect is playing:
(3) How do these dynamics pattern the outcomes? And how does local change
take part in the wider context of the sector?
The implementation of a certain standard has important consequences for the
participating organisations on different levels. For example, the extension of
67
corporate boundaries in order to be part of a larger network may create qualitative
and quantitative effects with regard to organisational, technical and social aspects. In
this way, adoption of a particular standardisation strategy can generate complex
interactions between the technology and the participating organisations that might
influence their monopoly, flexibility and/or efficiency. The study of the interrelation
between IONS standardisation and the modelling of good business practices will
eventually outline practical implications and yield recommendations how to




In social sciences, five major research strategies exist that can be used for
exploratory, descriptive and explanatory purposes: experiments, surveys, archival
analysis, histories and case studies (Yin, 1994). The choice of research strategy
depends on three factors: (a) the type of research question posed, (b) the extent of
control an investigator has over actual behavioural events and (c) the degree of focus
on contemporary as opposed to historical events (Yin, 1994: 4).
For research questions such as "how" and "what" regarding a contemporary set of
events over which the investigator has little or no control, the case study is
considered to be the best research strategy (Yin, 1994). The case study approach is
preferred in explanatory research examining emerging phenomena and contemporary
events, and relies on two sources of evidence: direct observation and systematic
interviewing (Yin, 1994: 8). According to Yin (1994), a case study is "an empirical
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon with its real-life context,
especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly
evident" (Yin, 1994: 13) (see also e.g. Creswell, 1994: 12; Benbasat et al., 1987).
A case study strategy is not a single specific method of data collection such as
ethnography or observation. Case studies could also include other sources of data
such as literature studies (Yin, 1994). Additionally, every case investigation should
have a general analytic strategy, to guide the decision regarding what will be
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analysed and for what reason (Yin, 1994). Thus, the role of the strategy is to support
the investigator to choose among different techniques and to complete the analytic
phase of the research successfully. According to Dube and Pare (2003), the setting
where the case study was conducted, the specific period of time under investigation,
the data collection periods and whether or not the researcher was able to gain
sufficient access and has spent enough time to develop an intimate understanding of
the setting and the phenomenon of interest, are very important with regard to
credibility and generalisability (Dube & Pare, 2003).
The single-case study as a research design was chosen for the pragmatic reason that
the standardised portal development and implementation in the automotive industry
context had been a real time event and a very large-scale innovation project that the
author had access to. Prior to the consultant work for the Global Procurement &
Supply department ofDaimlerChrysler, I have a long history ofwork experience.
With an engineering background, I hold a degree in business administration with a
focus on computer sciences. After starting my career at the central purchasing
department of Siemens, Germany, I joined the KPMG procurement practice in Paris,
France, where I worked in the area ofprocurement and supply, followed by an
engagement as Content Director for Commerce One.
SST provides guidelines and concepts to explore both continuity and change
(Sorensen & Williams, 2002: 89), and this approach seems to represent best the
environment of current situations where ICT innovations such as portals are
deployed in the industry. In SST, the case study approach attempts to explain the
specificity of processes in different areas of technology and different domains of
application, and the dependence of outcomes on contingent factors such as history
and social settings. This single case study is not only a description of the highly
complex setting of its environment, but also of the conditions under which a
particular outcome was produced and how they can be analysed.
In this thesis, the researcher explores a single phenomenon ("the portal case")
bounded by time and activity ("project") and collects detailed information by using a
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variety of data collection such as ethnography, quantitative and qualitative data
procedures including participant observation during a sustained period of time (six







Figure 6. Basic types of designs for case studies (Yin, 1994: 39)
Type 1 - single-case holistic design
Type 2 - single-case embedded design
Type 3 - multiple-case holistic design
Type 4 - multiple -case embedded design
An appropriately developed theory is the level at which the generalisation of case
study results will occur (analytical generalisation). Four tests have been commonly
used to establish the quality of empirical social research (Yin, 1994: 32): (1)
construct validity - establishment of correct operational measures, (2) Internal
validity - establishment for causal relationships (for explanatory/causal case studies
only), (3) External validity - establishment of domain to which the study's findings
can be generalised and (4) Reliability - demonstration that operations of study such
as data collection procedures can be repeated, with the same results (ibid: 33). As a
detailed description of the research context is necessary to assess the credibility of
the research results and findings, and to determine their validity and generalisability
(Punch, 1999: 30; Miles & Huberman, 1994: 36), the context of this case study will
be described in chapter 4 (Benbasat et al., 1987; Yin, 1994).
In each explanatory case study, the unit of analysis has to be specified, whether it is,
for example, a specific technology, a methodology, or a particular type of
organisation. The definition of the unit of analysis is related to the way the initial
research questions have been defined (Yin, 1994: 22). This is critical in
Single-case Multiple-case
design design
Type 1 Type 3
Type 2 Type 4
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understanding how the case study relates to a broader body of knowledge (Dube &
Pare, 2003). As Markus (1989) notes, it is critical to the practical significance of the
findings that the theory rests on the appropriate unit of analysis (Markus, 1989). In
an explanatory case, a clear definition confirms that the unit of analysis under study
is consistent with the boundaries of the theory being tested (Dube & Pare, 2003:
610). As illustrated in Figure 7, this case study uses five different units of analysis:
the actors, alternative strategic options, networks, context and resources.
Figure 1. Units of analysis
Critical reflections
This research follows a single-case embedded case study design. Following Yin,
(1994) single case study design was chosen because it enables the researcher to
observe and analyse a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation
(Yin, 1994: 38-40). This choice is motivated by the long-term engagement in an
IONS portal implementation project and the strong professional industry background
of the researcher. The potential vulnerability of the single-case design is that this
case may later turn out not to be the case it was thought to be at the outset (Yin,
1994: 41; Punch, 1999: 153). Thus, single-cases require careful investigation of the
potential case up-front, to minimise the risk ofmisrepresentation and to maximise the
access needed to collect the case study evidence. In this study, ethnography is used to
support the single-case approach and to establish a longitudinal perspective in order
to ensure reliability and generalisability. According to Lipset et al. (1956), the goal
of a single case study is to do a "generalising", not a "particularising", analysis
(Lipset et al., 1956: 419-420).
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Some researchers argue that the case study approach suffers from the small
possibility ofvalid generalisation: case studies provide little basis for scientific
generalisation. However, the results of a single case study do not represent a
"sample" and the researcher's goal is to expand and generalise theories (analytic
generalisation) rather than to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation) (Yin,
1994: 10).
The subsequent descriptions of the strategy, development and implementation of the
global supplier portal are mostly based on my personal participant observer status in
the project. The descriptions are based on a chronological basis and the information
derives from personal observations in project meetings and workshops where I was
directly or indirectly involved. Additionally, internal documentation came from
multiple sources which led to a difficulty in citation. The direct involvement in the
project as participant observer linked with personal professional experience shaped a
particular viewpoint. To solve this issue and to include another perspective into my
descriptions, managers from DC IT, GP&S and Covisint were interviewed one year
after the pilot start of the portal.
3.3.2 The frameworks used
As it is an issue to analyse the context of a case, the single-case study approach was
complemented by concepts of the SST research and the organisational studies strand,
namely the concept of'arena' of Jorgensen (1999) and the 'firm-in-sector' approach
ofWhipp and Clark (1986).
Arena of development
The locus of technology innovation has received a lot of attention in recent social
studies of technology (detailed description in chapter 2). However, the complexity
and dynamism of standardisation set specific challenges for theory building.
According to Fomin et al. (2003), theoretical frameworks have to fulfil a number of
criteria in terms of openness and the ability to capture the essential features of the
standardisation process and its outcomes. Also, concepts should take into
consideration the standardisation agreements related to technical artefacts, the
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involvement ofmultiple activities (including decision making and technical
construction) and also the change of the standardisation process over time and space
across a set of diverse actors who do not necessarily share the same interests (Fomin
et al., 2003). I will return back to these aspects when developing the new framework
(in chapter 7).
A "development arena" is defined as a space which holds together the settings and
relationships that comprise the context where a standard develops, and includes three
distinct elements: (1) a number of elements such as actors, artefacts and standards,
(2) a variety of locations for action, knowledge and vision, and (3) a set of
translations that shape and play out the stabilisation and destabilisation of relation
and artefacts (Jorgensen, 1999). The notion of "development arena" emphasises the
idea that a particular product or process is shaping and changing throughout its
lifetime, and that the processes ofmarket creation, user positioning, recruitment and
interaction are as important as the early stage of development in shaping the product
(Jorgensen, 1999).
The "development arena" concept is very similar to the Actor Network notion of
"actor worlds" (Callon, 1986) discussed in chapter two. Callon's "actor world"
describes how actor networks are built and maintained, and how they break down,
but it has problems dealing with broader structures, such as the issue of competition
between actor worlds (i.e. how different such actor networks compete in building
different actor worlds). Within the ANT framework, these networks are just other,
more durable actor networks. To address these shortcomings, Jorgensen and
Sorensen (2002) have introduced the concept of a "development arena" which frames
the heterogeneous processes in technological change drawing from existing theories
of technology management. The concept consists of the notion of configurations
defining a space containing certain orderings. The concept complements innovation
economy and ANT; elements from both theories have a place in the arena as
'configurations' (ibid: 218). It provides a space for conceiving and visualising the
fight between competing attempts at translating and stabilising heterogeneous
elements into concrete technologies and networks (ibid: 218).
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The arena concept of Jorgensen (1999) is one concept which allows for inclusion of a
broader context and addresses the issue of competition and co-operation between
different actor networks, to explain how different actor networks co-exist and
interfere with each other within a certain space. In this way, the notion of
"development arena" can be applied to explain the evolution of standards as a result
of competition and co-operation between different networks of actors (Jorgensen,
1999).
The development arena concept also enables a multi-level analysis that encompasses
the interactions between various actors networks involved in standards development.
It aims to capture key participants and features of particular contexts of innovation.
This concept of a special innovation development space is characterised by a
population of actors and artefacts, and by the relationships between them. The actors,
artefacts and processes are characterised and delimited by a cognitive space that
holds together the settings and the relations within that represents the context for
technology developments. Conceptually, it allows for the inclusion of competition
between the actors, the entry of new actors and strategic realignments that may arise
in an increasingly 'globalised' innovation landscape. Thus, the "arena of
development" concept accommodates the analysis of the development and
interaction ofmultiple networks better than the widely-adopted actor network theory
notion of "actor worlds" (Russell & Williams, 2002; Jorgensen & Sorensen, 2002).
The notion of development arenas is thus a helpful instrument to analyse the
dynamics of standard setting and the changes in inter-organisational relationships
with regard to the development and implementation of a standard. In this context,
interestingly, both concepts presented by Jorgensen and Sorensen (1999) as well as
by Clausen and Koch (1999) pay attention to the management of a company, how
decisions are being made regarding the development and implementation of a




As discussed in Chapter 2, ANT does not deal with different levels. In the framework
developed different levels are introduced, the meso level - the industry context, and
the firm level - the micro level, which are both important to be analysed separately
and in their interplay. The firm-in-sector framework is included in the new
framework to draw attention to the comparative dimension of the industry context as
well as the historical and cultural dimension which allows for an intra-organisational
analysis.
Based on the work ofPettigrew (1985, 1987), Whipp and Clark (1986) investigated
the process of design and innovation in the automotive industry. In their study, they
analysed for the first time the process of innovation in the automotive industry from
a product, process and work organisation perspective. The authors examined the
experience of the Rover Company and their major innovation project during the
1970s and 1980s in the context of a changing global car industry (Whipp & Clark,
1986).
Whipp and Clark criticised the research approach ofmany economic theorists
approaching innovations, and particularly strategic innovations, only from a product
and process perspective, neglecting the fact of the dependant change in work
organisations. Above all, they noted the small progress which had been made so far
in unravelling the roles and relationships within the process of innovation and in
management and labour (ibid: 7). Other points of criticism included the insufficient
historical and comparative component in analysing innovations as well as the
fragmented specialist approach of analysing innovations instead of focussing on the
total process (ibid: 8). Abernathy (1978) analysed long-term changes in products and
production processes from an economic and engineering point of view. Whipp and
Clark (1986) extended Abernathy's work by adding the knowledge of social
scientists ofwork organisations encompassing the entire process of design and
innovation (Whipp & Clark, 1986).
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For the first time, the innovation study of Whipp and Clark (1986) analysed the
process of innovation in the automotive industry from a product, process and work
organisation perspective. Their framework of inquiry analyses product, process and
work organisation and consists of four major pillars (see Figure 8): the historical
dimension, the comparative dimension, the sector and the enterprise dimension





Figure 8. Framework of inquiry (Whipp & Clark, 1986: 15)
The framework allowed for focusing on "the interrelationships between the design of
products, production processes and work organisations by addressing the multiple
structures within the enterprise and by locating design and innovation within the
appropriate historical perspective and comparative contexts" (Whipp & Clark: 14).
Consequently, innovation in productive units is analysed along the historical and
comparative dimension and on the two main levels of the enterprise and the sector
(ibid). In analysing the whole process of design and innovation in a longitudinal
study ofRover, Whipp and Clark (1986) in their 'analytically structured narrative'
(ibid: 211) found that corporate knowledge is highly specific and politically
embedded. However, even nearby productive units have had difficulties translating
corporate policies into specific projects (ibid: 211). The study revealed a various
number of competing and interdependent staff who were directly and indirectly
involved (ibid). Therefore, the design process as a strategic innovation was shaped
by Targe degrees of uncertainty and indeterminacy' due to multiple opportunities to
shift directions (ibid: 213). The innovation process becomes a chance for many
interest groups who used it to advance their agendas, reshape power relations or
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selectively interpret major corporate policies. Consequently, those struggles and
conflicts led to a fragmentation of the entire process (ibid: 213).
To integrate the dynamics of innovations and industrial change, Whipp and Clark
(1986) developed their framework of inquiry by focusing on the interrelations
involved in innovations, processes and work organisation by addressing the multiple
structures within the enterprise and by locating innovation within the appropriate
historical perspective and comparative context (Whipp & Clark, 1986). In analysing
the whole process of design and innovation in a longitudinal study ofRover, Whipp
and Clark (1986) in their 'analytically structured narrative' (ibid: 211) found that
corporate knowledge is highly specific and politically embedded. However, even
nearby productive units have had difficulties to translate corporate policies into
specific projects (ibid: 211). Therefore, the design process as a strategic innovation
was shaped by 'large degrees of uncertainty and indeterminacy' due to multiple
opportunities to shift directions (ibid: 213). The innovation process becomes a
chance for many interest groups who use it to advance their agendas, reshape power
relations or selectively interpret major corporate policies. Consequently, those
struggles and conflicts led to a fragmentation of the entire process (ibid: 213).
Regarding the sector dimension, this study will analyse the relationships between
business partners in the automotive industry, particularly in the context of IONS
implementation. Interviews of consultants, service providers, OEMs and suppliers
are complemented by the analysis of available documentation of technology
implementation in the industry. Within the enterprise dimension, interviews with
actors from different business departments and top management have been carried
out. Additionally, all documentation available such as, for example,
production/procurement processes, supplier policies, company ethics, etc. have also
been analysed.
Enterprises possess a repertoire of structures which are part of the corporate culture.
This fact generally presents a problem in developing a processual perspective to
handle the notion of a structural repertoire "in such a way that events occurring
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infrequently lead to the transformation ofthe repertoire into a new structuration "
('structure/event/structure') (ibid: 41). The inclusion of the historical dimension
covers the changes in the automotive industry that could be observed in the past
decades. The quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis, and the
ethnographical approach, try to avoid misinterpretations often experienced in
snapshot case studies which only allow an episodic view on phenomenon. Finally,
the comparative dimension reveals the role of associations (industry institutions) in
the automotive industry in the context of the deployment of standardised IONS in the
entire industry, supplemented by interviews with key actors of other OEMs and
available documentation.
Although the 'firm-in-sector' framework is a useful concept it provides a very
schematic treatment of the sector. In this study, a more specific view on different
levels is needed due to the fact that supply chains are both of a process and technical
nature.
3.3.3 Approach to draft a new framework
As illustrated in Figure 9 a new model consisting of both of the concepts of
'arena of development' and 'firm-in-sector' has been developed.
Figure 9. The standardisation arena and the 'firm-in-sector' concept merged
The actors are understood as the "relevant social groups" (Bijker & Law, 1992) who
hold a stake in the development and implementation of the new standard. For
example, the standardisation arena comprises the companies that want to develop and
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implement a new standard: software providers, business consultants, technical
experts, market intermediaries, and their suppliers. Quite frequently, the same actors
or actors from the same sector are involved in competing standard setting processes,
e.g. suppliers often have to accommodate different customers with different standard
requirements. As a result, a complex web of interests characterises the
standardisation arena which is leading into complex interaction amongst them.
The actors in the standardisation arena are linked in a complex organisational setting
which is characterised by two levels of analysis: the company layer on a micro level
and the industry layer on a meso level. On the micro level of analysis, i.e., the
company layer, the actors are linked through a concrete IONS standardisation project
and can be characterised not only by their relationships but also by their
organisational structure and culture. Consequently, the level of analysis is much
more detailed than on the industry level. Here, the focus is on a specific company
driven by Internet-based technological innovations and market triggers, and directly
involved in IONS standardisation initiatives. This particular company is embedded in
its industry, incorporating structures and processes, organisational culture, market
posture or arenas ofpower (Whipp & Clark, 1986). As this company has set up a
dedicated project team which has been in charge of a specific IONS standardisation
project to improve inter-organisational collaboration between players in the industry,
the nature of the relationships between the single players can be analysed in detail,
for example in terms of trust and power.
The next focus of attention is intermediaries such as electronic marketplaces (e-
market) and/or consultants. The role of the e-market is ambiguous insofar as the
intermediary is a technology provider connected to the industry and the company
through a set of new technologies. The intermediary is the formation and demise of a
coalition of companies that coordinate IONS development, standardisation and
implementation (Chwelos et al, 2001; Ratnasingam, 2000; Venkatraman, 1994). This
standard setting coalition attempts to dominate the market by introducing a de-facto
standard, a standardised technology platform, which is called 'industry standard' or
'best practice'. In doing so, they develop standards around a template ofwork
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practices from the context of their early development and use (Sorensen & Williams,
2002). This standard-setting coalition in an inter-organisational network has the
potential to constrain innovation by promoting a particular solution as best practice
and de-emphasising others (Swan, 1994: 86).
In contrast to the company layer, on the meso level of analysis, i.e. the industry layer,
the focus is on the entire industry including the market with manufactured and sold
products and players such as manufacturing companies, suppliers, industry
intermediaries, consultants or industrial associations (see Figure 10). The actors are
linked through their supply chains which are electronically mediated by ICT and can
be characterised in terms of their role in the industry, the nature of their relationships
and the pressures they are forced by.
3.4 Data collection and data analysis
3.4.1 Data collection
The research methodology follows the principles of qualitative research inquiry
(Creswell, 1994), and a mixture of quantitative and qualitative techniques are used
for data collection and analysis. Benbasat et al. (1987: 381) point out that "a clear
description ofthe data sources and the way they contribute to the findings ofthe
research is an important aspect of the reliability and validity of the findings in case
research The connection of the data collecting method provides the link between
IT Supply
Figure 10. Companies collaborate in supply chains
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research purposes, research questions, research strategy and data collection
techniques (Marshall & Rossman, 1989: 78).
The data collection is based on multiple data sources such as ethnographical
observation, quantitative data gained from an online survey, and qualitative data
gathered through semi-structured interviews and internal project documentation as
well as publicly available information (Blomberg et al., 1995; Button & Sharrock,
1996). In this case study, each of the research questions were answered by using
ethnography, documentation and semi-structured interviews.
Ethnography
Hammersley and Atkinson (1995:1-10) claim that ethnographical research is done by
a researcher who participates, overtly or covertly, in people's daily lives for an
extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking
questions and collecting any other relevant data (Punch, 1999: 157). Wolcott (1988)
points out "ethnography means, literally, a picture of the way oflife ofsome
identifiable group ofpeople. Conceivably those people could be any culture-bearing
group, in any time andplace" (Wolcott, 1988: 188). According to Easterby-Smith et
al. (1991), ethnography requires the researcher to "immerse himselfor herself in a
setting and to become part ofthe group under study" (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991:
38). The point of ethnography is to study and understand the cultural and symbolic
aspects of behaviour and the context of that behaviour, whatever the specific focus of
the research which is typically a case. In addition to this, six related important
characteristics determine ethnography:
(1) Ethnography starts from the assumption that the shared cultural meanings of
the observed group are crucial to understand its behaviour
(2) The ethnographer is sensitive to the meanings that behaviour, actions, events
and contexts have
(3) The case will be studied in its natural setting
(4) Ethnography is likely to be an unfolding and evolving sort of study, rather than
pre-structured
(5) Data collection techniques are eclectic, not restricted
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(6) Data collection will typically be prolonged and repetitive (Punch, 1999: 160-
161).
The researcher was part of the portal project team working within DCXnet. This
ensured not only a very good access to data but also allowed for a better
understanding of the context and the interactions of all actors. As a result, an
extended and detailed study over a period of six years, two years full-time on the
project followed by interviews done one-and-a-half years later after the portal pilot
went live, and the subsequent research, could be conducted.
3.4.2 The semi-structured interviews
In Table 1, the interview guidelines for the semi-structured interviews related to the
research questions and the suggested analytical framework are listed.
Table 1. Research questions and topics of discussion
Research question Topics of discussion
1. What are the factors that shape the
emergence of a inter-organisational portal
strategy?
■ What role does a portal strategy
play within a corporate business
strategy setting?
■ What factors/actors determine
the direction of a portal strategy?
2. What causes the dynamics in
developing and implementing a
standardised supplier portal?
■ How are the influences of actors
and factors understood?
■ How do the individual actors
influence the different stages of
the standardisation life cycle?
■ How do the single stages
influence each other?
■ What alternatives emerged
during the different stages of the
standardisation process?
3. How do these dynamics pattern the
outcomes?
4. How does local change take part in the
wider context of the sector?
■ What are your individual
perceptions of outcomes?
■ How do these match the
expectations?
■ If there is a gap and, if so, what
do you think is the principal
reason for this?
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3.4.3 Analysis of the semi-structured interviews
According to Miles and Huberman (1994), a summary-aided approach is useful to
analyse the data of semi-structured interviews (see Figure 11).
Figure 11. Summary-aided approach to analysis (according to Miles & Huberman, 1994: 79)
Field notes and their write-ups should be reduced in the respective summaries. This
also helps preparing coding and the drawing of conclusions. As contemporary social
sciences are likely to use semi-structured interviewing, the data gathered needs
interpretation in combination with reasonably extensive observation of actual social
situations (Blaikie, 2003). To get the collected data into a form suitable for analysis,
data reduction techniques such as coding frames have to be established as data from
open questions require a set of coding categories (e.g. Oppenheim, 1992; de Vaus
1995, in Blaikie, 2003: 235).




Interview partners No of
interviewees
OEMs 4 ■ Strategic department B2B
■ IT department













SW Provider 2 ■ Technical experts 2
Other 2 ■ Consultants 2
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3.5 Benefits of the research
This research is relevant both for academia and industry. For academia, with the
suggested analytical model, a framework is available that aims to analyse the
dynamics of standardisation. The case is an interdisciplinary and longitudinal study
consisting of an unusual combination of social, technological and economic theories.
The different strands of existing research are linked together in order to achieve
contributions for a deeper understanding of the dynamics of standards development
and implementation of inter-organisational networks and systems.
For practioners in companies, this thesis helps to understand the issues of developing
and implementing standardised IONS from both perspectives the micro and the meso
level. With the practical relevance of the chosen topic and the results found,
interested companies facing the same situation could benefit from the description of
the project and the related issues discussed. According to feedback from international
paper reviews and conferences, this socio-technical analysis of standardisation in
IONS from a social shaping perspective is one of the rare studies that investigated
ICT in its context.
The longitudinal and contextualised single-case study approach was chosen to
explore the portal implementation case from a SST perspective because it turned out
to be an exceptionally detailed case with much information. During the project I
occupied a dual role both as actor and as a participant observer, which had its
benefits and downsides. On the one hand, it offered the unique chance to get access
to rich and valuable information and data to create a rich knowledge base. On the
other hand, as actor I was part of the system that framed my writing. It is difficult to
track back some of the information sources, for example. I cited sources wherever it
was possible, but had to interrogate carefully my commitment and position.
Data collection tools such as ethnography, project documentation and semi-
structured interviews were used. The value of the research in terms ofvalidity and
generalisibility was assured by reviews of submitted conference papers and journal
articles. Eventually, the thesis is valuable for praxis and academia due to more than
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13 years ofpersonal working experience in procurement and logistics, and more than
seven years in e-business.
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Chapter 4. CASE STUDY CONTEXT
4.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to provide the context of the study. With respect to portals as
tools to support and bridge inter-organisational processes between car
manufacturers and suppliers, the focus of this chapter is to describe the
automotive environment, starting about around 120 years ago. Beginning with a
historical perspective in the next section, the industry of today and its actors are
described as being reshaped tremendously by technological changes and
enormous market pressures. All those changes are explained in section 4.3.
Their outcomes influenced the ways Original Equipment Manufacturers
(OEMs) and their suppliers are structured internally, and co-operate today.
For about two decades, the automotive sector has been using IONS systems,
starting with EDI for the exchange of real-time information, mainly in logistics.
With the advent of Internet-based technologies a wider range of possibilities
enables the support of business processes between an OEM and its supply base.
Portal technology in particular enabled not only the exchange of information,
for example in logistics, but supported most of the business processes during the
manufacturing of a car. Portal technology allows for collaboration between
OEM and suppliers across company boundaries. To facilitate cross-company
activities, electronic marketplaces (e-markets) as intermediaries entered the
market; for example Covisint hosted both the supplier portal investigated here,
as well as the major competitor SupplyOn.
Most of the study was done at DaimlerChrysler (DC), an overview ofwhich is
subsequently provided. As mostly the Global Procurement & Supply
department (GP&S) was responsible for the supplier portal project, this
department is also briefly introduced. The chapter concludes with a brief
summary.
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4.2 (Hi)story of the automotive industry - an evolutionary reflection
"The Model TFord is being available in all colours - as long as it is black"
(Ford & Crowther, 1922: chapter IV).
4.2.1 The birth of the Automotive Industry
The automotive industry has already been studied in the past regarding
technological change (e.g. Abernathy, 1978; Whipp & Clark, 1986). A brief
review of the historical events will provide the context to describe the massive
changes in the automotive market and the subsequent changes in the whole
industry.
Originally, the automotive industry had its roots in European countries such as
Germany4, France and the United Kingdom. Additionally, the US were a big
player, but entered the market at a later stage. In Europe, from about 1880 until
1908, cars were manufactured through craft production rooted in the rich
industrial experience that had existed in Europe for over a century (Lamming,
1993). Craft production was characterised by a highly skilled work force in
design, machine operations and fittings. Many of the workers progressed from
apprenticeship to posses a full set of craft skills and were then able to run their
own workshops, and so become contractors to assembling companies.
Companies were extremely decentralised; most parts of a car came from small
workshops. The owner coordinated everyone involved - customers, employees
and suppliers. General purpose machine tools were performing operations for
very low production volumes: 1,000 or fewer cars per year, only a few ofwhich
were built to the same design. Out of 50 no two were exactly alike since craft
techniques inherently produced variations (Womack et ah, 1990: 24).
Whereas in the first years of the industry the market was populated by hundreds
of small firms each producing only a small number of cars, the situation
changed dramatically when Henry Ford started to manufacture his famous
4
Piore and Sable (1984) point out that craft production remains at the heart ofGerman
manufacturing.
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"Model T". The main characteristics of the Model T included the reduction in
complexity and number of components (standardised component
manufacturing) in order to make assembly easier. This was the start ofmass
production. Changes in the product design were triggered by both the market -
'a universal car for the common man' - and by technology (Lamming, 1993).
With advances in machine tools, Ford was able to develop innovative designs
with a reduced number of parts and he made these parts easy to assemble.
According to Chandler (1964), the idea of interchangeable parts was not new,
but Henry Ford was the first person who fully applied them in the automotive
industry. This reduction in complexity represented a cost reduction in the
manufacturing process and improvements in quality. However, this had
significant consequences for the suppliers because fewer parts meant fewer
suppliers and larger and more sophisticated parts meant more demanding
challenges for suppliers (Lamming, 1993: 4-5). The Model T gave the Ford a
dominant position in the industry.
By 1926, other car companies such as Chrysler or General Motors (GM), led by
the legendary Alfred P. Sloan, joined the bandwagon and overtook Ford's
market share. GM pioneered the organisational innovation of decentralised
operating entities linked through communication and reporting systems.
Additionally, they provided the market with a range of car brands which were
part of a larger corporation (Abernathy, 1978). GM also took a different
approach in terms of collaboration with suppliers. Ford's view of them was
characterised by mistrust and close technical control, eventually leading to a
vertical integration/in-sourcing of suppliers. Sloan decided not to operate in
component manufacturing, but rather rely on external suppliers and outsource as
much of the manufacturing as possible.
4.2.2 Cars enter the world
From 1907 to 1924 the British market expanded more than tenfold whereas the
US market increased seventy fold in the same period (Whipp & Clark, 1986). In
a phase of industry transformation, the North American 'big three', Ford, GM
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and Chrysler, exported mass production to the whole world. In Europe, they
opened plants in England in 1911, in Australia in 1925, and they set up
'completely knocked down' (CKD)5 assembly operations kits in Japan. Due to
the adoption of the deskilling processes ofmass production, many craft
companies disappeared and European automotive engineering gradually became
history. As Womack (1988) summarises, mass production is characterised by
high scale mechanical components produced with single-purpose machines,
specialisation in work tasks, concentration on manufacturer level and vertical
integration of the final assembly manufacturing. This requires the coordination
of complex processes with multiyear lead times and large capital investments
(Lamming, 1993; Womack, 1988: 303).
In Europe, the years between 1930 and 1980 were characterised by the adoption
of the American mass production system. For example, in Germany large scale
production appealed to the industrial engineering professionals (Lamming,
1993: 12). As American cars were unsuitable for the European market (due to
for example, size, different European countries having different tastes and
different economic circumstances) a plethora of design experiments emerged
(Altshuler et al., 1984: 21). Additionally, protective tariffs prevented the large-
scale export of American cars to Europe. After these tariff barriers for export to
the US were removed in the 1950s and 1960s, Europeans sold their smaller cars
to the US. In modifying the mass production concept, they achieved economies
of scale and consolidated their progress in product innovation. About six car
manufacturers produced cars in high volumes, in addition to half a dozen
manufacturers of luxury and performance cars.
Suppliers had gradually developed into a technologically sophisticated
component industry and experienced lower levels of vertical integration than
before (Womack, 1988: 304). European suppliers had their origins in highly
skilled craft-based companies. Some of them, for example the Zahnradfabrik
5
Completely Knocked Down (CKD) means the entire decomposition of a car in its country of origin
and the subsequent assembly in a country where for example it is forbidden to import a complete car
or customs hamper imports (high tariffs).
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Friedrichshafen (ZF), were involved in technological innovations like airships,
and Bosch worked on control systems. These type of suppliers were unaligned,
not depending upon a specific car manufacturer. Due to political reasons, a
strong national identity played an important role in terms of collaboration
between suppliers and car manufacturers. In Germany, for example, a huge and
influential industry association "Verband Deutscher Automobilindustrie"
(VDA) was founded and aimed to knit German suppliers and car manufacturers
together (see also 4.3.1.).
4.2.3 A new player changes the auto production game
The next transformation of the automotive industry was largely triggered by the
market entrance of Japan, strongly related to their approach to improve mass
production, and subsequently the influence this had on the established mass
market manufacturers. In the 1950s, the Japanese Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) severely restricted foreign investments and forced
twelve domestic car companies to coordinate their product offerings to achieve
economies of scale. Thus, MITI's policies clearly helped the Japanese car
manufacturers joining the global automotive industry (Lamming, 1993: 17).
According to Womack et al (1990), the Japanese post war economy could be
described as tiny, war-ravaged, starving for capital and foreign exchange, and
requiring a wide range of vehicles. In the mid-1950s, Japan entered the
American automotive market where the well established car manufacturers
feared losing their market share and sought to defend themselves against
Japanese exports (Womack et ah, 1990: 49-50). Their fears were absolutely
justified. Thanks to their poor economic situation, the Japanese car
manufacturers realised the mismatch between mass production and product
differentiation, which seemed to be a fundamental market feature. This need for
innovative thinking paved the way for 'Just-in-Time' (JiT) and Tean
production'.
In the late 1970's and early 1980's, the Japanese car industry became exemplary
for JiT. The JiT concept emerged as a dramatically new approach to executing
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all activities on the plant floor. The primary focus of JIT centred on a "pull"
approach where all upstream manufacturing activities were linked and
controlled by the activities of the next down-stream operation. The down-stream
operation would physically send distinct and direct signals to the prior upstream
operation in the form of "Kanban"6 or card signals directing that operation to
respond to its needs for product or service. In essence, this approach can be
classified as a "process-driven" philosophy.
Starting in the late 1980's, "Lean Production" was introduced by the US as a
response to the Japanese market power. Womack et al. (1990) have summarised
what happened in their book 'The Machine That Changed The World'7. Lean
o
production encompassed not only a new way ofmanufacturing but also a
corporate strategy and integration model. The new way of production included
JiT concepts, pioneered by Toyota and incorporated in the 'Toyota Production
System' (TPS). The TPS consisted of a number of specific techniques such as
kaizen9 and heijunka10, and took advantage of additional quality management
techniques (Womack et al., 1990). These specific techniques were a
fundamental part of a global manufacturing strategy built upon the benefits of
JIT production, and total quality management. Toyota is reported to have no re¬
work areas, and lean production extended to development and design cut down
development time to half (Womack et al., 1990). The integration of suppliers
was shaped by regulatory rules and historical developments. The MITI set up
rules to form a tightly-knit subcontracting structure which was translated (by
6 Kanban is a signalling system. Kanban uses cards to signal the need of an item in the store.
7 The book focuses on the comparisons of different new emerging concepts that we now know as the
Lean Enterprise. It was at this point in the manufacturing cycle where dramatic changes began to
evolve into what we now recognise as 'Lean Production'.
8 Womack et al. (1990) and Lamming (1993) refer to it as 'production paradigm'.
9
In Japanese kaizen means literally "improvement"; is an approach to productivity originating in
applications of the work (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaizen. as of 11th of December 2005). The
Toyota Production System (TPS) is known for kaizen, where all line personnel are expected to stop
their moving production line in the case of any abnormality, and suggestions for improvement are
rewarded.
10
Heijunka is the act of levelling the variety and/or volume of items produced at a process over a
period of time. Heijunka is used to avoid excessive batching of product types and/or volume
fluctuations, especially at a pacemaker process
(http://www.leanadvisors.com/Lean/glossary/definition.cfm/Word/Heijunka.cfm).
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Toyota and others) into a purchasing policy that clearly defined which group of
suppliers should be taken for general purchasing, special purchasing or special
factory purchasing (Nishiguchi, 1989).
Additionally, after the Second World War, new industry structures emerged,
known as 'keiretsu', consisting of a number of clusters of companies without a
single leader company (Lamming, 1993). The role of Japanese car
manufacturers was on the one hand characterised by the support of suppliers in
order to help them set up and operate their businesses. On the other hand, the
car manufacturers wanted to prevent the same suppliers from dealing with
Western customers and tried to take control. Western mass producers tried to
adapt to the lean ideas of process improvements and supplier integration.
Unsurprisingly, they made some painful experiences. Today, the Japanese car
manufacturer Toyota is still the number one in benchmarking studies of the
industry, and is watched by competitors worldwide. The automotive industry in
total has adopted a mixture of older concepts such as (JiT) and Just-in-Sequence
(JiS), and new ideas such as the optimisation of inter-organisational processes
between business partners in order to adapt to the changing market
requirements. These new ideas are discussed in the next section.
4.3 The automotive industry today
This section gives an overview of the current situation in the automotive
industry. After an introduction of the actors who populate the sector (including
its structure), current trends that massively influence this industry are presented.
In the subsequent section the core process ofmanufacturing is explained, as
well as some of the concepts aiming at both improvements in production
efficiency and responsiveness to customer needs.
4.3.1 The automotive arena and its actors
In an era characterised by marketing, mobility and environmental sustainability,
the automotive industry still fascinates. One of the reasons might be that it is an
industry that has undergone huge transformations in terms ofmarket, products
and distribution channels; this is illustrated in Figure 12.
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Products & Distribution Channels many
Figure 12. The evolution of the car business (DC presentation)
In the early days craft production gave customers the advantage of a bespoke
product. A wide variety of personal tastes and requirements could be
accommodated. Interestingly, automotive companies had to undergo three
transformations within about 100 years to once again appreciate the importance
of customer preferences. Today, a car is manufactured according to the so-
called "Build-To-Order" (BTO) concept (see section 4.3.4.), based largely on
the customers' needs - all car companies have focused their business strategies
on the customer again.
Overall, a continuous growth of the global car production can be observed. In
2003, almost 60 million cars were manufactured in the five different economic
regions the European Union, Eastern Europe, NAFTA (US, Canada, Mexico),
Japan, and 'Rest of the World' (RoW). Three main categories of actors populate
the automotive industry arena: (1) OEMs, (2) suppliers and (3) industry
associations (e.g. VDA, ODETTE, AIAG).
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(1) Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEMs)
In the automotive industry, one can differentiate between the first equipment
manufacturers, the so-called Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEMs) and the
aftermarket (Adolphs, 1996). In this study, the focus is on OEMs. The
landscape ofOEMs has changed dramatically in the past decades. From 36
OEMs in 1970, only about 20 companies have survived (see figure 13 below).
At the same time, the number of variations of a car model increased
dramatically; for example the BMW 3 series comes in a number of different
petrol engines (horsepower), as a common rail diesel model, as a convertible as
well as an off-road vehicle .
With the growth of outsourcing, an increase in skills to manage large supplier
networks has emerged, for example during product development. Naturally,
these trends have a huge impact on the business partners ofOEMs, the
suppliers. Suppliers also have to redefine their roles, for example by shifting to
integrated competencies. In re-thinking their business strategies, OEMs have
started to shift downstream, for example by extending their service models (by
e.g., offering financial services). Finally, sales are under continuous and
increasing pressure due to changing customer demands and an increasing
competition which leads to price wars.
As illustrated in Figure 13, General Motors (GM) and Ford are followed by
Toyota and DC in respect to turnover.
erwar-
(nach
Konzern Land Umsatz2 Rendite3 tung4 Umsatz)
General Motors Tk USA 185.524,0 5.52 8,15 1
Ford 29 USA 164.196,0 2,75 5,50 2
Toyota sb jpn 151.013,8 7,54 3,46 3
DaimlerChrysler 59 DEU 147.531,2 1.39 3.72 4
Volkswagen sa DEU 92.486,5 2,07 0,68 5
Honda 59 jpn 74.445,7 8,92 3,27 6
Nissan 89 jpn 64.419,1 14,50 4,42 7
Peugeot 59 FRA 63.501,5 4,97 0,36 8
Fiat 59 ITA 54.315,5 -1,97 3,32 9
BMW 59 DEU 47.866,9 5,39 4,25 10
Renault 59 FRA 42.618,8 1,18 -4,81 11
Hyundai 59 kor 38.297,9 9.16 7,62 12
Mitsubishi 59 jpn 35.431,4 5,77 1,27 13
Mazda jpn 26.596,1 -1,88 3,68 14
Suzuki 59 jpn 20.055,5 5,88 2,93 15
Fuji Heavy Industries 89 jpn 13.128,3 3.52 2,40 16
Kia 59 kor 13.049,9 8,42 7,00 17
Isuzu S jpn 13.045,2 -0,47 4,69 18
Yamaha 59 jpn 9.305,2 5,88 2,92 19
Daihatsu 59 jpn 9.062,1 -0,36 2,69 20
Porsche 59 DEU 6.728,3 14,68 10,97 21
Hartey-Davidson 59 USA 4.624,3 20,10 11,89 22
Astra International - IDN 3.267,8 10,08 10,71 23
Figure 13. International comparison of OEMs (manager magazine as of 14/02/05)
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These four companies are leading the industry in terms ofmarket share; the
fifth, VW, only achieves half the turnover ofGM. This shows a high level of
concentration. Cars are sold by exclusive dealer networks. In Europe, this will
change in the coming years due to a decision of the European Commission on
an EU guideline known as "block exemption regulation", and will allow dealers
to sell more than one brand.
(2) Suppliers
As shown in Figure 14, the supplier segment is highly dominated by US and
Japan-based companies. In 2004, the top five suppliers had a market share of
about 40% with a turnover ofmore than € 120 billion.




Konzern Land Umsatz Rendite tung4 Umsatz)
Delphi USA 28.096,0 5,50 5,71 1
Denso JPN 23.370,1 4,43 2,29 2
Johnso Controls USA 22.646,0 10,47 6,89 3
Bridgestone JPN 21.012,5 5,35 4,59 4
Michelin FRA 18.526,0 3,27 4,13 5
Visteon USA 17.660,0 -2,96 1,26 6
Lear USA 15.746,7 14,74 8,89 7
Magna International CAN 15.345,0 8,80 6,29 8
Goodyear USA 15.119,0 1.51 4,75 9
Aisin Seiki JPN 14.640,4 2,70 2,39 10
Continental DEU 13.903,0 5,70 6,74 11
Faurecia FRA 11.891,4 5,10 3,99 12
TRW Automotive Holdings USA 11.351,0 8,64 9,59 13
Valeo FRA 11.130,2 4,13 3.51 14
Toyota Industries JPN 10.619,5 3,17 0,69 15
Toyota Auto Body JPN 8.139,2 3,01 1.01 16
Dana USA 8.020,0 6,32 6,84 17
Arvinmeritor USA 7.788,0 7,32 5.02 18
GKN GBR 6.117,9 3,01 6,64 19
Calsonic Kansei JPN 5.647,3 4,37 1.45 20
Figure 14. International comparison of the 20 major suppliers (manager magazin, as of
14/02/05)
Suppliers have also seen a massive concentration at the horizontal level during
the past decades. Between 1989 and 1992, more than 100 mergers took place in
the German Automotive supplier community (Wildemann, 1994), such as the
merger ofVarta (batteries) and Bosch (Adolphs, 1996). Automotive suppliers
belong to a range of industries such as, for example, textile, metal, steel,
chemistry, electrics, electronics, plastics, etc..
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(3) Automotive associations
Automotive industry associations exist at national, European and international
level. Examples include VDA, ODETTE and the AIAG described below:
■ Verband Deutscher Automobilindustrie (VDA)11: Founded in 1901 as
Verband Deutscher Motorfahrzeug-Industrieller (VDMI). German
association, comprising car manufacturers and their suppliers. Facilitator
of common project specific working groups.
■ Organisation for Data Exchange by Tele Transmission (ODETTE):
Founded 1984, a non-profit organisation of the automotive industry.
Development of tools and recommendations to improve the flow of
goods, services, product data and business information across the whole
supply chain, throughout the entire product life-cycle.
■ Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG): Founded in 1982, AIAG
is headquartered in Southfield, Michigan. It has more than 1,600
member companies, including North American, European and Asia-
Pacific OEMs and suppliers to the automotive industry with combined
annual sales of more than $850 billion. A not-for-profit association,
AIAG's primary goals are to reduce cost and complexity within the
automotive supply chain and to improve speed-to-market, product
quality, employee health-and-safety and the environment.
Those associations represent the interests of the automotive community, for
example in promoting communication standards for both OEMs and suppliers.
4.3.2 The relationship between OEM and suppliers
The reasons for the evolution of the "OEM - supplier relationship" are manifold.
This evolution has not been stabilised and forces a tighter collaboration between
not only OEMs and suppliers but also between other business partners that are
11 Translation into English: German Automotive industry association
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part of the automotive value chain. The boxes at the top of figure 15 show that
in the 1980s the relations between an OEM and all its suppliers were similar,
whereas in the 1990s this changed to favour a "tier structure" due to the
adoption of for example the manufacturing concept JiT.
Figure 15. Automotive networks determine future collaboration (BMW)
The main collaboration partners for OEMs have been the tier-1 suppliers which
in turn collaborate with the tier-2 suppliers, and so on. Today, due to the
demanding market, OEMs are not only collaborating with their supply base but
also with other business partners, for example system integrators. The relations
between OEMs and their suppliers are expected to change dramatically in the
future. OEMs are redefining their business strategies and their core
competencies, and consequently are pushing for more outsourcing in all parts of
the value chain.
The progressive concentration of suppliers was emphasised in an interview
recently given by the CIO ofDC, Susan Unger, who made the point that
"100 years ago we even produced steel ourselves. Today, we only
coordinate a network ofmore than 100 specialised suppliers and
concentrate our business on our core competencies - engineering,
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manufacturing, sales and services ofour brands " (manager magazine,
as of 18/02/05).
The modern approach to outsource and modularise influenced the relationship
between OEM and supplier. It created a pyramid-like structure of supplier










Figure 16. Automotive OEM-supplier pyramid (Dornieret at., 1998)
Going down the pyramid, the number of suppliers increases while the level of
strategic importance for OEMs decreases. This development of the OEM-
supplier relationship came with the JIT production paradigm.
Depending on the systems and modules supplied to the OEMs, suppliers can be
categorised as follows:
System integrators - tier 0.5: engineering and systems integration
responsibility and management of entire supply chain ofOEMs. Also,
increasing share of risk. Design, development, manufacturing of
automotive systems, modules and components, and assembly of
complete vehicles. Currently, due to limited manufacturing capacity,
only a few tier 0.5 suppliers are strategic partners ofOEMs. One
example is Magna Steyr, Austria, who manufactures whole models for
DC and BMW.
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■ System and module suppliers -Tier 1: solution and development
partner in engineering, with product and manufacturing know how.
Modules are characterised by a special integration capacity. The module
supplier takes over the pre-assembly of special components for the
OEM. Suppliers' competencies are focused on logistics and assembly.
The only difference between systems and modules is the additional
R&D effort to be associated with systems. The supplier is responsible
for problem solving, and for all parts. Example: braking systems, driver
assist systems. Sample companies are Webasto (roofing), Brose
(brakes), or Bosch (valves).
■ Component suppliers - Tier 2: a component supplier is a
manufacturing specialist with competences in methods and procedures.
Components consist of special OEM requirements. A component
supplier for example is Faurecia (seats).
■ Parts suppliers - Tier 3: parts supplier manufactures predefined
products and procedures, execute work-intensive activities and have
special know-how at the production level. Parts are characterised by a
high level of standardisation (in procurement language this is the so-
12 • •called "commodity" ). An example is Freudenberg (sealing).
Up to now there is no common definition available in the automotive industry
for systems and modules (FHI, 1994). Each OEM has a different understanding
of a system or a module. For DC, for example, a system is a consolidation of
several single elements. Criteria that allow for consistent checks include, for
example, functionality or technology. Systems have different levels of
complexity. They embody product-related and an added value-related
dimension (Schindele, 1996).
12 Commodities are parts which are easily replaceable regardless of the supplier.
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In the book "Beyond Partnership - Strategies for Innovation and Lean Supply",
Lamming (1993) argues that a successful positioning of suppliers depends upon
the nature of the relationship between them and their OEMs. A successful
relationship is characterised by a complex range of factors that "build to an
effective, supportive communication channel". Without it, the necessary
collaboration on processes and product development cannot be achieved
(Lamming, 1993).
4.3.3 Characterisation of the automotive industry
Currently, the automotive market is characterised by several trends as pictured
in Figure 17.
• Increasing market saturation
• Increasing growth in Eastern Europe and Asia
• Continuing competitive pressure
• Changes in market and customer segments
• Decreasing differentiation in engineering
• Increasing product range
• Decreasing level of manufacturing
• Focus on integration management, product design and
branding
• Repositioning of OEMs and suppliers in supply chain
• Increasing added value networks and strategic alliances
• Increasing outsourcing
• Competencies in engineering-, manufacturing- and supply
• New risk sharing models
• Persistent cost pressure
• Increasing service orientation
• Changes in business models
• New companies in the market
• Increasing customer demands
• Increasing competition causes price wars
• Obsolete sales structure
Figure 17. Current characteristics of the automotive industry (McKinsey, 2003)
One of these trends is the saturation and fragmentation of the three large
markets ofUS/Canada, Europe and Asia. The increasing growth ofmarkets in
Eastern Europe and Asia, stagnant markets elsewhere, and a continuous
competition complete the picture. The pressure for differentiation is another
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100
characterised by an increase of outsourcing and marketing activities to push the
brands.
Apart from changes of the nature of the relationship between OEMs and
suppliers, the industry is confronted with a number of transformations that
challenge the established relations between industry players. The automotive
industry is characterised by extremely complex processes and the
standardisation of processes, and data is inevitable in order to meet production
requirements. Driven by challenges such as shorter product life cycles,
increasing cost pressure in stagnant markets and higher complexity of the
electronics embedded in modules and systems, OEMs gradually increase the
outsourcing ofmanufacturing, which is expected to rise from 25% up to 35%
within the next 10 years (McKinsey, 2003).
The supplier community is also undergoing strong shifts as the result of these
pressures. Increasingly, platforms and model varieties require advanced project
management capabilities. That is, in terms of innovation, management suppliers
have to be able to provide leading-edge technology and efficient simultaneous
engineering processes. This change primarily affects the tier-1 suppliers who are
taking over systems integration responsibility and management of the supply
chain from the OEMs. At the same time, they also take an increasing share of
risk. As a result, the industry is forced to collaborate more closely. This means a
repositioning of both OEM and supplier in the supply chain. As more and more
competences in engineering, manufacturing and supply are handed over to some
of the suppliers (who experience a totally new role), the OEM needs employees
who have the ability to manage networks. A redefinition ofOEM and suppliers
also influences the level of service orientation and leads to completely new
business models and new market players. Finally, the increasing pressure on
production also affects sales. Dealers have to fight against price dumping by
competitors and have to rethink their sales structure.
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4.3.4 Manufacturing processes of a car
The production of a car is a well defined sequence of processes. The core
processes of the automotive value chain can be identified by using Porter's
value chain model (Porter, 1984), illustrated in Figure 18.
Product development / production / Aftersales
Figure 18. Core processes of the automotive value chain (Schindele, 1996)
The automotive supply chain consists of three main phases, the product
development phase, the series production and the after-sales phase.
Product development - characterised by four phases which include (1)
strategy, definition of top-down and bottom-up goals and allocation strategy of
parts, (2) technology, selection of technology matched with suppliers' selection,
(3) prototyping, which requires controlling of budget and (4) starting, which
includes type series reporting.
Series production - characterised by change management and performance
optimisation in redefining goals, controlling volumes and type series.
After-sales - provides the aftermarket with parts until end of production.
Concepts of car manufacturing
Driven by challenges such as shorter product life cycles, increasing cost
pressure in stagnant markets, and increasing technological complexity, the
automotive industry is currently facing increasing demand for rapid innovation
in order to meet the customers' needs, reduce costs and stay competitive
(McKinsey, 2003). To this end, OEMs have changed their concepts of
manufacturing and collaboration models with suppliers. Today, catchwords
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such as BTO, JiT or JiS are commonplace to reflect new approaches to
manufacturing and collaboration between OEMs and suppliers.
For the past few years, the automotive industry has been putting in place a
number ofmeasures to respond to increased customer needs. In contrast to the
traditional "built-to-stock" (BTS) model, where cars are produced on stock, the
BTO enables to manufacture a car according to individual customer
requirements. BTO, for example, is leveraged by new Web-based
communication and transaction technologies, such as supply chain planning and
supply chain execution tools in order to ensure seamless production.
This allows car makers to better respond to customers who are increasingly
more knowledgeable, and demanding about their preferred vehicle
configurations. However, this method requires that OEMs are able to accurately
forecast demand. This may be achieved using Internet-based technologies that
allow for continuous monitoring of the supply chain. This approach enables
OEMs to operate with lower inventory levels, relying on their supply chain to
deliver the parts they need to build cars. The parts do not arrive before they are
required. JiT is a concept to minimise cost and increase efficiency, productivity
and quality through economies of scale and control (Womack et al., 1990).
Today, JiS is the more common procedure than JiT. With JiS systems and
modules are delivered directly by suppliers to the assembly line in the exact
order in which they are to be incorporated into a car.
As the market changed dramatically in the past 20 years, the business relations
between the main actors, OEMs and suppliers, have also changed significantly,
reflecting a change in the needs of the more powerful OEM. Today, OEMs are
forced to manufacture a large range of different car types. However, they have
major difficulties to satisfy customers expecting their car to be ready at the
promised day. OEMs and their suppliers have to collaborate, for example, in the
exchange of data to avoid out-of-stock situations. Margins are shrinking for
both and they have to collaborate closer because otherwise they are either out of
103
business or bought by a competitor. Since the 1960s, collaboration has to a large
extent been influenced by Information and Communication Technologies (ICT).
After the introduction of the Internet and related technologies, the "industrial
everyday manufacturing life" cannot be pictured without these technologies.
4.4 Collaboration supported by IONS
Today, the automotive business is unimaginable without ICT. Particularly IONS
have been adopted to increase the efficiency of cross-company collaboration.
Christiaanse et al. (2004) understood electronic markets as referring to all kinds
of inter-organisational arrangements involving multiple firms. Within this
conceptualisation, electronic markets are defined as "electronic networks where
buyers and sellers meet to engage in buying and selling as well as other
activities, such as collaborative planning, logistics, transportation
arrangements andfulfilment" (Christiaanse et al., 2004: 152). This
conceptualisation differs from earlier studies, which have looked at electronic
markets as a matter of buying and selling (Bakos 1991). This emphasises a
change from a purely transactional focus (Bakos 1991, 1997; Malone et al.
1987) to a relational one. Electronic markets are thus seen as concerned with
supporting collaboration functions (e.g. supply-chain management solutions,
fulfilment, trust mechanisms) between players rather than just as an exclusive
focus on the sale transaction and price (Christiaanse et al., 2004).
Such IT systems are adopted not only to achieve operational effectiveness by
reducing co-ordination costs and transaction risks, but also to improve
communication and information presentation, and to enhance the collaboration
between OEMs and their suppliers. An example of such IT initiatives is the
development of electronic markets, for example Covisint or SupplyOn. E-
markets were seen as the industry's most promising initiative to adapt to
changing market conditions and cost pressure, and to facilitate inter-
organisational collaboration between industry players. They were supposed to
boost profitability and reduce transaction costs by providing a transparent,
flexible and collaborative structure.
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4.4.1 The need for collaboration between OEMs and suppliers
The automotive industry is characterised by vertical integration in terms of the
business relation structures between OEMs and suppliers (Adolphs, 1996). A
current trend in manufacturing is that OEMs attempt to cooperate with fewer
suppliers, but on a worldwide scale. As a result, small and medium sized
suppliers will be suppliers to integrators - that is, tier-1 or tier-2 suppliers -
rather than directly to the OEMs.
In practice, the term 'collaboration' replaced the formerly-used term
'cooperation'. A reason might be that cooperation is increasingly facilitated by
IT underpinning the dynamic character of cooperation, and leading to "real"
collaboration. Dyer et al. (1998) distinguished between 'arm's length'
relationships and 'strategic partnerships' depending on the product or service
purchased by the OEM. From the OEM's perspective, collaboration certainly
relies on partnerships with those suppliers that are classified as 'strategic'
(depending on pre-defined criteria such as priority of the product delivered,
reliability or quality) (Dyer et al., 1998). However, in theory, according to
Lambe et al. (2002), collaborative partnerships are those in which:
■ both sides believe that their own investments are substantial
■ each recognises the substantial investments of the other
■ both sides believe that they themselves would face difficulties
accessing alternative partners and
■ each believes that the other would face costly consequences if the
established relationship were terminated (Lambe et al., 2002)
To support collaboration between OEMs and suppliers in the automotive
industry IT tools such as IONS are used. Portal technologies also belong to this
group of Internet-based systems. They support an efficient and user-friendly
collaboration of different business partners, and enable the integration of all
types of different information systems in the car industry.
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4.4.2 IONS in the automotive industry
The importance of IONS has been increasingly recognised by companies in the
automotive industry. However, since the times of early EDI systems, the
adoption has proved to be difficult in the past decades. Whereas the objective of
EDI was to exchange recurring information with a handful of preferred
suppliers, portals made the adoption of a network of suppliers a goal of OEMs.
In this section, the adoption of (1) EDI as one of the first IONS and (2) portals
in the automotive industry are discussed. This is followed by a discussion of a
couple of issues during portal implementation. Finally, in (3) a comparison of
EDI and portal is presented.
(1) EDI in the automotive context
For more than 20 years, OEMs have adopted EDI to communicate more
efficiently with their large suppliers. Using EDI systems, buyers and suppliers
arrange routine business transactions such as invoices or delivery notifications.
The information used to be exchanged over proprietary communication
networks using prearranged formats (Hanseth & Monteiro, 1998).
The Electronic Data Interchange For Administration Commerce and Transport
(EDIFACT) format is the most widely accepted standard. EDIFACT messages
are defined internationally. Such international messages are often accompanied
by specification of national or sector-specific subsets as well as "exchange
agreements" between pairs of communicating partners. Such specifications
define in more detail how a general message should be used within a region or
sector or between specific partners (Hanseth & Monteiro, 1998).
In the automotive industry, there are three organisations that develop EDI
standards:
■ VDA - EDI standard of the German automotive industry
■ GALIA - EDI standard particularly used in the French automotive
industry, similar to ODETTE
■ ODETTE - EDI standard of the European automotive industry
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These EDI standards have been adopted in the logistics area for all sorts of
transport messages such as Delivery Instruction, Despatch Advice, or Invoice.
In Europe, the most important standard used in the automotive industry is the
ODETTE standard. ODETTE started in 1984 with participation by automotive
organisations from Benelux, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. It
aimed at both direct communication between installations and indirect
communication via a third party clearing centre. It was developed to facilitate
communication within the European motor industry (www.odette.org). In 1998,
ODETTE started to migrate from the original Odette EDI format to the
UN/CEFACT standard. Although the VDA is a German industry body and
ODETTE is a European association, both have close relationships with the
international automotive association "Automotive Industry and Action Group"
(AIAG).
EDI allowed organisations to integrate their various business processes and
enabled the formation of networks of inter-organisational relations. Until the
advent of open, cheap and flexible standards-based Internet technologies during
the late 1990s, EDI still was the dominant standard in the area of Business-to-
Business (B2B) e-commerce. In the automotive industry, for logistic processes
such as delivery schedules, EDI still is the dominant standard for
communication between OEMs and tier-1 suppliers. Apart from the lack of
flexibility inherent to EDI standards, the high costs associated with the
implementation and use ofEDI meant that only large suppliers could be
involved in this IOS; Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) were largely
excluded.
However, EDI has never achieved the envisaged adoption rate within the
industry due to high cost and low fit of supplier requirements. Therefore, new
IONS such as portals emerged to provide the technical ability to connect the
entire supply base.
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(2) Automotive portals and their functionality
A portal is defined as a linked electronic platform with a single point of entry,
independent of time and space that enables collaboration through access to
multiple sources of information (cf. theoretical background in chapter 2).
Portals in the automotive industry were often initiated by large buyers, the
OEMs, to facilitate interaction with their network of suppliers. Usually, the
initiating OEM has essential needs to be taken into consideration when
developing and implementing a portal, particularly in a larger organisational
environment. This led to various important aspects of portal functionality to be
considered when developing and implementing a portal shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Important aspects of portal functionality
# Requirements Characteristics
A Single point-of-entry ■ Dynamic and flexible web
layout
■ Registration of users






C User data ■ Integrated user data
management
■ Authorisation




E Security ■ Authentication
■ Single Sign-on (SSO)
■ Encrypted communication
(A) The major motivation to develop and implement a portal in the
automotive industry is the availability of a single point-of-entry with
real-time access, standardised processes and support services. Portal
functionality should provide dynamically generated websites with a
corresponding content management system, personalisation features, and
integration options for applications. Additionally, standardised processes
should support user registration, and a help desk allowing them to find
their way through the portal; particularly when using the portal for the
first time upon registration.
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(B) The next important aspects are the portal's access and navigation
structure. Portal design and structure of the portal website directly
influence the navigation through the portal. Depending on the
performance, the appearance of the portal pages plays a crucial role for
suppliers' acceptance when working with the portal. Another key issue
that has to be taken into consideration is the availability of the portal;
preferably 7/7d and 24h/24h.
(C) A single integrated user data management system is required to manage
user data and the use of applications. In practice, user data already exist
and have to be integrated into the new portal's user data management
system. The availability of advanced authorisation concepts is playing a
key role in this context as the authorisation of a user has to be integrated
with the authorisation concept of individual applications (which usually
have their own authorisation modules).
(D) Scalability and the integration of the portal technology into an existing
IT infrastructure are key elements when implementing a portal.
Integration patterns and standardised approaches are needed as the portal
is usually integrated into the corporate IT architecture (which is difficult
enough even if portal functionalities to be implemented are available and
sufficient).
(E) Security is a major concern for most companies starting IT enabled
collaboration. Therefore, user authentication and individual access to
applications (with the so-called "single sign-on" functionality) as well
as, in some cases, the encryption of communication are important portal
functionalities.
The above mentioned aspects and how they influenced the portal project are
described analysed more deeply in chapters 6 and 7.
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(3) The comparison of EDI and portals
Despite the implementation of various IONS based on XML, the use ofEDI and
related standards have not been abandoned (as it was predicted by XML
supporters). Table 4 compares the differences between EDI and portals
according to a number of criteria such as area of application, degree of
standardisation or the level of a business partner relationship.
Table 4. EDI/VDA vs portals











Standardised messages in a
standardised format
Only with tier-1 suppliers







Dominant players push for
technology
Yes
Critical mass Not reached Not reached
Portals seem to be the more advanced technology because they could cover the
entire value chain. However, OEMs still are a long way from completely
moving from EDI to XML-based technologies. EDI is still very much is use in
logistics due to high switching cost and the fear of causing a costly interruption
in production processes. Another reason is that an OEM's logistics department
belongs to the manufacturing plant. Logistic processes are 'production-critical'.
In the worst case scenario, changing completely from EDI to XML would mean
a stop of production with all associated consequences.
Portals offer a higher degree of standardisation (processes) than EDI messages
(content). Another advantage of portals is that they have the potential to connect
the entire industry whereas EDI was only attractive for the big suppliers who
could invest in EDI hardware and software. Also, EDI is only in place in some
areas ofEurope, but portals are not subject to any geographic limitations; they
13 The association VDA has defined EDI messages in recommendations, adjusted for the automotive
industry for example VDA 4936 for delivery schedule, order and self-billing invoices (cf
www.vda.de).
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can be used on a global scale. However, portals as well have in many cases been
pushed by powerful OEMs. Unfortunately, those OEMs have not been able to
communicate the benefits of a portal to their suppliers. This led to a critical
mass issue similar to the one experienced with EDI; the expected number of
participants is not reached within the envisaged timeframe.
In the next section, one of the big OEMs, DaimlerChrysler, is described. As a
corporation, not only EDI but also portals have been deployed by different
Business Units (BU) in order to increase collaboration with their suppliers.
4.5 Electronic marketplaces in the automotive industry
Electronic marketplaces are defined as "electronic networks where buyers and
sellers meet to engage in buying and selling as well as other activities, such as
collaborative planning, logistics, etc. (Christiaanse et ah, 2004). Electronic
markets are thus seen as an enabler of supporting collaboration functions (e.g.
supply-chain management solutions or fulfilment) between players rather than
having just an exclusive focus on the sale transaction and its price. This is
exactly how DC understood e-marketplaces: they were seen as tools to achieve
operational effectiveness by reducing co-ordination costs and transaction risks,
as well as to improve communication with suppliers. Apart from the examples
Covisint and SupplyOn described in detail in the subsequent sections, other e-
marketplaces in the automotive arena include, for example, AutopartsB2B.com
or RubberNetwork.com.
4.5.1 Covisint
In 2000, Covisint14 (Connectivity, Visibility, Integration), temporarily named
NewCo15 was founded by three of the largest OEMs - DaimlerChrysler, Ford
and General Motors - and two software companies - Commerce One and
Oracle. They commonly announced to join forces and to set-up one single
global B2B e-marketplace. Later in the same year, Renault/Nissan joined. The
14 In 2004, Covisint became part ofCompuware Corporation.
15 NewCo refers to „New Company".
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vision behind Covisint, as illustrated in Figure 19, was to enable the
interconnection of the entire automotive industry with a single, global exchange






(not used in actual vehicle production)
MRO
A single global Internet-based
exchange for the auto industry.
• Global scope
• One common platform
• secure environment
• easy to hook up for suppliers




Figure 19. The vision of Covisint (Covisint presentation, 2000)
Covisint aimed to become a de facto industry standard for production as well as
for non-production goods, and for business process integration for the whole
automotive industry with a global scope and in a secure environment. While
transferring key business processes onto the Internet, it had been claimed to
increase significantly the value and efficiency, transparency and integration of
the supply chain. The interconnection of the disparate elements of the industry
in a virtual space was meant to speed up decisions, eliminate duplicated work,
reducing costs and increase efficiency while supporting common business
processes between the OEMs and their supply base (Kandampully, 2003).
Therefore, Covisint had been branded as a global and independent e-business
exchange for the automotive industry, focusing on products and services in
compliance with industry standards. It worked closely with industry bodies such
as AIAG. Covisint's business model was based on transaction fees for the
provision of services built upon secure B2B e-commerce technology.
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Services of Covisint
Covisint provided three types of services: procurement (through the electronic
market), supply chain management (such as state of inventory and demand
forecast of the supply chain) and collaborative development business (i.e. the
Virtual Project Workspace). Standardisation could be achieved across the entire
range of services that Covisint offered, for example through the uniform
personalised access from any location ('single sign-on') including
authentication and authorisation, portal administration with registration, user
management, user help desk, integration into existing IT infrastructure and
through diverse interaction channels (e.g., integration into backend systems),
and standardised e-auction and e-collaboration tools. Figure 20 presents
products and services for product development, procurement and supply chain
management offered by Covisint. They cover the processes of the entire






































Figure 20. Covisints product and service offer (Covisint documentation, 2001)
For product development, Covisint offered standard tools such as a virtual
project workspace or interactive modelling and analysis. In procurement, quote
management, auctions and catalogues should electronically support activities
like concept development and programme approval. In supply chain
management, a standard solution called 'SupplyConnect' aimed to enhance the
visibility in the supply chain or to support inventory management.
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Covisints portal vision ofDC's global supplier portal
As shown in Figure 20, Covisint provided products and services for the
integration of the various DC applications such as 'Fastcar' or 'Container
Management' already available, while at the same time connecting and
integrating all relevant business units on one secure platform.
Container Constraint _ ...





Covisint to handle registration/security and host "standard" applications.
Portal infrastructure ist the pre-requisite for the rollout ofweb-applications in fields of Development, Production-
Planning, Procurement. Supply, Production, QualityManagement, AfterSales and Accounting
Figure 21. Covisint's portal vision (Covisint documentation, 2001)
Registered supplier users or other business partners should have one single point
of access to enter this integrated world of inter-organisational systems.
Apart from its own standardised e-services (e.g., e-auction and e-collaboration
tools), Covisint particularly focused on the highest level of integration in order
to integrate business processes for the supplier management, for example on
standardised portal administration. However, as Figure 21 shows, the portal
architecture was designed in an open way to integrate different standardisation
levels, from business processes to network infrastructure.
4.5.2 SupplyOn
SupplyOn was the major competitor of Covisint and sees itself as a global
player. SupplyOn is a joint venture of global automotive tier-1 suppliers (in the
literature also referred to as component supplier). The automotive component-
specific expertise of the founders was seen as a competitive advantage for the
development of e-marketplace services. As a direct answer to the foundation of
Covisint, in April 2000, the tier-1 suppliers Robert Bosch GmbH, Continental
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AG, INA Werk Schaeffler oHG, SAP AG and ZF Friedrichshafen AG signed a
Letter of Intent (Lol) and kicked-off their e-marketplace business. Offices were
installed in Germany and Detroit/Michigan. Covisint has been the trigger for the
tier-1 supplier community to counterbalance the OEMs obvious power
consolidation. In retrospect, the existence of Covisint was the trigger to set up
SupplyOn.
"I really felt threatened. At that time, volume bundling has been
announced, pricing, where a supplier had to think about how do I
develop my strategy. How do I secure a certain independence and a
certain degree of options. Step by step this has been one of the reasons
why suppliers in the end had decided to set up SupplyOn. We had to look
at what are the big differences compared to a OEM and what is
supplier-specific. So, this has been one of our start projects to set up
SupplyOn " (A founding tier-1 supplier of SupplyOn).
The basic vision was the same as for Covisint, namely to join forces, bundle
know how, and to a certain extent to standardise at the application and the
transaction level. However, this eventually changed, as one of the interviewed
tier-1 suppliers mentioned:
"Ifyou look on how both of them have been developed, it looks like a Y.
For a time, it has been parallel, also the question to collaborate (join
forces) but then they grew apart and more complementary. Covisint
shifted from the original idea of a marketplace to a portal with
registration. From there, to the individual portals of the OEMs which
has been a desillusion for the participants. Because the hope was only to
work with one application and one process and then, it ended up in DC,
Ford, GMwith separate portals".
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Services of SupplyOn
The product portfolio of SupplyOn targeted suppliers and buyers. According to
this business objective, they named their services "Source side" and "Sell side".
SupplyOn still provides standardised interfaces and actively supports backend
integration. As illustrated in Figure 22, SupplyOn services cover standardised
applications for procurement, such as a tool called 'Sourcing Manager' or for
supply chain management, through 'Vendor Managed Inventory'.
Problem resolution
(80 - Problem 8olver)
SupplyOn - integrated solutions for the entire product life cycle
Supplier rating
(Performance Monitor)





Figure 22. Product portfolio SupplyOn as of 2004 (www.supplyon.com)
Until 2004, SupplyOn recorded 4,600 customers from 30 countries with more
than 16,500 active users on its platform. About 1,200 electronic inquiry
processes are transacted and 110,000 Web-EDI messages are sent per month.
They remained an independent company and the business is up and running, as
one of the founding members stated:
"Today, the business operates surprisingly positive, no-one had thought
this, 4 years before, have achieved break even. Apart from the
shareholder's business, SupplyOn has acquired further customers, but
unfortunately not many more than expected. They managed to achieve
kind of a distance to the original founders, but on the other hand they
know that these a loyal customers. The logistic andprocurement chain is
covered very good, financial services, credit and invoices, we have just
started the quality area with supplier assessment".
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At that time, the perception of the industry, particularly of the supplier
community, was that the smaller size of SupplyOn was a huge advantage
compared to Covisint. The alignment of participating founders and the
management of the new company was seen to be much easier than it was with
Covisint. One of the tier-1 supplier interviewees stated that even if each of the
Covisint founding companies were regarded seperately, the sheer organisational
diversity and complexity could be just about handled, but three or four of them
could not. The previous subsections have described the history, the challenges
of the automotive industry today, as well as the electronic tools and e-markets
adopted in the automotive industry. In the next subsection, one of the big
players, DaimlerChrysler is presented.
4.6 A brief overview of DaimlerChrysler
According to turnover figures, DaimlerChrysler (DC) is the number four OEM
in the automotive industry. In 2004, with its global workforce of 384,723
employees, DaimlerChrysler revenues amounted to € 142.1 billion (Annual
report, 2004).
DaimlerChrysler AG was formed in November 1998 as a result of the merger
between Daimler-Benz AG, Germany and Chrysler Corporation, US. DC can
look back on a tradition ofmore than 100 years, featuring pioneering
achievements in automotive engineering by both of its predecessor companies.
In addition, DaimlerChrysler holds a 33% interest in the European Aeronautic
Defence and Space Company (EADS), one of the world's leading companies in
the field of aerospace and defence technology (Annual report, 2004).
4.6.1 DC brands and the business strategy
Due to the market pressures explained in section 4.3.3., the DC product
portfolio ranges from small cars to sports cars and luxury sedans; and from
versatile vans to heavy duty trucks and coaches.
■ DaimlerChryslers' passenger car brands include Maybach, Mercedes-
Benz, Chrysler, Jeep®, Dodge and Smart
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■ Commercial vehicle brands include Mercedes-Benz, Freightliner,
Sterling, Western Star, Setra and Mitsubishi Fuso
■ DaimlerChrysler Services offers financial and other services
DC's official publicly communicated corporate business strategy has four
major pillars:
■ a global presence
■ a broad and innovative product range
■ a strong brand management for the different business units such as
Mercedes Benz car group
■ technology leadership.
The fact that technology leadership and innovation are intertwined and an
important subject within the company is reflected in a strongly formulated
commitment to innovation, embodied in a statement of the annual report 2004:
"Innovation drives our company and is the key to the worldwide success
of DaimlerChrysler. We have a long tradition in this - because
DaimlerChrysler and its predecessor companies have stood for
pioneering automotive innovation for more than 100 years. With about
4,700 patents each year, DaimlerChrysler secures its leading
technological position and thus its lead in international competition. We
also intend to set new trends in the future with innovations that our
customers can experience in our products every day" (Annual report,
2004: 5).
As sketched in Figure 23, the Board ofManagement (BoM) consisted of the
CEO, Jiirgen E. Schrempp16, and 10 board members. There is no hierarchical
order of the different departments illustrated in Figure 23.



















Figure 23. The Board of Management of DC and departments (Annual report, 2004)
As a result of the merger in 1998, the organisational governance structure ofDC
is very complex. The different departments of the BoM do reflect on the one
hand separate brands and on the other hand corporate functions supporting the
brands. The function of a "COO Chrysler" seems to be an organisational
concession by the former CEO who actively initiated the merger between both
companies to gain a sufficient market share and have the size to survive in the
automotive market.
The Global Procurement and Supply department (GP&S) is an example of a
corporate department (see Figure 23) supporting all brands through procurement
and supply services17.
4.6.2 Global Procurement and Supply (GP&S)
GP&S is not only responsible for the procurement and supply of the corporation
on a global basis but is also one of the interfaces for suppliers into DC (research
and development is another interface between DC and suppliers). In 2004, DC
GP&S purchased goods and services for a total of € 101.4 billion (in 2003: €
99.7 billion). If this purchasing volume were split for individual brands, the
Mercedes Car Group accounted for 38% of the total purchasing volume, the
Chrysler Group for 32%, and trucks for 26%.
A couple of years ago, GP&S set-up and developed a specific program for
suppliers called "Extended Enterprise® "that aims to strengthen strategic
supplier relations":
17 In the case of IT topics often in collaboration with the different existing IT departments.
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"To strengthen the global aspect of our procurement activities and
maintain business relations with the world's best suppliers, we have
developed the Extended Enterprise® supplier programme further. Within
the framework of Extended Enterprise® and with the aid of a scorecard
model, we analyse and evaluate the procurement and supply performance
ofour suppliersfrom a global perspective. " (Annual report, 2004: 78)
In the former Daimler-Benz AG, supply systems and processes were
specifically oriented towards the needs of individual plants, due to the
decentralised organisational structure. The US Corporation Chrysler, however,
was centrally organised within a standardised supply concept for
implementation at all plants. In order to integrate both approaches, Daimler and
Chrysler jointly described a framework for all supply processes within the
corporation. The goal was to define the relationships of upstream and
downstream functions, for example development, procurement, production and
sales, and to provide at the same time transparency and a comprehensive
overview of the complex and diverse interdependencies of supply processes and
internal as well as external partners.
In order to visualise the supply system, GP&S created a so-called "Supply
18House" , a vision of successful supply and procurement, including success
factors relevant for procurement and supply. This was part ofDC's vision to
develop an advanced supply strategy to shape the world's most effective supply
chain while maximising the flexibility of order processing, delivery and
distribution processes at optimal cost efficiency, minimum cycle times and top
quality. This vision is guided by six principles which are: (1) customer
orientation, (2) value-based management, (3) expertise network, (4) process
orientation and process responsibility, (5) standardisation ofprocesses, methods
and tools, and (6) a continuous improvement. These principles have to be
followed by all employees working in GP&S. This vision in combination with
18 Due to a non-disclosure agreement with DC, the figure cannot be displayed in the PhD thesis.
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the e-business strategy (cf. chapter 5) seemed to offer support in synchronising
and rationalising the flow of supply information between DC and its suppliers.
The supplier programme 'Extended Enterprise' - cooperation between
DaimlerChrysler and its suppliers - was the driver for the development and use
of SCM at the DaimlerChrysler AG. The vision of Extended Enterprise was to
create - in close cooperation with the supplying business partners - a Global
Supply Network Integration Program that represents a crucial prerequisite for
successful market presence. Guidelines for Extended Enterprise were, for
example:
■ We will shape the future positively by acting jointly
■ The needs and requirements of our customers determine our activities
and our products
■ Efficient companies are our partners
■ We require and support creativity and initiative on the part of suppliers
■ We expect uppermost engagement with regard to costs, quality, cycle
time and technology
■ We aspire to have fair and long term partnerships
■ We believe in trust, fairness, open communication and information
■ We want to be the best customer and the most valued partner of our
suppliers
■ We act with ecological awareness
■ We profess to our social responsibility
Process optimisation and the consideration of the whole supply chain to increase
both customer satisfaction and corporate profitability, were the main focus of
this programme. Such a programme gained importance due to the increasing




As the history of the automotive industry shows, it had been subject to constant
changes, and will continue to be so in future. Technology has always been a
trigger of these changes. Today's technologies are driven by Internet-based IT
ofwhich the actors in the automotive industry try to take advantage. They
implement these new technologies in order to respond to external and internal
pressure. Due to huge promised benefits, in the past five years inter-
organisational systems such as portals aimed to replace the former EDI
standards. While EDI always aimed to integrate only the very large suppliers of
OEMs, portals were supposed to connect the entire supply base. However, with
the adoption of portals, the same issues as with EDI have occurred: unbalanced
power distribution within business relationships and a lack of trust hamper the
acceptance and use of both IONS systems.
In the automotive industry, two initiatives were founded to further develop the
electronic support of buyer - supplier relationships and of collaboration. One of
them was Covisint, an OEM-driven e-marketplace. The other one was
SupplyOn, which was founded by tier-1 suppliers to counterbalance Covisint.
The global supplier portal, one of the e-business projects pushed by DC, should
have been implemented by the electronic marketplace Covisint ofwhich DC
was one of the founders. The foundation of the e-marketplace Covisint, which
attempted to become the common standardised exchange platform for the entire
industry, offered DC a number of advantages. First of all, they shared the
investment risk with the other co-founders such as Ford or GM who additionally
pushed the whole initiative through their market power19. Secondly, as Covisint
was marketed internally as an investment ofDC, pressure was put on the
internal departments to follow the e-business strategy directed by DC executives
(see next chapter), and to support a possible collaboration with Covisint.
Thirdly, in the case of a failure of Covisint, the damage was well calculated and
represented not that much of a risk for DC. As a reaction to the foundation of
19 In practice, it is much easier to act when more than 50% of the players follow the same initiative. In
this context, power plays a crucial role.
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Covisint, influential tier-1 suppliers such as Bosch or ZF Friedrichshafen
founded the e-marketplace SupplyOn because they feared the omnipotence of
OEMs' Covisint.
Both e-marketplaces offered more or less the same services. SupplyOn started
very moderately step-by-step whereas Covisint spent some of their initial
budget for advertising. Unfortunately, most of Covisint's promises only existed
on Powerpoint slides. This led to an acceptance level much lower than
originally expected. This holds especially for the suppliers.
Flowever, due to the lack of understanding the processes of the automotive
industry, as well as management errors, Covisint failed in establishing an
industry standard. As a result, in 2004, Covisint lost its independence when
software maker Compuware signed a deal to buy the remaining Covisint assets,
i.e., messaging, portal and Web services. This followed the sale of Covisint's
auction business to Freemarkets20. Although SupplyOn still tries to attract more
actors of the industry, it has not been a business success either.
In the subsequent chapter, the emergence ofDC's supplier portal strategy is
described and discussed.
20 Freemarkets is now part ofAriba.
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Chapter 5. The EMERGENCE of a SUPPLIER PORTAL
STRATEGY
5.1 Introduction
The empirical data presented in this chapter and the subsequent one on
'development and implementation of a standardised supplier portal' is based on
a longitudinal, ethnographic study, undertaken for about two years on the
Global Supplier Portal (GSP) project as a participant observer. Although the
two chapters are linked, they have been split into two to provide the reader with
an easier presentation of the very detailed material.
This chapter addresses, in a chronological narrative, the evolution of the
supplier portal strategy ofDaimlerChrysler (DC). This strategy was part of the
IT strategy which in turn was part of the corporate DC strategy. The term
"strategy" is derived from the Greek "strategos" and means a general set of
manoeuvres carried out to overcome an enemy (Eden & Ackermann, 1998).
Mintzberg (1994) pointed out that people use "strategy" in several different
ways, the most common being:
■ Strategy as a plan, a "how", a means of getting from here to there
■ Strategy as a pattern in actions over time
■ Strategy as a position; that is, it reflects decisions to offer particular
products or services in particular markets.
■ Strategy as a perspective, that is, vision and direction (Mintzberg, 1994).
Mintzberg also argued that strategy emerges over time as intentions collide
with, and accommodate, a changing reality. Thus, one might start with a
perspective and conclude that it calls for a certain position, which is to be
achieved by way of a carefully crafted plan. The eventual outcome and strategy
are reflected in a pattern evident in decisions and actions over time. This pattern
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of decisions and actions defines what Mintzberg called "realised" or emergent
strategy (Mintzberg, 1994).
Translated into the DC supplier portal case, "strategy" meant that DC had to
adapt to the changing reality in terms of external market pressures to collaborate
closer with suppliers, and internal requirements to standardise with Internet-
based technologies. From the perspective ofMr Schrempp, the former CEO of
DaimlerChrysler:
"We at DaimlerChrysler view e-Business as a means ofsignificantly
accelerating and supporting both, internal and externalprocesses, while
at the same time reducing their duration and cost. But successful e-
Business also requires a major readjustment to the approaches taken in
many areas along our value chain -from development all the way to
sales andmarketing. " (J.E. Schrempp, CEO DaimlerChrysler in the
preface of the DCXnet annual e-Business report: 3)
Schrempp represented a certain position which he implemented in the set-up of
a business unit called DCXnet in order to push e-business in general and the
supplier portal strategy in particular. Consequently, the evaluation of a supplier
portal strategy and the start of the 'Global Supplier Portal' (GSP) project can be
understood as a pattern in decision and subsequent action in order to achieve the
objective of a seamlessly integrated value chain.
This is underpinned by a statement in the annual e-Business report of 2001:
"Completely new prospectsfor networking with suppliers have opened
up as result of the Web. Collaboration is significantly simplified by this
globally uniform medium. As a consequence of the increasing
interconnectedness ofthe suppliers themselves, the demandfor a
universally 'networked' industry is being met to an ever greater extent".
(Annual e-Business report ofDCXnet, 2001)
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As Schrempp pointed out, the successful adoption ofB2B e-commerce needed
major re-definitions of approaches used in the past. The global supplier portal
was one of the projects where a new approach combined with new technology
could open up a variety of possibilities to integrate the entire supply chain by
bridging inter-organisational processes. Consequently, this would ensure a more
profitable collaboration between DC and suppliers. The message given by
Schrempp was to actively exploit all big chances which Internet-based
technologies were supposed to offer.
The remainder of the chapter will proceed as follows. First, the early e-business
activities at DC, and how DC got involved in the Internet "hype", will be
reviewed. The first initiatives and their failure are described and analysed in
greater detail, from the initial idea of a cross-departmental organisation through
to its implementation. This will be followed by description of the next level of
approaching e-business in a more efficient way through the foundation of a new
organisational unit, DCXnet, and ofCovisint. Subsequently, the options of the
portal strategy are outlined and discussed from different perspectives. The
chapter is concluded by a presentation of the two other founding partners of DC,
Ford and GM, and their e-business activities as well as a discussion of the
strategic option two competitors, BMW and VW, had chosen.
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5.2 E-business - Status quo
The chronological course of events at DC regarding the portal strategy is
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Figure 24. Chronological course of events (Own figure)
For DC, the Internet endeavour started with a ranking of their Internet web
presences by McKinsey in 1999. It was considered to be very poor. Most
popular car sites then were Microsoft's CarPoint and Cartalk, followed by
traditional competitors such as Toyota; Chrysler ranked 8th, BMW 19th, Dodge
22nd, Mercedes Benz only 35th.
The ranking and the different other factors were the initial start to think of and
review web interfaces from DC to customers and to suppliers; this was done
during a period of two years. As figure 24 illustrates, the evaluation of a
supplier portal strategy started mid 2000 following the successful launch of
applications linking DC with its suppliers described in the next sub-section.
The overall situation ofDC in 1999 could be characterised as follows: no
existing e-business strategy, no common e-business platform for supplier
communication, individual e-business initiatives across DC, and strongly EDI-
based communication. Additionally, increased pressure from e.g. strategic
suppliers forced DC to deal with e-business more seriously in order to tap into
its potentials and to optimise business processes (Truhart, 2001).
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GM and Ford had already started to implement e-business initiatives, and
suppliers had also begun to demand a more efficient information exchange
preferably in "real-time".
5.3 Networks at DC - first activities
As always in the past 20 years, the automotive industry was characterised by a
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high pressure to collaborate more closely with business partners, primarily
with tier-1 suppliers but also with all other supply partners. However, this
required an inter-organisational strategy that covered more than the already well
adopted use ofEDI (see section 4.3.3). Such an IONS strategy had to take into
consideration not only the already existing business relations with suppliers and
the EDI technology in use, but had also to manage the integration of any
Internet-based solutions into the existing IT infrastructure.
At the end of the 1990s, all large OEMs had launched a number of applications
covering their entire value chain, including e.g., electronic collaboration and
electronic catalogue projects. Those stand-alone applications were operated
successfully within functional departments but were not integrated with each
other. As described in section 4.3.3, the pressure for collaboration led
organisations in the automotive sector to become involved in a range of IONS
projects in order to become networked with the whole industry.
Table 5 shows e-collaboration examples at DC in 2000. This included electronic
collaboration projects, the integration of engineering processes, and electronic
catalogue projects to present product and service data.
21 These pressures were described in 4.3.3.
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Table 5. Examples of single e-collaboration projects at DC (e-Business report, 2001)
Business unit IONS application example Characteristics
Engineering ■ FastCar Integrated Internet-based
development platform for
engineering





■ Suppliers provide goods
and services in electronic
catalogues
Logistics ■ E-supply Internet-based supply chain
management tool
Other OEMs basically faced the same situation. GM, Ford, BMW and VW also
tried to improve their various engineering, procurement and logistic processes.
As Figure 24 illustrates, Ford had already launched its new supplier portal (with
Covisint) in September 2001. Electronic auctions were the first Internet-based
tools implemented in all the above organisations. Elowever, e-auctions cover
only a small part of the entire value chain process. According to Kumar and van
Dissel (1996), such IONS were adopted not only to achieve operational
effectiveness by reducing co-ordination costs and transaction risks but also to
improve communication and information presentation (Kumar & Dissel, 1996).
Within DC, the motivation to find the right e-business and supplier portal
strategy was triggered by both, external and internal pressure (internal
presentation).
Continuous cost pressure and cost-benefit considerations, paired with an
innovation marathon in electronic devices for cars had forced DC to completely
rethink their supply chain strategy. Changes in procurement and logistics (e.g.,
increasing popularity of global sourcing and logistic concepts such as JiS) led to
severe quality issues, particularly in the passenger car sector. Therefore, a
global portal connecting all suppliers in order to address those issues would
have helped to build up a large automotive network. It was also seen as a means
to improve customer satisfaction and increase revenue growth and shareholder
value (an important aspect to consider as a public company listed at all major
stock exchanges).
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The internal pressure to standardise and streamline inter-organisational
activities was the second important initial trigger. A coherent strategy should
not only reduce costs but also increase efficiency of information and data
exchange, and take advantage of leading-edge technology (as technology
leadership was one of the postulated corporate strategies).
An e-business strategy as part of both the corporate and the IT strategy aimed to
reduce cost and risk of IT by harmonising the IT architecture. This would then
allow the implementation of e-Business applications designed according to
well-defined standards. The standardisation of the overall IT infrastructure was
seen as a major step to globally support and to push all e-Business activities
within DC (Annual e-Business report, 2001).
One of the outcomes of the McKinsey study was that the Global Procurement
and Supply department (GP&S), which was responsible for supplier
relationships, started the 'Electronic Extended Enterprise' (eEE) initiative in the
first quarter of 2000. At this point in time the Internet had created a special
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atmosphere in the so-called brick-and-mortar organisations. Those mostly
large and traditional companies felt the urge to participate in this exiting new
world of technological innovation in one way or other, and they wanted their
share of influence.
5.3.1 GP&S and the eEE programme
The Top Management (TM) felt annoyed by the McKinsey results. After all,
they represented a solid traditional company. Consequently, they charged the
Corporate Procurement Officer (CPO), Gary Valade, to come up with a concept
to address the issue.
22 Brick and mortar refers to companies that have a physical presence and offer face-to-face consumer
experiences, as opposed to an Internet-only presence (see online shop for comparison). Brick-and-
mortar companies usually are companies that have been in their specific field or service since before
the dot-com boom of the 1990s (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brick and mortar as of 24th of January,
2006).
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GP&S was the department in charge supplier relationships. Thus, it seemed
logical to assign them to push e-Business and a related strategy within DC. In
2000, the functional organisation and the eEE programme started. The eEE
programme intended to significantly change existing supply processes and thus
increase the efficiency of the whole supply chain by exploiting Internet
technologies.
Based on the already existing concept of the 'Extended Enterprise®' (EE) (see
chapter 4.6.2), which attempted to optimise processes throughout the entire
supply chain together with supplier partners, GP&S only put the "e" (for
'electronic') before the name of the existing supplier programme (Internal
documentation, 2002).
Although an e-strategy was defined by the eEE organisation which focused on
four pilot projects, it turned out very soon that eEE would fail due to a lack of
acceptance within DC, and because of its biased dual position as a programme
as well as a functional department which was part ofGP&S (eEE presentation,
2001).
In addition, communication issues and lack of leadership emerged at different
DC sites, triggered by the post-merger situation. The complex organisational
structure ofDC with its heterogeneous processes also contributed. In particular,
the production plants objected, largely to keep their independence.
In the automotive industry, the production plants enjoy a high degree of
freedom as they are manufacturing the cars. Historically, they represent
independent organisational units which mistrust every activity originating from
a corporate department. In addition, there was no clearly developed strategy for
the distribution of quantitative benefits to be shared between eEE and the
production plants.
An additional reason for the eEE failure was the lack of commitment by top
management and a non-existing budget to implement e-Business in the
organisation. There was a constant lack of human resources with appropriate
skills for eEE as business units feared to loose their qualified people if they
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seconded them to GP&S. Finally, eEE had to cope with the complex IT
infrastructure and various legacy systems installed all over the organisation,
which were difficult to understand without adequate IT knowledge.
Another important point was the communication between GP&S and IT - or
rather the lack thereof- related to a common supplier strategy. GP&S had too
little technical IT knowledge to speak to DC IT at eye level, and therefore tried
to hide as much as possible of their supplier strategies, even if they were IT-
related. Another unsettling fact was the strong move of the IT department to
take the lead in e-business (personal impressions and conversations with GP&S
and IT managers).
5.3.2 IT & existing supplier portals
One of the corporate strategic goals was the leadership in corporate IT. The
corporate IT strategy proclaimed the concept of a proactive IT architecture for
all applications and systems. It was to be based on a modern, scalable and
consistent IT infrastructure with standardised products (Annual Report, 2001).
The belief of the upper management was that such an IT infrastructure was one
of the cornerstones of a successful e-collaboration strategy. Approved by the
Board ofManagement, the IT department was developing such a 'proactive' IT
infrastructure. All relevant IT infrastructure elements were centrally controlled,
and their use was mandatory for all e-collaboration projects. However, existing
current operational IT systems for procurement and supply only supported local
tasks, and global data were only available on an aggregated level. To integrate
processes and to capture synergies on a global basis, new IT functionality was
required. Different single initiatives in the procurement units were not
interlinked, and there was no overall coordination of local and divisional
initiatives (Annual e-Business report, 2001).
Furthermore, the implementation of a standards-based infrastructure was seen to
provide many benefits to DC:
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■ Timely provisioning of IT infrastructure test and development
environments
■ Economies of scale through global contracts (hardware and software)
■ Global access to all key infrastructure components
■ Improvement ofROI through infrastructure reuse across multiple
projects
■ Replication of common solutions in all DC locations world wide
■ Reduction of lead times for new applications (development and rollout).
A first step to implement the corporate IT strategy was expressed in a so-called
"Developer Resource Portal" (DRP), a standardised developing environment
including tools, techniques, etc., to assist the internal customers in developing
applications according to standards, etc. (Annual e-Business report, 2001).
Within DC, the supplier portal issue was addressed differently by the Chrysler
side in Auburn Hills (DCA) and the Daimler side in Stuttgart (DCS). In 1998,
the portal software market was in its infancy and consisted only of a handful of
large players. The DCS IT department decided to develop its first portals in-
house. In Germany, the 'DCS Supplier Portal' did not only offer a single point
of entry as a secured link between DCS and its suppliers, but also reduced
process times. Furthermore, DCS attempted to provide support within the
Supplier Portal based on the idea of "one-face-to-the-customer". A central user
help desk offered technical support concerning the portal and the associated
applications.
The functionality of the first release offered a guest login and a secured user
authentication, a portal specific directory, a single sign-on and a unique user
account. The portal incorporated three e-business applications. The test phase
combined with a controlled roll-out started in January 2001. Another release
followed quickly and replaced the first one, with functionalities such as
dynamic personalisation, decentralised administration, national language
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support, encrypted communication, task box, registration service and global
user directory (corporate directory).
In contrast, Chrysler was connected to its suppliers via a portal called
'Sponsored Partner Information Network' (SPIN) since 1994. This web-based
infrastructure hosted more than 100 applications connecting over 5,000 trading
partners. Consequently, two supplier portals existed in parallel in the US and
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Europe . As a result, from an IT perspective, a portal was seen as consolidating
applications in order to realise savings and check for the best technological
solutions available.
5.4 A focused strategy approach
In parallel to the unsuccessful attempts ofGP&S and IT, the TM analysed the
influencing factors and consequences of e-Business on DC's business activities.
As a result the TM decided to found an organisation which would translate and
push this transformation process throughout the entire corporation (Annual e-
Business report, 2001).
5.4.1 The foundation of DCXnet
The foundation of the DCXnet holding, at the end of 2000, was a logical step in
the corporate strategy and was presented as an effort to consolidate all
company-wide e-business investments and activities in the areas ofB2B, B2C,
and telematics24, and was understood as a means to translate the strategic
concepts into practice.
In the annual report ofDCXnet, Jiirgen E. Schrempp the CEO ofDC admitted
that:
" ...e-Business is already an integral part of daily
operations ...results ofpilot projects are being transferred to all levels
and throughout the entire DC corporation, DCXnet will be a major step
23 Other regions ofDC also started portal initiatives, for example South Africa.
24 http://intra.daimlerchrysler.com, DaimlerChrysler consolidates e-Business Activities and Founds
New DCXnet Holding, 05.03.01.
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forward toward our goal ofmaking DaimlerChrysler the first automaker
in the world with a completely networked value chain
Consequently, DC established not only a functional department but also the
strategic programme called "DCXnet'. A DC business manager described the
situtation very clearly:
"In 2000, DC launched an e-business initiative called 'DCXnet' as a
result of the outcomes ofa study of the impact of e-Business/Internet on
DC's business activities (in cooperation with business units and
corporate departments) within the framework of "e-Strategic Business
Development".
The objectives and roles of DCXnet were manifold, as sketched below:
■ Budget responsibility for initial investments; for example, for Covisint
or the GSP project
■ Role as coordinator/facilitator between GP&S and IT
■ Support ofGP&S due to their lack of acceptance
■ Support Covisint in terms of their set-up of business and develop
together with Covisint standardised industry solutions (Annual e-
business report, 2001).
DCXnet could not only be seen as budget source, but also as coordinator. From
past experiences, it seemed necessary to ensure the implementation of a
corporate e-business strategy by a third party in order to balance the interests on
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Figure 25. The DCXnet organisation (Annual e-businessl report, 2001)
The programme was launched to coordinate future strategies in the area ofB2B,
B2C, and telematics on a higher level. It aimed to coordinate an overall
eBusiness strategy throughout the corporation to link internal and external
processes and people, and consisted of four modules: (1) Business Connect
which aimed to improve the collaboration with suppliers, (2) Workforce
Connect which wanted to build a stronger network of employees, (3) Customer
connect which wanted to strenghten the link to the dealer base, and (4) Vehicle
Connect that dealt with the telematics in a car. Consequently, the global
supplier portal was part of the Business Connect strategy which was worked
out in cooperation with the procurement department (GP&S) as one of the
interviewees pointed out:
"The supplier portal was part of the global procurement as well as of
the global IT solution strategy which took into consideration the
corporate IT strategy" (DCXnet manager).
In order to achieve this global transparency, one single point of entry through a
supplier portal was part of the overall Covisint strategy. DCXnet opted for the
'early adopter approach' to take advantage of promised potentials related with
the use ofweb-based technologies in order to gain competitive advantage.
Consequently, the next step was the foundation of Covisint. This approach was
driven by DCXnet and also aimed at joining forces with Ford and GM in order




5.4.2 The foundation of Covisint
As the objective to achieve standardisation across the entire supply chain was a
top priority ofDC's agenda, DC attempted to push its own organisation for
standardised solutions. With the foundation ofCovisint, DC, Ford and GM not
only created a new consortium; the additional objective of Covisint was to set
up a de-facto standard for an e-commerce platform in the automotive industry.
In 1999 , to leave 'all avenues open' (i.e., either acting alone or being part of a
greater interest group), the electronic marketplace Covisint was founded in
Detroit, close to GM and Ford. All three companies became shareholders of the
new company. This close vicinity later influenced the entire development
process of Covisint and the Global Supplier Project (GSP) (see chapter 6). The
total investment in Covisint by DC, Ford and GM amounted to around 500
million dollars.
For DC, being a shareholder ofCovisint was a strategic benefit for several
reasons: First, the financial commitment could yield a high return on
investment. Second, forming an alliance with two major competitors and
leading the way was a demonstration of power for the entire automotive
industry. In line with the corporate strategy of being a technology leader, DC
wanted to demonstrate that it had understood the innovation signals radiated by
the Internet. DC found itself in the same situation as other OEMs in terms of the
need to improve supplier relations and cut down cost. Electronically supported
collaboration across the supply chain was on every company's agenda.
Therefore, the foundation of Covisint was a natural step to increase efficiency in
the industry through a collaborative effort that distributed risks and costs across
the players and ensured standardisation of business processes and information
exchange.
25 The date differs from the date in the figure 21 because in 1999, the first meetings concerning
Covisint started. In Spring 2000, the unofficial launch of Covisint took place which was legally
allowed end of 2000 (see annual figure in figure 21).
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Using leading-edge Internet technology Covisint should help DC to reorganise
internal and external business processes. Consequently, Covisint was a means to
an end, supposed to enforce process harmonisation through the introduction of
best practice processes and standardisation of the ICT infrastructure across the
corporation.
5.5 The search for the philosophers' stone
GP&S and their eEE programme failed, and GP&S managers were not able to
join forces with IT in order to develop a supplier portal strategy at a cross-
departmental level. Due to the unsuccessful attempts of the eEE programme to
establish acceptance and professional experience in e-business projects pressure
on GP&S was increasing. Gary Valade, the Head ofGP&S, was forced to react.
The creation of one single global supplier portal held many potential benefits
for both DaimlerChrysler and their suppliers, including:
■ Major improvements in OEM-to-supplier and supplier-to-supplier
communication worldwide, supporting data exchange and
synchronisation across the entire supply chain
" A uniform solution for web-based applications, providing users with a
simple, common interface for navigating and conducting business across
DC's systems and those of its partners
■ A simplified user experience, driven by a single sign-on identity, and
backed by a high-integrity, cost-efficient security system
■ Increased efficiency, enabling the company and its suppliers to focus on
their core competencies (i.e., making high quality cars and trucks), rather
than on reinventing the business (internal presentation).
The automotive industry was very well aware of the fact that an improvement of
the inter-organisational collaboration was necessary. The remaining question
was how this objective could be best achieved.
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5.5.1 The alternative options: in-house or outsourcing
Usage of the platforms mentioned above required complex use of technology
and incorporated a multitude of standards. Consequently, the decision to
integrate business partners with IONS involved a range of actors and
perspectives and required a strategic decision related to inter-organisational
collaboration: whether to implement commercial off-the-shelf systems (COTS)
or to implement standardised technology; i.e., 'do-it-yourself (make) or
'outsource' (buy). This was a strategic decision as it meant either to develop a
bespoke solution or to join forces with other OEMs to develop and implement a
standardised solution.
The decision depends on the individual situation of a company, including, for
example, the company's individual strategy or its current position in the market.
Both alternatives were implemented in practice in various firms with different
outcomes for the implementing organisation as well as for business partners
(particularly suppliers). Table 6 exhibits the criteria of the different alternatives.















According to an official presentation of a DC GP&S manager, three criteria
largely guided the discussion of the pros and cons of the strategy to be decided
upon: the economies-of-scale, the differentiation to competitors and the process-
ownership.
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Economies of scale criteria
Advantages and disadvantages of both alternatives from a cost-benefit point of
view were leading to the overshadowing question if the implementation of an
"in-house" solution would be cheaper than the implementation of an industry
standard.
Among the OEMs, not only at DC, this was discussed under the 'economies-of-
scale' heading. Business management defines economies of scale as to occur
in industries with high capital costs in which those costs can be distributed
across a large number of units of production (both in absolute terms, and,
especially, relative to the size of the market). Translated to the implementation
of a customised solution it meant that no economies of scale could be realised
because the number of users (only the company itself) is restricted and the
average total cost would not decrease. Also, experience indicated that the
'make' option would require customisation related to specific company
processes which usually tends to generate high extra cost, e.g., for additional
programming.
In addition to these cost considerations, it was not DC's core business to set up
a global supplier portal. This is where outsourcing and Covisint, offering
industry standard solutions, enter the game. Industry-standard solutions were
characterised by no differentiation from competitors and uniform processes that
can potentially offer economies of scale. With Covisint, DC would not only
reduce cost and risk (and therefore realise economies of scale), it would also
increase its power in the market and thus determine standards and publicly
demonstrate a certain power vis-a-vis competitors that were not participating. In
addition, the consolidation of the different existing portals would contribute to
lower operational and maintenance cost.
26
Often, economies of scale are mixed up with network externalities.
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Differentiation to competitors
Around the turn of the millennium, the launch of an electronic marketplace or a
business portal, or at least whether or not to join forces with other organisations
of the same industry were hot topics for discussions in many industries. Apart
from cost-benefit considerations of implementing a supplier portal the question
about the differentiation to competitors was hotly discussed. In marketing,
product differentiation is the modification of a product to make it more
attractive to the target market. This involves differentiating it from competitors'
products. The question was whether or not established brands would suffer from
a global supplier portal which was co-financed by two other major competitors.
The already existing supplier portals supported selling the DC brands, Mercedes
and Chrysler. They thus represented marketing for DC and differentiated it from
competitors. On the other hand, a supplier portal operated by Covisint meant
that DC would at least reduce this benefit, and IT managers expressed their
concerns to lose the uniqueness of the brands. Some DC managers feared that
customers and potential customers would get a negative image ofDC due to an
alliance with car brands that were clearly outside the 'premium' segment.
Independent from that, however, the dilemma how to balance the options of
differentiation versus standardisation still remained.
Process-ownership and processes
In terms of processes and process-ownership, in-house meant independence
from any other business partner. However, processes would remain company-
specific, hence offering no economies of scale. At DC, independence was
assigned a very high value. There was the pride of being one of the premium
OEMs, associated with the fear of the loss of control over processes and IT
responsibility. In addition, concerns about security and technical integration
difficulties were expressed by opponents of Covisint. As these opponents were
based in the IT department it might be suspected that these arguments were little
more than a red herring; the real fear was of loss of control of technical
resources and processes.
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Industry standard solutions such as the e-marketplace of Covisint offered a
standardised IT infrastructure reflecting business processes common in the
automotive industry, also called "Best Practice". With the outsource option, the
involved companies would lose their full independence and would have to come
to grips with industry standards that resulted from best practices of the industry,
but that would not necessarily fully cover the own processes.
However, the outsourcing option was in line with the TM's views. Their
perspective on IT, including portal technology, was directed by the vision of a
standardised corporate infrastructure and characterised by the business objective
to save money on IT infrastructure while harmonising systems and applications.
The discussion about 'in-house' or 'outsource' business processes in
procurement and logistics separated the participating departments ofDC.
DCXnet's and GP&S' understood the portal technology as an underlying
infrastructure to enable inter-organisational processes (between DC and the
suppliers). Consequently, it was of no relevance if this portal infrastructure was
provided and hosted by DC or elsewhere. However, IT had a totally different
understanding of the subject. The supplier portal was seen as an integral part of
the corporate IT infrastructure and therefore belonging to DC rather than to a
third party such as Covisint. For the IT department, Covisints' integration
within DC had already been a concession; a further project like the global
supplier portal would mean another defeat for them (Own participant
perspective).
Eventually, four major factors shaped the portal strategy: Internet technologies,
budget, organisational history, and company culture. Although technology
providers promised cheap and easy-to-implement solutions, challenges were
seen in the technical and organisational integration of a supplier portal into the
existing IT architecture, and in the incorporation of existing applications and
their corresponding functionalities. In the technical integration context, IT
security was very high on the agenda ofDC IT's top managers, at least of those
in Stuttgart. The supplier portal hosted in Stuttgart was secured by different
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firewalls and role-based authentication systems. Additionally, apart from
contact details such as address, phone, etc., supplier company administrators
wishing to log-in had to fax a copy of their personal ID in order to prove that
they were who they claimed to be. This clearly shows the level of concerns and
doubts of the DC Germany-based IT department regarding collaboration with
external parties.
Working with the former supplier portal hosted in Stuttgart, suppliers were
forced to change their password every 4 weeks which caused an unsatisfactory
situation within supplier organisations and led to workarounds (e.g., the
password of the month was printed and posted centrally for everyone to read it).
The US-based supplier portal, though, could be reached one login and a
permanent password. Suppliers were never forced by DC US to change the
password and automatically had access to every application linked with the
portal.
Second, budget considerations influenced the portal strategy. A defined budget
influenced procurement negotiations with suppliers and influenced the way DC
attempted to operate and maintain a scalable and consistent IT infrastructure. As
DC and the other OEMs experienced shrinking margins and were continuously
forced to lower their production cost, the idea with respect to Covisint was to
join forces in order to achieve better prices, using e.g., electronic bidding tools
(e-auctions). At a next level of supplier integration, a supplier portal should
also, for instance, help integrate supply chain planning systems of suppliers into
the DC IT architecture in order to increase the performance ofmaterial
forecasts. Finally, organisational factors such as the past history and the
company culture, for example trust and power, shaped the portal strategy. This
will be addressed in the following section.
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5.5.2 The battle of interests
97
Although a multidisciplinary approach had been chosen, the B2B council
introduced a clear distribution of roles between the different actors in the portal
case. Three departments were involved in devising the portal strategy for DC,
each group representing its own interest during the decision phase of the portal
strategy. Their roles and interests are described in Figure 26 and explained in-
depth in the remainder of this section.




























Figure 26. Actors and factors shaping the DC portal strategy
GP&S
As already mentioned, the Global Procurement & Supply department (GP&S)
was in charge of the management of relations with suppliers, including the
supplier policy. The procurement departments play a key role in most sectors
because they contribute significantly to the value of a company. Every Euro of
savings has a direct impact on the EBIT28 of an organisation which is an
important figure for financial institutions and shareholders. Therefore, GP&S
understood its role within DC as very important although company-wide the
level of acceptance of its service offer and activities varied from limited to no
acceptance at all. The vision ofGP&S was formulated in a statement aiming for
the "Shaping of the World's Most Effective Supply Network". GP&S aimed to
27 The B2B council was a sub-group of the TM. In regular meetings, they were supposed to be
informed about the on-going activities and decisions to be made by the respective groups working in
the B2B area.
28 EBIT: earnings before interest and taxes; a business ratio particularly important for companies
quoted at the stock exchange.
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optimise and balance what they called 'value drivers' such as system cost,
technology, supply and quality (eEE brochure, 2001).
Based on internal customer requirements, the GP&S department is responsible
to achieve quality goals, optimise costs, identify and acquire technology and
innovation and provide fast, reliable and consistent delivery of goods and
services (Global Supplier, 2000). With the experience already gained from the
eEE venture, and pursuing own strategic goals, GP&S was to some extent
involved in the shaping of the portal strategy. In an interview, a GP&S manager
tries to link the GP&S strategy with concrete activities:
"As GP&S is responsible for supplier partner management, the portal
will help us to work with the best suppliers, for example in implementing
a global commodity strategy in order to save money. Therefore, the
portal is part of the implementation of the strategic goals of eEE
supplier programme
There were two issues associated with the GP&S strategy. First, all applications
in place were only supported by individual inter-organisational processes.
Second, one of the objectives was to achieve consolidation of applications in
order to keep system costs to a minimum and to keep pace with current
technology developments.
However, the goals of the existing supplier policy, i.e., to collaborate with
suppliers in a partner-oriented way, were missing from the GP&S
mission/vision. Suppliers suffered from the need to communicate with various
different departments and different people at DC. Consequently, the effort to
manage supplier relationships effectively had increased in a way neither desired
nor intended. There was a current need for only one 'single point of entry' into
the DC world:
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The way we do want to collaborate with our suppliers is written down in
the eEEprinciples. Our business relationships are based on partnership.
With all the different applications, we, unfortunately, cannot provide the
suppliers with one single communication channel which hopefully will
change with the supplierportal (GP&S manager).
DCXnet
The newly established DCXnet department had a number of objectives to
achieve that were put on the agenda by the TM. Most notably, it had to actively
develop the e-business strategy. In addition, the founding ofDCXnet allowed
the TM to better control the course of events and the progress of activities in the
area of e-Business, as well as the decisions to be taken. Moreover, they could
get direct feedback from DCXnet which was in close contact with all business
units and departments. External and internal public relations, such as for
example the distribution of e-business success stories and the progress of e-
business activities across the corporation, were tools DCXnet consciously used
to achieve positive awareness of e-business in general.
Analysing once more both existing supplier portals, the 'Business Connect'
team ofDCXnet identified risks such as complexity, double efforts, redundancy
and inconsistency of information. The team was also supposed to actively
support the GP&S department in focusing on all types of e-business activities in
order to get a better company-wide acceptance and reputation. Another
objective was to wisely spend the budget which was allocated generously by the
TM. This money included not only the initial investment in Covisint but was
also related to e-business projects such as the GSP.
Finally, the Business Connect team ofDCXnet was not only the link between
DC and Covisint but also played a very active role in influencing and
coordinating Covisint's actions (obviously, DCXnet had an interest to look very
closely at what Covisint was doing or was not doing as they were financially
involved with a considerable amount ofmoney). For example, they would
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support Covisint in setting-up their own business (e.g., establish contacts with
important DC managers and to ask them about their advice, to make them feel
included) as well as to help them in developing the promoted 'standardised
industry solutions'. One could safely assume that DCXnet was very well aware
of the fact that not much of the promoted standardised portal existed. However,
they actively sold Covisint as success within DC (Own observation and personal
experience).
After the definition of the corporate e-business strategy and the first steps to
integrate them into everyday business, DCXnet was to be re-integrated into the
corresponding business units to ensure the local adoption of the strategies.
However, the date of re-integration had never been defined. When it was
announced before the portal pilot, this came surprisingly early for everyone in
the GSP project team. No reasons for this timing were given,
IT
During the time of the eEE programme, GP&S and IT already had to work
together. This was not really appreciated by GP&S because of their
understanding of their role. However, GP&S suffered from a certain lack of IT
knowledge. On the other hand, it was the primary objective of the IT department
to deliver IT services. The departments were, therefore, forced to work together
in the e-collaboration pilot projects. Despite some quarrels while pursuing their
respective own agenda, GP&S and IT formed an alliance when it became clear
that DC would go for the Covisint option which was pushed by DCXnet and
represented the objectives of the TM. The implementation ofDCXnet, which
was equipped with political power and the necessary budget, was seen with
some distrust by GP&S, IT and the production plants. This emerged on several
occasions during the GSP project, particularly when difficulties occurred (this
will be discussed and analysed in chapters 6 and 7).
Based on their experiences with different supplier and engineering portals, IT
was pushing the topic 'supplier portal' in a way that made them look more
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favourably. The IT department was not only operating and maintaining the
portals but was also responsible for the development of applications based to the
needs of the GP&S department. Therefore, they were very aware of the
consequences of having one portal in place instead ofmany different ones. In
addition, one meant a consolidation of applications and a re-check of the
existing applications whether or not they fulfilled the technical portal
integration requirements.
In addition, IT had set-up an initiative that focused on the analysis of the
existing portal world and came up with a business case for a single supplier
portal. In a study, they identified inefficiencies and risks of communicating with
suppliers through different interfaces. Those inefficiencies of inconsistent and
redundant presentation of functional departments caused high cost of
connection, heterogeneous IT-technology, multiple implementations of identical
functionalities, as well as high risks through lack of security and inefficient
processes, as for example multiple logins for internal and external users
(Internal documentation).
IT calculated the business case in favour of a DC in-house solution and
pretended this to be "for security reasons"; they were strictly against a solution
operated by a third party. Additionally, the proposals for migration of the
different portals and the integration into the corporate IT architecture seemed to
be cumbersome, expensive and to slow to deploy. Obviously, the suggestions
for a supplier portal strategy seemed too heavily influenced by an IT perspective
and the TM feared that GP&S needs would not be sufficiently considered. The
IT department was a very dominant organisation with very strong leaders. They
were very good in what they were doing in their area, as they had a lot of




Suppliers, particularly tier-1 suppliers, were aware of ongoing developments
with respect to a re-direction of supplier activities at DC. However, apart from
random information, suppliers were not involved in the portal strategy and
eventually had to accept Covisint.
Most tier-1 suppliers also worked on their own e-business strategies with
respect to collaboration with their tier-2/tier-3 supply base. Additionally, based
on practical considerations and realistic cost calculations, suppliers planned to
develop their own portals. The procurement manager of a tier-1 supplier
explained the companies approach:
"We worked on a strategy keeping in mind what makes sense, what can
we offer through the interface portal andportal design, not necessarily
with the title "we need a portal by all means" because it was the
trend."
However, the development and implementation ofmost of the tier-1 supplier
portals for the tier-2 and tier-3 suppliers followed only after a time of observing
the early adopters in the portal arena.
IBM
Once the announcement to use Covisint had being made DCXnet started to talk
to, and to integrate, IBM, DC's strategic technology partner, in the further
planning of the portal project. Prior to that, IBM had only been allowed to
contribute to some special technical questions, for example the future data base
design for user management data. IBM was also given the opportunity to
present some alternatives for content management solutions and to evaluate
them. As the strategic technology partner, they were neither integrated into the
e-strategy development process nor the supplier portal strategy. One reason for
this was that DC was too proud to enlist external support to find an adequate DC
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e-business strategy (virtually every consultancy company existing at this time
had offered their services to DC). Also, IBM already worked very closely with
the IT department. Consequently, DCXnet feared they could leak to DC IT
confidential information they got at DCXnet. In this situation, DCXnet used
their power to exclude IBM from participation in the definition of the portal
strategy. However, IBM was allowed to support DC in the development and
implementation phase where DCXnet experienced a lack of technical
experience and did not trust some of the arguments brought up by DC IT.
During the development and implementation of the portal, IBM experienced the
same issues between DCXnet and IT (Own participant observation).
5.5.3 The decision and its announcement
The final decision was shaped by the three major actors GP&S, IT and DCXnet.
In a way, this cross-departmental approach reflected the DC company culture
which had two main characteristics: some decisions were made on a corporate
level, for example decisions that were concerning several business units,
whereas others were made within single business units for special business
reasons. One of the interviewees involved from the beginning made a point
about the internal policy:
"The top management deliberately wanted this cross-departmental
approach to get everybody involved and to get everyone's opinion at one
table. Also, in anticipation that a business unit could not complain later
and object that they were not asked" (DC manager).
With regard to the IONS/portal strategy, Gary Valade proudly stated:
"We are reinforcing our commitment to creating industry standards in
the Internet space by choosing Covisint for our portal development. We
anticipate that our supply partners and ultimately our customers will
benefit from the elimination of time-consuming, cumbersome and
expensive web applications that do not interface with each other"
(Internal documentation, 2002).
150
The official press announcement in automotive journals and the daily press read
like this:
"In a continuing effort to implement its comprehensive e-business
strategy, DaimlerChrysler AG (DC) today announced its selection of
Covisint to develop and host the company's new, global supplier portal.
This will be the next generation of the company's supplier portal
solutions. The portal will integrate all OEM and supplier applications as
well as Covisint-tools worldwide via one common framework, based
upon input from DaimlerChrysler and its suppliers in the Extended
Enterprise®" (Internal documentation, 2002).
Eventually, after more than six months of evaluating both options, either to set¬
up the global portal (make) or to buy and let at an external entity host the portal
(in this particular case Covisint; (outsource)), the official announcement of the
decision by Gary Valade (externally and internally) flagged the end of the
search for the right supplier portal strategy and was the starting point for further
portal activities. The 'pro Covisint decision' was in line with the corporate IT
strategy, emphasising the adoption of standardised ICT infrastructure.
The announcement of this decision can be seen as a milestone in DCs' e-
business history. Interestingly, in the end, the decision reflcted not only the
GP&S commitment to Covisint, but also the commitment ofDC IT. Finally,
upon realisation that they did not stand a chance against DCXnet they had given
up their security and integration related concerns (upon which their refusal of
the Covisint solution was based). DCXnet not only had the budget but was also
very closely linked with the TM. DCXnet found itself in the comfortable
position of shaping the portal activities on an strategic level but havimg only to
coordinate on the operational level - without any responsibility for, e.g.,
meeting project deadlines. Additionally, DCXnet was responsible for the direct
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communication with the TM. This gave them some leeway in terms of
interpretation of project progress, issues, etc.
5.6 The big partners of DC in Covisint
During the Internet hype, most OEMs had already started to develop their
websites to attract end customers and dealers. The extended use of Internet
technologies was supposed to contribute to the added value of a company and to
help improve process efficiencies (see, for example, GartnerGroup, 2000;
Forrester, 2000; McKinsey, 1999). But not only technology seemed to play an
important role: speed was another buzz word. All industry areas were lured by
the huge promises predicted by GartnerGroup and others, and the automotive
industry was no exception.
Companies were kind of obsessed by the idea to gain competitive advantage
through implementing Internet-based technologies and adopting e-business. Yet,
the focus was largely on sales support (business-to-consumer, B2C; e.g., on
improved communication between the OEM and the dealers). However, the
much greater potential seemed to lie in improving the communication and
collaboration in the area of business-to-business (B2B). Improved collaboration
through the entire supply chain, including every business partner regardless of
company size, was predicted to offer huge potential for future savings
(GartnerGroup 2001; Forrester, 2001).
Ford and GM were the other big OEMs that initiated and participated in the
original establishment ofCovisint. Ford was the first OEM in this alliance who
decided to integrate its already existing supplier portal called "Everest" into the
Covisint e-marketplace.
5.6.1 Ford
Since 1997, Ford already pursued e-business activities and used it as
justification to start a transformation of the company into a consumer-oriented
business. For example, Ford built alliances with Microsoft CarPoint and Oracle
in order to have access to leading edge software. Additionally, they nominated
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Brian Kelley as a Consumer Connect Group CEO and key vice president in
charge of the e-business initiatives. Ford's vision, according to Jack Nasser,
Ford President and CEO, was:
"We are working to become the world's premier consumer company
providing automotive products and services, and to do that, we must
29also be the premier on-line company" .
In order to successfully cope with the number one competitive concern, SCM,
Ford formed an independent joint venture with software vendor Oracle and
founded the Ford Supplier Network called Auto-Xchange (www.auto-
xchange.com; the link was cancelled after joining Covisint). The scope ofAuto-
Xchange was to transform Ford's business. Auto-Xchange involved online
procurement as well as a suite of advanced supply-chain integration software.
Thus, Auto-Xchange was the Ford's first step to open up to a wider audience of
suppliers, dealers, etc. As an internal document reveals, Ford's philosophy
consisted in starting an open marketplace to target a larger community, with a
focus on a greater transaction volume, greater economies of scale, lower prices,
and better benchmarking data. It had been the first step towards establishing an
industry standard, although not a very successful one (Truhart, 2001). As one
former Covisint manager confessed:
"Originally, Ford and GM met secretly and were talking about to join
forces and kick-start Covisint. As the alignment of interests included
also their biggest competitor, DaimlerChrysler, they decided to
approach and gentle push them to join as well".
As the three big OEMs, Ford, GM and DC more or less had the same issues to
deal with and were at the same level in terms of the use of Internet tools, it
seems quite logical that they teamed-up to set up Covisint. Another good reason
29 Ernst & Young: Proposal to DaimlerChrysler: From Thought to Finish, December 16, 1999, p. 7
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might have been the increased purchasing power. It should also be mentioned
that Ford and GM approached Chrysler in the US, not Daimler in Germany.
5.6.2 General Motors (GM)
GM started its e-business activities almost in parallel with Ford. The intention
was also pretty much identical: to better meet customer expectations by
providing the right vehicle at the right time. GM's goal was to re-engineer old
automotive business processes, deploy the Internet, and create new value
through information products, services, and business ventures. Creating these e-
relationships meant that processes and systems across GM needed to be
standardised. Apart from extending its network capabilities, GM had been
developing several exchanges in order to set up the 'GM e-company', including
business relationships with customers, suppliers, dealers and employees
(internal documentation ofGM).
In 1997, the site was integrated with dealer inventories, allowing potential
buyers to configure the exact vehicle they want and find it at a local dealer. In
addition, the site offered third-party competitive comparisons, appointments for
test drives and the ability to apply online for GMAC financing.
However, GM's most ambitious e-business exchange was targeted towards their
suppliers. The goal was to optimise the procurement process for OEMs and
suppliers. Therefore, in 1999, in cooperation with Commerce One, GM
developed "TradeXchange". The scope and philosophy ofGM TradeXchange
were considerably different from those of Auto-Xchange. GM TradeXchange
attempted to focus on e-procurement rather than the extended network of
business partners. Certainly, one of the reasons was that Commerce One simply
had no expertise in supply chain management. Additionally, GM TradeXchange
was a "closed" marketplace, open only to GM, its suppliers, dealers and invited
guests. This was in contrast to Auto-Xchange, which was an open markeplace.
Unlike Ford's Auto-Xchange, use of which had been voluntary for suppliers,
GM TradeXchange was mandatory for suppliers of GM. When Covisint was
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founded, TradeXchange became part of it while being integrated at a very early
stage, setting the scene for best practice processes (Lapidus, 2000).
Finally, GM leveraged its exchanges with newly designed business processes
and significantly improved its business efficiency. For example, GM cut its
product design cycle from 48 to 18 months (Szygenda, 2000).
It has to be noted that other members of the automotive community, such as, for
example, Renault/Nissan and Delphi, joined Covisint at a later stage.
5.7 Supplier portals in-house instead of outsourcing - two examples
Unlike DC, Ford and GM, BMW and VW, the other two big OEMs based in
Germany, choose the alternative portal strategy. In order to improve integration
with their suppliers, they aimed at implementing and customising off-the-shelf
(OTS) systems related to their respective proprietary processes.
5.7.1 BMW
In 2001, the BMW Group, located in Munich, realised eighty IT-projects that
were part of twenty-eight applications relating to six core processes (product
development, procurement, production, marketing, sales, and after sales).
Examples of applications include knowledge management, supplier portal, web-
EDI, CRM, and Online Car Assist. The e-business strategy targeted the entire
company in contrast to earlier DaimlerChrysler IT initiatives which where
stand-alone projects. According to Dr. Helmut Panke, CEO, only a holistic
approach would lead to the desired improvements within the value chain. Until
2003, the Bavarian car manufacturer invested about € 450 million into the e-
business30.
Two main areas were central to BMW's e-business plans: the product
development process (PEP) and the customer-centric sales and production
process (KOVP).
PEP refers to the reduction of development time for cars in series. Since 1999,
BMW was able to bring down development time to less than 30 months. The
30 About a quarter of the annual IT cost.
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CAD data exchange completely runs via the net. Additionally a web-based
innovation bourse was established open for all firms involved in the
development process. This effort considerably contributes to the shortening of
development time. Within this process, BMW worked closely with about 800
suppliers in order to create interactive networks. Suppliers ofmodules or
systems are early involved in the evolution of these networks (Truhart, 2001).
KOVP covers all processes of the supply chain and order systems, including
both the procurement processes and the supplier relationship management
(SRM). Especially the SRM organises all information flows necessary for a
more efficient OEM-supplier relationship. In the scope of SCM BMW set
specific requirements to be realised before a global optimum can be achieved.
Several projects were initiated, e.g., the optimisation of the process chain
"vehicle", a new production concept, greater flexibility and stability through
new production concepts, or a project called "Pipeline of glass "Process chain -
Parts" (Mossmer, 2000).
Compared to other players, BMW has a long experience in connecting its
suppliers. In 2000, they already started to think about a portal strategy after the
foundation of Covisint and after having observed what was going on in the
market.
Yet, BMW did not really feel the need to put a portal strategy on top of their
agenda because a so-called 'supplier server' had been in place since 1996. After
a new release, including a more user-friendly front-end and addressing more
topics, this supplier server was used until 2000. The BMW manager interviewed
underlines this fact:
"[...] BMW had been the first of the OEMs who had a portal
implemented. Not in the sense of naming it portal., it has been at 1996,
we offered our suppliers a so-called supplier server. We relatively early
had recognised that we need a tool to ensure communication and give
our suppliers access to our applications. It certainly had not that much
in common with the portal as of today. The functionality for example
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looked totally different [...], we were the first OEM that got linked with
its supply base. It had not been named e-business, just electronic
communication where BMWwas about to set milestones
In 2002, BMW set up a programme called "Supplier Relationship Management"
where all e-business relevant applications were to be concentrated under one
umbrella. The programme aimed to control and monitor the various projects
related to supplier integration. Within this programme, one of the requirements
was to develop a supplier portal with enhanced functionality, such as an
improved user data management, the integration of existing applications and
new processes for the development of new, Internet-based applications. Besides
that, administrative processes in terns of responsibility and ownership required a
new strategy.
BMW's portal strategy was clearly focused on the integration of all applications
and aimed to give access to all business partners, not only suppliers but also, for
example, distributors. Yet, BMW also underlined it strong focus on
independence, as they pointed out:
"We always wanted to operate our own portal, but we are also ready to
link it with other portals, or to use applications out of them, such as
Supplyon. However, we did not want to rely on a third party such as
Supplyon or Covisiril and to give up our own portal" (BMW manager).
Moreover, the portal should be international and was seen as part of a "hybrid
solution or strategy" which left open the possibility to collaborate with other
portals, for example SupplyOn. As the BMW manager illustrated:
"With a hybrid strategy, we ensure to link with marketplaces outside or
we link our applications with another system, like SupplyOn in very
special logistic procedures
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A former business manager ofCovisint described his experience after having an
acquisition meeting with BMW:
"I also talked to BMW who made a point that procurement is their
competitive advantage and that they will not pursue any interest at all to
give away any of their procurement processes to a third party,
whatsoever".
The portal strategy was largely shaped by the department called 'processes,
standards and e-business', dealing with sourcing topics and being responsible
for the coordination ofBMW's supply base. To some extent, the application
owners of existing applications, different business units, also participated in
BMW's portal strategy.
5.7.2 The Volkswagen Group (VW)
The case ofVW seems quite similar to that ofBMW. In 1998, the Volkswagen
Group based in Wolfsburg, Germany, reacted to the new challenges within the
e-landscape with the creation of SupplyNet that attempted to optimise the
communication with about 5,000 suppliers. SupplyNet was the alternative
platform to traditional channels such as personal meetings, telephone, or fax to
provide collaborative information. The goals to achieve by establishing
SupplyNet were the following:
• Provide the suppliers with all important data and information
• Improve cooperation with all suppliers
• Reduce time in communication processes
• Optimise the project work with suppliers
• Optimise cost in affected areas of the supply chain
SupplyNet was some form of a predecessor to a supplier portal, and was
subdivided into a public and a closed area. The public part was accessible via a
standard web browser. The secure area was only accessible with user
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identification (Mattes, 1999). In 2000, an e-business unit, which was part of the
procurement department, started to consider developing a portal strategy. A VW
manager mentioned one of the facts:
"We watched the market and we were well aware ofwhat was going on
with Covisint. Covisint was the reason why we started to re-think our
supplier management".
One of the reasons which forced VW to re-think their e-business activities was
the fact that the existing platform did not deliver the expected benefits and that
not every supplier was participating. Additionally, only individual applications
were offered which were not integrated in the backend and therefore did not
provide seamless integration.
For VW, it was clear that outsourcing their own inter-organisational processes
to a third party was out of the question. Together with a strategy consultancy
they worked on a cost-benefit analysis and on a technology assessment. The
project was driven by the procurement department, particularly by the e-
business people within it. In addition, the application owners were included as
well as IT people. Within VW, the procurement department has its own IT. In
terms of acceptance, suppliers of all sizes were already included in the strategy
phase. As the interviewed VW manager describes:
"Our intention was to give the supplier a tool which makes his life
easier. One does not get acceptance if the users are not asked about
their feedback".
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As a VW manager further mentioned:
"Naturally, we wanted to get the supplier portal accepted...so we
included suppliers of all company sizes, even very small ones to
contribute and give us their feedback".
5.8 Concluding remarks
External and internal triggers forced all OEMs, not only DC, to improve
collaboration with their suppliers. Unlike in the case ofEDI, the conditions now
had changed in two ways. First of all, the target audience were the entire
supplier base instead of only tier-1 suppliers. As a result, each OEM had to
think of the right e-business adoption strategy in order to connect as many
suppliers as possible. Secondly, user-friendly interfaces, Internet-based
technologies offered users a simple way to access applications, and could
incorporate functionalities which enabled new possibilities of use. These
technologies represented some sort of catalyst which allowed not only for new
business models, such as electronic markets, but also pushed big players to give
up, to a certain extent, their market position they had battled for and to team up
with competitors in order to realise the benefits promised by those technologies.
Elowever, most companies initially tried to integrate their already existing
individual solutions into a wider network context. In most cases this approach
failed, as the example of the eEE programme demonstrated. Eventually, either
technical integration difficulties or budget issues forced them to rethink their
strategy. The development of an e-business and supplier portal strategy became
necessary. The next logical step, as presented in the case ofDC, was the
foundation of a special e-business unit; in our case the DCXnet department
which should coordinate and financially support the development of an
adequate strategy, including a later implementation.
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However, DCXnet experienced the same difficulties as did GP&S with their
eEE programme. DCXnet was seen with mistrust by both the IT and GP&S
departments. The founding of DCXnet was a bitter pill for GP&S and IT to
swallow as it rendered superfluous much of their earlier work. Additionally,
both had fought for an e-business budget of their own, to adopt their own e-
business projects. Yet, they had to accept a new player with a huge budget for e-
business projects.
As DCXnet were assigned by the TM to be the budget holder and coordinator of
the GSP project, IT and GP&S showed a certain level of respect As already
described, DC is a very traditional organisation with a grown structure and
history. Within this historical context, both departments thought that it would
not be easy for DCXnet as it was a young department and still had to perform.
Additionally, IT as well as GP&S were very well linked within the corporation
(knowledge networks), had very detailed expertise of their business processes.
They thus thought that time would work in their favour.
However, a certain level of respect stemmed from two facts. First, DCXnet was
located in the same building as the entire TM and had established a very well
functioning communication line with them. Thus, the close proximity of
DCXnet to the "power" of the TM caused certain uneasiness at IT and GP&S.
The portal strategy chosen by DC shaped the development and implementation
of standardised portal technology, which is presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6. DEVELOPMENT and IMPLEMENTATION
of a STANDARDISED SUPPLIER PORTAL
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has introduced the process of how DC and the other actors
involved in the global portal project decided upon the portal strategy.
Eventually, the decision was to adopt an 'industry standard solution' which was
offered by a third party - the e-marketplace Covisint. In this chapter, the focus
is on the development and the implementation of standardised portal technology
(and business processes) as part of the Global Supplier Portal (GSP) project.
During the course of the portal project, the development and the implementation
phase were tightly intertwined.
This chapter is organised as follows. In the first section, an introduction to the
set-up of the GSP project in terms of project organisation and project plan is
provided. The subsequent sections discuss the main GSP project deliverables:
the Statement ofWork (SoW), the development of the user interface (UI) /
content management, the technical integration of the GSP portal into the
technical IT architecture ofDC, the development of the portal administration
and the concept development for the portal governance. In the conclusion, the
different aspects that emerged during development and implementation are
summarised and reflected upon.
6.2 The portal project kick-off
In January 2002, after the public announcement by Gary Valade ofDC's
decision to develop a global supplier portal with Covisint, the first preparatory
project activities started very soon. The goal was to set up a global and
interdisciplinary project team for the project "Global supplier portal" (GSP)
with members from different business units from both Auburn Hills/Detroit
(US) and Stuttgart (Germany), Covisint, as well as IBM consultants. A former
DCXnet manager summarised the start the start of the project as follows:
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''The portal implementation touched many functionalities across different
business units. This was the reason why an integrative project approach has
been chosen. It has been the same people like in the strategy phase before.
Besides, DCXnet, procurement, logistics and IT have been actively involved.
A statement ofwork, the portal user interface, the integration ofthe portal in
the DC architecture and the registration/migration ofportal users were the
first and most important milestones to achieve
6.2.1 Portal project organisation
Only a small group ofmanagers ofDCXnet, GP&S and IT departments had
participated in the strategy phase (see chapter 5). For the development and
implementation phase also business managers with a strong process background
from other departments, experienced application owners and IT operations and
IT security staffwere brought in. Additionally, during both phases of the portal
project, IBM played a more important role than in the strategy phase, where
they only facilitated the development of different strategy scenarios and portal
integration patterns for architectural purposes.
A complicated and coordination-intensive project organisation was put in place.
The idea was to get the buy-in of everyone even if it was clear that the people
concerned were pursuing different agendas (that were not always openly known
and discussed). The aim was to involve all stakeholders to such a degree that
later on nobody could claim lack of information or of opportunity to express
opinions. This had been a precautionary measure by the portal sponsor group to
limit the risk of a possible non-acceptance of the portal by well-established
business unit leaders.
Figure 27 illustrates the complex project organisation established with the





Figure 27. Project organisation of the GSP (Internal documentation)
The GSP project organisation comprised four different groups: the portal
sponsor group, the steering committee, the project management and finally, the
nine different sub-project groups.
In the portal sponsor group the Board ofManagement member Gary Valade
was representing GP&S, OlafKoch was the DCXnet representative (and leader
ofDCXnet, closely linked with the TM and the CEO ofDC) and Sue Unger,
Chief Information Officer (CIO)31. As the GSP project involved all three
business units, these people were responsible to ensure that their different
departments were "on target" with the objectives the project sought to achieve.
Additionally, the portal sponsor group was responsible for implementing the
portal strategy and was the budget holder. At irregular intervals, the steering
committee had to report to them about the project progress.
Apart from the DC representatives ofGP&S, DCXnet and IT, the steering
committee included a representative of Covisint's top management as well.
Whereas the portal sponsor group acted more on a strategic level, the steering
committee was responsible on a more tactical level. They had to deal with
deadline extensions and budget adjustments, and were also responsible for
solving any issues with regard to the collaboration with Covisint on the
31
Unger is not in the Board ofManagement although IT plays a very dominant role within DC and
she is quite frequently interviewed in relevant IT journals.
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management level. Additionally, they should ensure the smooth project
operation which turned out to be challenging due to the interdisciplinary
character and multicultural approach of the project. At least once a month
members of the project management team had to report to the steering
committee about results achieved as well as about issues that had come up and
could not be solved by the sub-project group leaders.
The Sounding Board included all relevant business unit directors ofGP&S and
the IT departments involved. This group of people was well established within
DC, and they saw themselves as 'conscience of the corporation/project'. They
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objected heavily to some of the decisions taken by the steering committee
because they felt being in a disadvantaged position with their business unit
compared with other business units. As each of the sounding board members
was representing his department, each had his own agenda. At least every three
months there was a meeting of the sounding board, the steering committee and
the project management team. The sounding board liked playing political
games; for example, to agree to decisions in a meeting and to retract this later
on. In some cases members of the sounding board even denied having supported
decisions related to the GSP project (one of the big issues here was, for
example, the governance of the portal after its shift from project state to a
'normal department').
As illustrated in Figure 27, the Project Management (PM) team included only
DC people with a business background from GP&S and IT, supported by other
DC business units if and when necessary (e.g. the legal department), DCXnet,
IBM and by a Covisint project manager. The PM team was responsible for the
smooth daily project work. A project management leader had been nominated
who was responsible for the nine sub-project groups. The sub-project group
leaders had to communicate and clarify issues with the project management lead
on a regular weekly basis, except for urgent situations where telephone
conferences were arranged.
j2 Minutes were taken within meetings of the Sounding board and/or the Steering committee,
unfortunately publicly not available.
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Each of the nine sub-project groups (such as, for example, application
migration, help desk, etc.) was led by a sub-project manager responsible for the
respective team. In total, there was a core team of about 40 to 50 dedicated
people plus another 30 people who joined if necessary. On the European side
the team consisted of only about 10 people from DC (two of DCXnet, four of
GP&S and four of IT); most project team members came from Detroit. The
reasons for this were twofold. First, it was difficult to find qualified people in
Europe and to get those on the portal team on a full-time basis. Second, the
European team members had to work in different sub-project groups in parallel
because business unit managers did not want to lose too many people to the
portal team. Yet in many cases this was an advantage compared to their LIS
colleagues as communication was much stronger, and therefore collaboration
and problem- solving were simplified.
A web-supported e-collaboration tool was developed to ensure project
communication/documentation between the portal teams, complemented by
regular video conferences (at least once a week) and face-to-face meetings both
of and within the different project sub-groups, or of the sub-groups and the
steering committee. The face-to-face meetings took place on a monthly basis, at
both Detroit (US) and Stuttgart (Germany). In some cases, when issues could
not be solved during phone conferences, people also decided spontaneously to
meet in person, thus incurring additional travel expenses (see the following
section).
From the beginning, the use of the web-based tool turned out to be cumbersome
because no-one within DC could explain how it works. The tool basically lost
its acceptance when it took more than two weeks to obtain logins and
passwords. Even with a login/password, it took a long time to start the software.
The software design was not very user-friendly and caused difficulties in
finding existing documents or saving new ones. Consequently, the project team
started to email many files back and forth which caused trouble as it led to
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different versions which were not synchronised. In the meantime, the project
management team set up a document infrastructure within the DC mail system
(Lotus Notes) which was not user-friendly, either.
Typically, the European team members were well prepared during video
conferences with their US counterparts. During these sessions it became
obvious that the Americans needed quite a while to settle themselves in the
video conference room. Moreover, the management was not as tight as in
Europe. Frequently, they were less than well prepared, and as a result many
issues could not be discussed properly. Most Covisint team members came from
US. The European team of Covisint comprised only 5 people, who were in
charge of all Covisint clients in Europe. This was the reason for frequent
complaints about a lack of support from Covisint Europe by different sub-
project groups.
Clearly, this created considerable trouble for both sides, DC and Covisint, as it
was quite obvious that the "newbies" had no clue of the current state of the
project, nor, in some cases, had the professional background to take any
responsibility so badly needed right from the start. A DC manager interviewed
remembered:
"The more such things happened, the more we lost trust into Covisint
and in its business and people. The pity was that we as a portal team
also lost credibility within our own company. From my perspective,
some of the things which happened could have been easily solved with a
more open and honest communication. Sometimes, I missed the
understandingfor our needs at Covisint
6.2.2 Portal project plan
A project plan with milestones (depicted in Figure 28) was developed within
four weeks. As shown in the figure, the GSP project was subdivided into 9 sub-
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Figure 28. Project plan GSP (Internal documentation)
Emerging issues and the progress within the individual project sub-groups were
tracked by DCXnet in a dedicated "activity tracking list". In this list, for each of
the nine sub-project groups ongoing developments were marked with green for
"being on time", yellow for "time critical", and red for "issue". The
understanding was that the different sub-group leaders had to feed the
information from their teams to the DCXnet person responsible for the list. One
core feature of the project plan was the diversity of the important deliverables
that needed to be produced. The 'going live' of the portal pilot after the first
phase was planned for end of September 2002, only nine months after the first
public announcement of the project.
6.2.3 The deliverables in the project plan
As shown in Table 7, the main deliverables included
(1) the SoW
(2) the development of a UI for the supplier portal (this also included the
integration of dynamic content and the selection of a content
management system)
(3) The technical integration of the portal technology into the DC IT
infrastructure, including the migration of existing applications and users
33 3270: old host system used in US.
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(4) the development of administration/registration processes, and
(5) the portal governance model
Work on the first four deliverables commenced in parallel right from the project
start whereas the portal governance topic only came up in the context of the
content management, and therefore started at a later phase of the project.
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The first deliverable, the SoW was supposed to arrange the 'who is responsible
for what and who pays what' on a formal basis. The second deliverable was the
user interface which consisted of the design and the structure of the portal web
site. Important aspects to consider regarding the portal vision were
personalisation and the functionality of all portal pages. Closely linked to that
was the page content and how the relevant information could be properly
structured and displayed. The most important aspect of the third deliverable, the
portal integration was to be technically integrated in the GSP architecture of the
existing DC architecture. Further topics in this context included security and the
integration of existing applications that were actually part of other portals. The
fourth deliverable was the portal administration that consisted mainly of the
registration of new users and administrators. Other key aspects associated with
the portal administration were the migration of existing user data and the
allocation of the portal roles and responsibilities. Finally, the governance of the
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portal, i.e., the structure of a portal organisation after the portal had been
established, was on the agenda.
The development of the five deliverables will be discussed in detail in the
remainder of this chapter.
6.3 Statement of Work
Once Gary Valade had announced the decision to set up the supplier portal with
Covisint, the IT department insisted on pursuing the creation of a service
agreement with Covisint - the "Statement ofWork" (SoW). First of all, this was
the normal procedure which was in place with every third party service and,
secondly, IT wanted to ensure that the rights and responsibilities were clear for
each party involved. The SoW was therefore drafted in parallel with the official
start of the project. The initial plan was to have the SoW ready at the end of
March 2002 in order to proceed with the project on time. The SoW was
supposed to be a sort of agreement with contract character between DC and
Covisint, incorporating exactly the detailed services Covisint should provide,
and it should also define the scope ofwork associated with the GSP project.
Apart from the definition of the different portal services ofCovisint (for
example, the hosting of the portal, the provision of the user registration system,
etc.), the SoW should cover some project assumptions (for example, defined
types of portal integration, who is responsible for what, etc.), the scope of
services and finally, the deliverables and milestones plus the fee structure.
Initially, the SoW had been developed by Covisint US in close cooperation with
the IT people ofDC US because of the proximity of the company offices. For a
start, DC had sketched out the main topics which should be covered in the SoW
and provided them to Covisint. The first draft of the SoW was provided by
Covisint in late February 2002. In total, the document consisted ofmore than
100 pages, including technical annexes, special agreements (for example, the
hosting service agreement) and different attachments.
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However, the SoW development process took much longer than estimated by
DC. Several reasons were responsible for the delay. Firstly, Covisint and DC
had agreed that DCXnet Germany should be in charge of the coordination and
correct contents of the SoW, backed-up by the IT people from US and
Germany. In a scheduled meeting the document was discussed by DCXnet and
IT Germany. This meeting lasted almost a day and the Germans were quite
concerned about some aspects in the SoW. They felt that many sections of the
document were quite vague, giving Covisint the freedom to interpret them in
one way or the other.
The document was returned to Covisint with feedback and concerns within a
few days. After the initial feedback round, the main areas of concern became
clear, and did not change over the next six versions. The need for constant
revision of the document was due to the cultural differences and language
difficulties (US vs. Germany), tentativeness of both sides (Covisint and DC)
and the relatively inexperienced Covisint organisation. DC in general, and
particularly the IT department, intended to have a written statement clearly
describing roles and responsibilities for each service to be provided by Covisint;
this was the usual procedure. As the GSP was the first complex project for
Covisint, they seemed neither prepared nor experienced and were astonished by
some ofDC's responses. The former Covisint project manager was quoted to
have said when he saw the first feedback ofDC that:
"They really had used the 'track changes' option ofWord...and everything
was red. Apart from the fact that the document is twice as long as it had
been before, I cannot believe it".
In contrast, due to the fact that there was no valid SoW in place during the
whole first phase of the project, some of the issues still remained in the category
'open issues' during the implementation phase. This held particularly for the
integration of the portal into existing IT infrastructure, and for the application
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integration. One of the IT managers considered this was down to a lack of
existing processes which caused a blurred definition of specifications. He stated:
"I think, much of IT projects run into problems when the specifications
of the customer are not worked out in detail; in the beginning and,
during the project phases when changes occur. This is a critical variable
and when a certain date has to be achieved, these variables are really
very disturbing and cannot be cleared away or ...they are just there.
This also happened in this project. Primarily, I think, the main reason
for the difficulties had been that processes were not described in such
detail as it was required".
IT US and the US management of Covisint did not have the same level of
concern for many issues raised by German DC project members. Whereas the
Germans worried about the definition of the service level agreements,
particularly about the coverage of events such as the guarantee of the portal
system availability, operations and maintenance and an adequate reporting of
errors, their American colleagues did not see these aspects as main issues. The
question ofwho (DC or Covisint) would be responsible if the portal were not
available to suppliers was a particular concern of the German side. This became
one of the hot topics during the development of the "supplier portal agreement".
This agreement was worked out together with the legal department ofDC and
should cover aspects such as portal availability, etc, and should also define who
was responsible for what. For example, in the case of the non-availability of the
portal, DC would give Covisint the entire responsibility because Covisint was
hosting the portal infrastructure.
In addition, due to cultural differences within DC, the development of the SoW
was difficult. Originally, the SoW should have been driven by DCXnet, but in
truth it was pushed very heavily by the German IT department and just checked
by their US colleagues. The latter did not fully understand the very detailed
requirements of the German IT people. A IT manager involved stated:
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"At the beginning, we had a specification phase where we commonly
defined with Covisint our requirements. The original plan was to spend 4-6
weeks to fix all specifications needed from our side. Then, the outcome
should built the SoW and be the basis to realise the portal".
From the beginning, Covisint struggled with the 'hard deadlines' identified in
the project plan's milestones, particularly set by the DCXnet management who
were under pressure internally to prove that the Covisint strategy would be a
success. Additionally, the nine different sub-projects generated problems for
Covisint. They did not have the staff required; hence it was difficult for them to
send the required specialists to the working groups. In the end, most of the
working group meetings included the same staff from Covisint. This caused
difficulties for example in the agreement of special needs to be integrated in
deliverables. This behaviour caused a lot of frustration within the DC project
sub-teams. Their perception was that Covisint did not treat them as proper
clients and that Covisint staff did not have the appropriate expertise. In addition,
the fact that Covisint had only a few staff in Europe, and that those people only
showed up very rarely, caused further distrust and unease.
Another enormous area of concern for DC was the design of the overall portal
architecture. For IT, it was unclear what would be available in terms of Covisint
infrastructure, and which additional gateways would have to be programmed.
This, in turn, caused additional costs that could have been an issue with regard
to the original project budget. Furthermore, this led to the need for clarification
concerning the question as to who (which department) was responsible for such
additional costs. As a IT manager mentioned:
"Covisint gave us a very hard time when we tried to find out which of the
Covisint solutions would cover our requirements and what was supposed to
be developed new. There had been very controversial discussions in terms of
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the portal architecture itself and their integration into our IT world, where
we did not agree with Covisint ideas
As it was quite obvious during the development of the SoW, a high degree of
communication and clarification were needed. Covisint staff came far more
often to Europe than planned beforehand34. Consequently, the budget estimated
for travel expenses did not cover the real cost and had been subject of re¬
negotiation. In the beginning, when Covisint mentioned that the travel expenses
could be an issue because the travel budget was too low, DC argued that they
had already spent more to cover Covisint's travel than originally planned. They
further argued that Covisint also had to invest resources (manpower and money)
because the GSP project had a sort of reference character for Covisint.
Eventually, the seventh version of the SoW document more or less satisfied DC
and Covisint; the re-work of content was stopped by the TM. At the end of July
2002 the DC project manager was about to collect the signatures of the
responsible managers. At the same time the implementation of the user interface
began to take shape.
In parallel with the SoW, the development of the GSP UI with its complex
structure of pages was addressed. Unfortunately, according to the IT people, the
apparently 'simple task' to conceptualise a user interface had given rise to a
number of significant problems, described in the following section.
6.4 The GSP UI
The work on the design of the GSP UI started immediately after the official start
of the project. Although GP&S had the lead for this deliverable, the main
'driving force' was DCXnet. The IT department had only been involved with
34 Some issues were popping up in every discussion and simply could not be fixed by sending emails
or having phone conferences. Even video conferences were not applicable in some cases to solve
problems or to clarify misunderstandings.
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respect to the technical feasibility of portal pages' functionality in the IT
architecture.
In this section, the development of the GSP UI and the page structure as well as
related content management is described.
6.4.1 The Creation of the UI
The portal UI was supposed to reflect Valade's DC collaboration vision,
outlined in detail in chapter 5. The GSP UI to be developed should support an
easy navigation through the web site. Other aspects to be considered included
the personalised and integrated access for suppliers, portal functionality and the
related information provided. As the UI was the first concrete deliverable and
represented the interface to the outside business world, the development and
implementation took far more time than originally expected.
DC used some sort of guideline which reflected the idea of a supplier portal that
had been developed by DCXnet and GP&S during the first UI workshop:
(1) one workspace for Covisint and DC applications worldwide
(2) the integration of all regional initiatives worldwide while catering for
T C
local needs (this was called "Glocalisation" )
(3) web-based communication with suppliers that should reflect the DC
supplier philosophy ("supplier partner approach")
(4) the provision of up-to-date and regularly updated information about DC
projects and supplier bulletins.
The general concept of the GSP pages had to be built upon the Covisint
'Trading Partner Pages' and was influenced by organisational, social and
technical factors.
In the UI sub-project team, the main issues and discussion points with regard to
the user interface design centred on the general concept of the GSP homepage
and the related portal pages, integrated in the Covisint pages. Other topics were
functionalities to be provided in the different views (for registered and non-
35 Glocalisation is a mix of globalisation and localisation. The term was introduced by de Ruijter
(1997).
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registered users, respectively) and their integration into the portal. One of the
interviewees illustrated the objectives:
"One of the first activities had been to figure out the different ways
suppliers should get access to the global portal and what the entrance page
should look like. Not only from a "look and feel" point of view but also in
terms of what information should be presented on the main entrance
page.fi...]".
According to the SoW, the portal service would provide two types of pages: the
public pages that a non-registered user could see, containing more general
information, and the private pages for registered users requiring a log-in. If a
non-registered user entered Covisint's public portal page ofDC, this public
view would feature a navigation structure based on four main "tabulators" (tabs)
which were:
• 'My Covisint' tab - contains pages (represented as 2nd level tabs) each
of which contained portlets . The pages can be customised by portal
administrators and users.
• 'Covisint Solutions' tab - lists all applications which are available from
Covisint such as collaboration, procurement, supply chain, quality
• 'Trading Partners' tab - directory of Covisint partners with their
general corporate information. If a user is registered to the service of a
partner, this site might include more information (e.g. the subset of
applications he is registered for)
• 'Help' tab - general information for assistance (training material / FAQs
/ help desk, etc.).
3b Portlets are web components, usually managed by a container that processes requests and generates
dynamic content. Portals use portlets as pluggable user interface components to provide a presentation
layer to information systems. A portlet is defined by several elements such as the portlet name, the
content location, content source or change frequency, number or editors, etc. Portlets are part of an
open portal architecture that is based on Java/XML and enable, for example: interoperability between
portals and portlets (any portlet runs on any portal), interoperability between content providers and
portlets (portlets access sources of similar content through standard protocols and formats), and
dynamic integration of business applications in portals (remote portelet web services).
176
After the very first workshop, during which time the portal design guidelines
were developed, the UI team in Stuttgart started to draft the general design of
the portal pages and to develop a concept of the overall structure the site and of
the navigation structure. The intermediary results were sent to the rest of the
team based in US for feedback and comments. Altough GP&S was supposed to
have the lead in this sub-group and time was running, they had difficulties in
both setting-up a proper portal page structure/navigation as well as finding a
creative design for the pages. This was largely due to a lack of experience.
Therefore, one more Internet-experienced and very ambitious person from
DCXnet kick-started the design and development process by emailing some of
his ideas to the rest of the team. During the next working meeting, his ideas
were discussed and most of them were adopted for the design of the portal
pages. The first difficulties and issues were about how the pages should be
structured in general and particularly regarding the integration of the different
portlets and the page style (fonts, colours, etc.).
In terms of the page structure, the idea was to use the same 'three column'
format as the Intranet pages in order to be in line with the Corporate Identity
(CI) guidelines which specified how DC would like to present themselves
internally and externally. This decision to use the same structure as for the
Intranet was agreed very fast within the UI team. The questions about colours
and fonts were more challenging. While emailing draft structures back and forth
between Stuttgart and Detroit, it turned out that both locations had different CI
style guides to create the pages. The US colours were very loud, for example,
whereas those of the Germans showed the typical conservative style which was
characteristic for DC. After having discussed the guidelines internally, the
different UI interface style guides were integrated parallel.
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In the meantime, all draft portal pages were also sent to Covisint. Their UI team
produced 'mock-up's' based on the design proposals that were sent to DC.
Quickly it became clear that Covisint was not able to present the DC colours
properly with the technology they used. However, team members in the US
were far from being as critical with Covisint as the German team members
were. Covisint very well understood the issue but insisted on the fact that their
portal technology represented an industry standard and that DC had to adapt to
it. This statement had been a great shock for the UI team. After all, the struggle
they had gone through during the integration of the different CI style guides,
and Covisint now argued that their solution would be the standard and had to be
accepted by DC.
This was an issue which was escalated to the steering committee. DC's point of
view was very clear on that matter: they would never change their CI guidelines
only because Covisint pretended to have an industry standard CI. The project
management team ofDC basically had no choice but to adopt this position
because the communication department, which was also responsible for the CI,
had been alerted and tried to get access to the portal project in order to sustain
its position. This was not what the project management team wanted because
this would have been another unit to come to an agreement with. The portal
management team already was more than large enough, and additional 'trouble
makers' were not really appreciated. In retrospect, an interviewed GP&S
manager mentioned:
"First, we had to find the design and define the content of the GSP
homepage. Here, we started to look on the Employee portal to get an idea of
what should be on the main page. Then, step by step we worked on the first
designs which we emailed regularly to our team colleagues in the US to
discuss and get their feedback. It turned out that US had a totally different
perception of the corporate identity (CI) rules than we had. For example in
37
Mock-up's can be run easily on each PC with a browser. They simulate the navigation through the
designed pages and are very valuable for feedback purposes.
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terms ofcolours and design when we conceptualised the DC supplier portal
home page
However, in the end a compromise was negotiated that combined the idea of the
Covisint industry standard portal design and the DaimlerChrysler Corporate
Identity guidelines, illustrated in Figure 29.
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From now on, you can find the DaimlerChrysler Online Bidding Guide for
Suppliers in the "Reference" tab, see "Downloads". This document is intended as a
comprehensive reference tool and description of the global Online Bidding process. The
document will provide useful guidelines for you when staging Online Bidding Events with
DaimlerChrysler.
My DaimlerChrysler Q m
Applications | Locations Worldwide
No DaimlerChrysler
Application selected.
Figure 29. GSP implemented Ul (Screenshot as of 2002)
On top of the page the three tabs 'Home', 'Applications' and 'References' are
located. The page shows a two column approach instead of the originally
developed three column approach. On the left hand side, portlets that could be
personalised by the user, general links and Covisint applications could be found.
At the top centre of the page the 'DC Bulletins' announced the most recent
news for suppliers, followed by the announcement of new software updates. At
the bottom half of the page, more internal information about the supplier
programme 'Extended Enterprise' and 'Locations worldwide' were provided.
The 'three column approach' and its adaptation to the GSP pages represented an
organisational and technical constraint for Covisint. This was due to the fact that
similarity to the DC Employee Portal and Chryslers' 'Dashboard' could not be
provided by Covisint's technology. Technically, Covisint was only able to
present the pages in a two column version which meant that DC feared to loose
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their brand recognition for DC portals. These technical constraints coupled with
organisational issues caused a lot of discussion between DC and Covisint.
Despite the continued attempts ofDC to press for the 'three column approach',
Covisint continued to have difficulties to cope with the DC UI requirements in
terms of brand and components/content to integrate. This included, for example,
the user customisation within the private view of the GSP page which had
originally been an important objective for DC.
Another hot topic was the functionality to be provided by Covisint and their
integration into the different portal pages, e.g., portlets. During the design of the
general concept for the GSP pages and the UI, the requirement ofDC to re-use
portlets was supposed to be beneficial with respect to cost and effort in content
management. For DC it would be extremely beneficial to use portlet
functionality to link with DC Intranet websites. The goal was to reduce content
management efforts, keep information current and not to reproduce it several
times. This held, for example, for the DaimlerChrysler Bulletins, which
provided the most recent information to meet the needs of regional users (North
America, Europe, Rest ofWorld) and functional areas (e.g. development or
procurement).
Key characteristics of using portlets for DC were that applications could be
displayed as part of a page or as a separate page and that portlets could share
content. Major advantages in this context were seen in the user customisation of
portlets (individual selection), and the ability of portlets to communicate with
each other. After an analysis of portlet capabilities DC identified a number of
portlets which could be managed with Covisint's content management system
and others which were time critical (for example, 'Daily News', 'worldwide
locations'). Time critical portlets were to be managed through the web-based
interface solution that Covisint offered.
Unfortunately, due to misunderstandings between DC Europe and DC US, the
negotiations about style, structure and technical feasibility between DC and
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Covisint took longer than expected so that the GSP UI was delayed for more
than four weeks. In the end the GSP team, including Covisint, reached some
sort of compromise about the design and the content of the pages. DC had to
give up some of their requirements such as the identical 'look and feel' design
whereas Covisint had to change their whole technical portal infrastructure.
During these discussions about the realisation of the GSP pages, it became more
and more evident that the technical requirements ofDC would not fit with the
technological basis of Covisint. This was the reason why Covisint had to change
their technical platform from a 'best-of-breed' approach to the IBM
'Websphere' platform. Also, Covisint enabled portlets on the DC trading
partner page for personalisation; this had not been technically feasible before.
In total, the design of all pages took longer than originally planned as a lot of
coordination work between the DC team members from the US and Germany,
and between DC and Covisint was required. An important and vital part of the
UI was the content management described in the following section.
6.4.2 Content Management
The content of a supplier portal is a vital part of this communication instrument
due to importance in terms of acceptance and use of the portal by suppliers.
Within the development of the GSP UI, the content aspect gained momentum
and raised a number of questions and issues.
In the SoW, Covisint proposed to load the content provided by DC into the
Content Management system for the initial launch of the portal. For the time
after the launch they promised to develop an interface to enable simple
uploading of new content. During the work conducted by the UI team it became
clear that some of the portlets would need a daily or even hourly update. If those
portlets were part of the GSP, the content would have to be updated on time.
Although it was clear that Covisint would put in the content manually for the
start of the portal, DC became more and more aware that this would not be what
they really wanted. Due to the fact that this was an on-going issue in the
negotiation of the SoW, and that the awareness of the timelines of some portlets
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would make a more automatic content update necessary, DC (and IT in
particular) pushed Covisint to come up with a draft solution.
As already mentioned, one of the huge advantages of Internet-based portlets is
the re-use of already existing ones, thus reducing content management costs.
Again, as stated in the SoW, Covisint's suggestion was to provide a web-
services- based interface to connect DC's existing Content Management System
(CMS). However, this would not have been ready for the start of the portal.
At this point, DC-internal organisational issues occured that were related to the
process of information actualisation and information sharing. Business units
started to become suspicious and asked the portal team about BU-specific
content and processes. As a GP&S manager mentioned:
<
"They wanted to know exactly what content, in which form and how
often they should provide it. They also feared that we would start to
control how often they renewed it".
DC was forced to rethink their content publishing process; no standardised
procedure had been in place so far, not even for the old portals. Yet, they felt
that this issue was becoming quite urgent and had to be solved. Therefore,
GP&S's idea was to transfer the content after the internal approval (here, it was
not clear who would be the right person/department to approve) through a web
interface to Covisint. Then, the changed content had to be updated and stored at
Covisint. As a DC manager stated:
"There was a discussion about whether the content should be provided
in a static or dynamic form, how often it has to change, andfrom which
sources it should be fed in. The longer the discussion went on, the
clearer it became that, even internally, we had no standard process in
place to provide a supplier portal with current content and
information
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Additionally, due to fact that DC and Covisint had two different CMS, it was
technically not possible to integrate much of the already existing portlets. In
addition, the web-based interface solution from Covisint was not a real
alternative because it was believed to interfere with security policies. This was a
major drawback to the original idea to re-use portlets at least for time critical
information.
At this point in time, the IT people joined the content discussion which was led
by GP&S and supported by IBM. IBM was expected to support GP&S with a
solution in the near future, i.e., at the launch of the portal, expected for the end
of September 2002. The UI team, comprising ofGP&S people, was not
experienced at all in terms of technical solutions. Thus, they did not understand
what IBM proposed. They only understood that a solution would mean extra
effort and budget. Therefore, they moved IBM's proposed alternative solutions
to DCXnet which was responsible for the budget, but DCXnet did not have the
necessary experience to judge IBM's proposal either. Thus, they approached the
IT people. IT had several concerns. One of them was the security aspect (see
also 6.5.2), the other were the estimated costs and efforts for programming and
integrating the alternatives. Although IT collaborated with IBM in several
projects, and IBM was the strategic technology partner, IT always presumed
that IBM only wanted to make money rather than look for solutions which
would suit DC. The involvement of IT led the content issues being on the
agenda of every meeting and video conference. Covisint's point of view was
that they would provide an interface after the initial launch of the portal. They
argued that the fact that DC and Covisint had two different CMS should have
been clear for all parties involved right from the beginning of the project. After
many discussions and a cost estimation, it was finally decided to meet Covisint
half-way and to implement a web interface on the DC side as well, through
which the content from different sources could be uploaded automatically.
The sub-project group leader of the content management team did not really
push the issue of the two existing systems. However, IBM was keen to present
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several alternative 'content integration concepts'. To them is was clear that
neither DC nor Covisint would change their CMS. DC still had the strong belief
that they could influence Covisint, as in the case of the portal technology, and in
the end push them to use the DC CMS. After many discussions between
Covisint and DC it became clear that the project team had to technically
integrate two different Content Management Systems (CMS). Although
Covisint offered a special web interface to transfer DC content to Covisint, the
IT manager, backed by different other IT departments, decided to develop a
separate web interface for content transfer, to be hosted at DC.
This urgency to have standardised processes in the content area was increased
after the sub-project group had started to compile content for the GSP from the
GP&S functional departments. Responsible GP&S managers did express their
concerns about what would happen to the content, or were very suspicious about
the entire GSP undertaking. As the responsible team had no answer to most of
the questions, the corresponding standardised content management processes
had to be defined. Taking into consideration the already drafted future portal
government model, the project team worked out a couple of standard content
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management processes ; the one for a change request is shown in Figure 30.
The figure portrays the different stakeholders who were represented and the
necessary process steps related to content changes. Based on the developed
process, each party's roles and responsibilities in case of a content update were
included.
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Apart from the portrayed process, standard processes were defined for translation of portal content,
content transfer to Covisint (short-term), content transfer from different databases and a standard
process for the Supplier Bulletins.
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Figure 30. Content management process (Internal documentation)
These new processes were presented to the steering committee and the sounding
board in order to get the commitment of the business unit leaders. Subsequently,
to communicate the agreed content management model internally, the
communication department ofGP&S set up a communication plan to widely
distribute the information about the new process.
In terms of the portal/content responsibility aspect, the content team eventually
came up with the idea of an editorial board that should include representatives
of all business units affected. This was addressed by the project management in
the steering committee. They took this issue very seriously and gave DCXnet
the mandate to work out a concept of how a portal organisation could look like
after the project phase. This will be discussed in more detail in section 6.7.
Consequently, the content management issues were not solved within this
deliverable and continued to be an open issue for the rest of the project.
The integration of different systems and the corresponding processes were not
only part of the UI but were also part of the overall portal integration described
in the next section.
6.5 Portal integration
A key challenge was the integration of the portal architecture and functionality
into the existing corporate IT infrastructure. Especially with regard to security
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policies, the single sign-on (which enables access to different information
sources and applications with only one login and password) was not only
difficult to implement in the overall IT infrastructure but was also a challenge in
terms of the integration of the existing portals.
6.5.1 The technical integration of the portal
The portal integration was driven by the different IT departments39. Although IT
had the lead for this deliverable, DCXnet took the role of a facilitator and
coordinated on-going negotiations between DC and Covisint on how to sustain
the project progress, to avoid deadlock situations and to be on track with the
project budget. Generally, the first phase of the global supplier portal (GSP) was
characterised by internal and external constraints, such as time and lack of
information about Covisint's technical abilities. At the beginning of the project,
in order to meet the ambitious deadlines, the time to achieve certain milestones
had been calculated very tightly by DC team members. Therefore it was very
difficult, even for them, to specify all requirements accurately, and to cover all
contingencies. Also, due to the enormous time pressures, it was not clear for IT
(and neither for DCXnet, but they would never have expressed this in public)
whether or not Covisint could meet the IT integration requirements ofDC. The
IT people expressed their fears very openly, not only during the team work in
the sub-groups but also at meetings with the project management and the
steering committee. As an IT manager ofDC pointed out:
"At the beginning of the portal project, we only had a very short
specification phase where we attempted to define our requirements with
Covisint. There had been controversial discussions between Covisint
and us in terms of architecture, where we did not agree to the ideas of
Covisint. In addition, due to our own portal experience, we knew that
time was too short to do a proper job and that it would not be easy for
Covisint to take into consideration all our requirements ".
39
People in the IT focused sub-groups were from different IT departments ofDC such as IT/M (IT
Methods), IT/P (IT Processes) or IT/S (IT Security).
186
Within this part of the project, one of the first basic objectives was to integrate
the two existing supplier portals ofDC Germany and DC US into Covisint. DC
US had about 200 applications and 8,000 supplier-users, DC Germany had 11
applications and 2,000 supplier-users. After a review of Covisint's portal
solution by IT, Covisint had to change the technology provider. Their original
portal solution was based on a Oracle/Cl solution upon which the Ford supplier
portal was also based. However, DC forced Covisint to accept the IBM
Websphere technology. As most of the IT architecture is based on IBM, DC
justified this approach with its own strategic partnership with IBM.
Consequently, Covisint had to change their portal technology. They switched to
IBM websphere because they wanted to facilitate and to fast track the
integration of the portal solution into DC's IT world. For Covisint, this
fundamental change in technology had both inconveniences and advantages.
With respect to the latter, Covisint aimed to sell this newly released portal
solution to other customers40. Regarding the former, Covisint had to invest
additional money. Figure 31 illustrates the detailed integration approach for the
old portals after the new agreement with Covisint.
Figure 31. GSP integration with existing portals (Covisint documentation, 2001)
The original requirement by DC was to have one common service. This could
not be realised by Covisint due to technical restrictions. Unfortunately, this
40 This has been the accurate strategic approach in a retrospective view. When Compuware in 2004
bought the remaining rest of Covisint, only the portal solution and the messaging were part of their
originally very large product portfolio.
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causes a lot of trouble on the supplier side today. For example, if a supplier who
worked with Daimler in Europe has his administrator in the US, this
administrator cannot register the user with a DCS application. This example had
been anticipated by the statement of a DC manager:
"During the implementation phase ofdesigning the business process for
the application integration it turned out that Covisint portal technology
could not support a limited display of applications, which was a no-go
for the DCS team. The US had no problem with this and DCS insisted to
its opinion to proceed like in the old portal. In the end, two services -
one for DCA and one for DCS - were defined which has been a sub-
optimal solution because the portal idea was to have one portal for the
entire DC company. I don 7 think that the suppliers were happy to have
again two different services
The integration of the portal architecture into the existing IT infrastructure of
DC was another significant challenge. Not only had IT departments to migrate
their existing old portals to another technology, there was also the need to
develop additional software to ensure communication between the old portals
and Covisint.
However, during the negotiations for the portal integration, DC achieved at least
a compromise. Both companies had to invest in extra programming to change
parts of their architecture in order to improve the integration of the Covisint
portal into the DC IT architecture. IBM helped build-up so called message
handlers, allowing the transfer of synchronised/asynchronised XML-based
message. These technical constraints translated into significant extra costs and
efforts for all parties involved. The technical portal and application integration
into the overall corporate IT landscape was accompanied by a security
discussion.
188
6.5.2 The development and implementation of security procedures
To do business electronically, one of the key benefits of Covisint was the
promised secure environment. Part of this secure infrastructure was the Single
Sign-On (SSO) functionality, enabling users to access different information
sources and applications with only one login and password (secure
authentication).
First, IT developed several integration scenarios with alternative integration
paths in order to integrate SSO functionality into existing IT infrastructure and
related applications. They then checked against Covisint's offer and identified
several issues. First of all, the security administration concept ofDC was not
covered by Covisint. Covisint only supported two different portal roles, the
administrator and the user, whereas DC aimed for three different roles, the
security administrator, the administrator and the user. Second, the registration
module of Covisint was not supporting a 30 day password change which was
required by DC. Others were related to technical problems such as that
applications simply could not communicate with SSO functionality. One of the
DC managers remembered:
"Internally, different integration concepts have been discussed where
topics were balanced such as user administration concepts, user
registration, SSO including user authorisation and authentication or the
direct access to DC applictions
As a first reaction to the SSO functionality, Covisint argued that their SSO
software was 'industry standard' and everything beyond that would require
additional effort for them in terms of resources. DC's argument always included
the underlying fact that they were not only a customer, but also shareholder of
Covisint and therefore could expect some more compromising behaviour.
Among the different levels of security, the technical and organisational (and
sometimes political) level was one of the most widely discussed topics during
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the whole GSP project. Fierce discussions took place, not only in the weekly
regularly meetings but also over the phone and via emails. Security issues were
raised on a technical level, related to the SSO component, and on an
organisational level related to the password policies ofDC and Covisint. In the
end, Covisint negotiated with Netegrity, the supplier of the SSO software, to
adapt their product to some of the DC requirements. Naturally, Covisint had to
pay for it.
DC did not move from their security policies and then assigned IBM to realise
extra functionalities which also implied additional cost and effort. Due to the
complexity of the portal technology as part of a wider company architecture,
and the existence of legacy systems, security concerns made it highly difficult to
implement the SSO functionality within the overall IT infrastructure. However,
during the negotiations, non-technical concerns were expressed by the IT
manager, supported by different people from different IT departments. One of
those reasons was that suppliers might have the access to critical DC
information. Another one were concerns about the audit of the GSP project
regularly done by the corporate auditing department. Non-compliance was
punished very severely.
A good example in this context is the standard registration process. With respect
to registration processes, different XML messages had to be adapted to match
the relatively high security levels ofDC. The discussions, surrounding the
change frequency of the password for the portal login highight the different
notions of security. At DC, the supplier password for internal applications
changed every four weeks. However, Covisint changed the password every
three months. There was a huge discussion going on within DC whether or not
they should give up the strict security policy at least in this area, and adopt
Covisints approach. The major problem was that Corporate IT had different
business units. Each of these units interpreted security differently, and no-one
wanted to take responsibility for it.
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Apart from technical security factors, the integration of the portal and the
applications was influenced by non-technical security-related issues. Concerns
about budget constraints and the question of who was responsible for the
additional work were expressed by DCXnet and IT. They were translated into
technical issues such as the difficulty to harmonise specially developed software
for message handling with the old portal architecture, the Covisint architecture
and the existing IT architecture ofDC. Within this context, the integration of
applications played an important role. This is described in the following section.
6.5.3 The Application integration
The integration of existing and future applications was another huge challenge
within the whole integration context. Organisational and social challenges
added to the technical and economic pressure of developing an overall portal
integration concept. Starting to work on this integration concept, the
application/migration sub-group found that there was no standard process to
integrate procurement and logistics applications. In the US as well as in
Germany, the respective application owners usually belonged to a business unit
where the application was implemented. Most applications, though, supported
only one particular procurement or logistic process. Moreover, application
owners handled application integration totally different. In Germany, the IT
department which ran the portal was part of the development team of an
application and therefore could influence decisions in terms of functionality and
future integration into a portal. In the US, an application was just created and
was simply integrated into the US portal web site via a link. This meant that
there was a strong need for a 'standard application integration process' to be
developed to ensure that all portal requirements ofCovisint as well as ofDC
would be met. Strongly related with the integration of applications was the
question of how an application in the GSP should be requested by a supplier
administrator/user. This process had to follow not only DC's security guidelines
but also to take into consideration the technical feasibility ofCovisint's standard
process for the application request used. This aspect will be described in detail
in the next chapter.
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All existing applications to be integrated in a first phase were either standard
software such as SAP, featuring a separate login process, or legacy systems
particularly programmed to fit the needs of distinct business units in
procurement and logistics that did not support web-based frames. As a result,
the cost for additional programming to "web-enable" these applications had to
be discussed with the different application owners. As IT budgets at that time
were limited, the negotiations focused around which department had the
responsibility to cover the extra costs. Additionally, the existing legacy systems
inherited functionalities that were either portal functionalities or functionalities
that were not in the standard portal package and therefore not available. The
difficulty here was to convince the application owners to integrate their
application in a first phase with a reduced functionality. In special workshops
organised by the GP&S manager, the application owners got an update on the
actual state of the GSP project and were involved as far as their applications
were concerned. An interviewed IT manager stated that:
"IBM worked on different scenarios describing the integration of
SAP applications and tried to support the on-going efforts with
SSO. In the end, we managed to sort out, together with Netegrity,
the company who provided Covisint with the SiteMinder software
for authorisation and authentication, what could be done in a
short term
As feared by some application owners, internal restructuring within DC during
the project meant that the funding for additional functionality and the costs for
application integration were difficult to allocate. Different cost models were
negotiated until eventually some business units took over the responsibility to
keep their applications updated, others did stop the communication with the
portal team completely or even reported the issues to their superiors.
Consequently, the GSP portal manager decided that the migration of existing
applications should take place in several so-called 'migration waves'. In the first
wave, applications were migrated (integrated into the GSP) if the application
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owners (and their superior) were in favour for the integration and if the
application fulfilled the technical requirements for a link with the GSP.
The standard process for the request and the integration of new applications,
described in Figure 32, was developed in a three-day workshop in the sub-
project group teams UI and content management and were implemented during
the implementation phase in a step-by-step approach.





Figure 32. Process of new application integration (Internal documentation)
With the implementation of the developed standardised process of application
integration, roles and responsibilities were clearly distributed among all actors
who were portal owner or application owner, and the functional department.
The focus was on the alignment of all different actors in the process.
The standardised application integration process was supported by a portal
integration guide and a checklist for application standards to be strictly followed
in order to assure transparency and consistency, while designing new
applications to be in line with the GSP.
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For IT, this new process meant that they had to change their entire internal
process for application integration. Prior to that, the IT department had different
processes in place. Also, application owners were now obliged to use this
process and to follow the guidelines. Covisint could not offer a standardised
process for application integration; they could only offer some very basic
service that would not have suited the needs of DC. The portal integration not
only consisted of the integration of existing DC portals and related applications,
but also of the task to orchestrate portal security functionalities with existing
legacy systems and their harmonisation with the existing corporate IT
architecture. Apart from all integration activities of new and old IT
infrastructure, the set-up involved the whole portal administration processes,
including user registration, user migration and definition of roles and
responsibilities.
6.6 Portal administration
In general, portal registration has a technical and an organisational dimension
for both the supplier-user and the user. Therefore, the portal's supplier-user
registration, itself part of the portal administration, was one of the most
discussed deliverables that involved most of the sub-project groups during both
development and implementation. One of the reasons was that the portal
registration was linked to many portal functionalities. However, not only the
development of the standard registration process itself but also its
implementation (the migration of existing supplier-users from existing portals)
and the different related challenges were important for the success and
accpetance of the portal, both internally and externally, and used up many
project resources.
6.6.1 Portal Registration, Portal Roles and Responsibilities
The registration of supplier-users enabling to work with OEM applications is
one of the important components of a supplier portal. If portal processes are not
understandable for the user, or not well mapped to the user's needs, acceptance
by supplier-users and internal OEM users will be low. Therefore, one of the first
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activities of the registration sub-group was to look at the available standard
registration processes of Covisint.
As promised in the SoW, Covisint provided a tool, called the Covisint
Connection and Administration Tool (CCA), which would enable registration
and delegated administration in the supplier portal. Covisint had developed two
standardised business processes for portal administration and migration, based
on the administrative processes delpoyed by Ford. These two different main
processes included the standard registration of a supplier-user (authentication)
and the standard request of a registered supplier-user for an OEM application. In
the end, the standard registration processes of the CCA tool were changed to fit
the needs ofDCX. Depending on the corresponding service a supplier could
register for, he could get access to the applications he could work with.
According to some of the IT and GP&S departments, the fact that there were a
number of suppliers having at least two supplier numbers remained an open
issue. But this was seen as a minor problem by the DCX project manager. What
happened after the GSP was operational - the consequences this had for
suppliers will be described and analysed41 in chapter 7.
Issues with respect to registration were organisational, social and technical. As
IT already had some years of experience with their own portals, they were not
satisfied with the standard procedures for registration of suppliers and the
migration of already existing supplier-users and applications which Covisint
offered. For example, in the registration case, DC pursued a much stricter
security policy than Covisint. In the old portal of DC Germany, the portal roles
'security administrator', 'administrator' and 'user' were in place. The security
administrator was on the OEM side, supervising all supplier administrators who
in turn were responsible for their supplier-users. The Covisint portal, in contrast,
only offered the portal roles 'administrator' and 'user'. A control function such
as the 'security administrator' was not part of their indudstry standard portal
solution. But as DC Germany insisted on the fact to further exercise a certain
41
Exactly this issue was addressed during an interview with a tier-1 supplier because it caused him a
lot of trouble and did not contribute at all to increase the acceptance of the GSP.
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level of control about who would be administrator, this was an issue for some
months and one major point of discussion in several meetings of the GSP sub¬
groups and in the steering committee. As for the old portal, if somebody from a
supplier wanted to register as a supplier administrator, IT required a fax
message to confirm his/her personal ID in order to be sure that the person who
asked for portal access really was the person he/she pretended to be.
Initially, Covisint did not react at all to the portal role issue, and later on had
severe difficulties to understand why this aspect was so important for IT
Germany. As DCXnet was involved as facilitator, it became clear to them that
this issue was going to be a cultural and organisational one. DC US had not half
of the data security and data protection concerns of the Germans. One of the
reasons was that they had worked with Internet-based applications much longer
than the Germans, and the second reason was that they had no intention to
control their suppliers. The view ofDC US was that the more suppliers could be
connected to the portal the better. Obviously, some of the IT managers had fixed
personal objectives to achieve with their managers and were keen to increase
the number of suppliers connected to the GSP. In terms of supplier-user portal
roles, IT had given up their reluctance and accepted the two Covisint portal
roles, administrator and user, even against the DC security policy. The security
argument was frequently used by IT managers when there was a risk of loosing
control over processes for which they believed to be responsible. Even when it
was clear that only two portal roles would be available, IT managers still tried at
several workshops during the implementation phase to persuade Covisint to
change their preferred standard two-role-model to the DC three-role-model.
Obviously, IT's type ofmodel was based on a lack of trust in the human
administrators on the supplier side; supplier administrators first had to fax their
personal ID to the DC helpdesk in order to get approval for portal access. With
this procedure, IT felt more comfortable, although they only did e-business with
suppliers with whom a business relationship already existed. Another issue
related to trust in business relationships was the set-up and introduction of the
portal Terms and Conditions (T&Cs), described in detail later in this section.
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In the end, a compromise between the best-practice processes and the DC
processes was worked out. This took more time than originally planned and
caused additional cost for both sides due to extra programming.
The registration process should ensure secure authentication of supplier-users.
Covisint claimed their process to be the industry standard process for portal
registration. Yet, incorporating it into the DC world turned out to be a real
challenge. Once a supplier-user, whether registering for the administrator or for
the user role, started to register for the first time, he/she had to complete
electronic forms asking not only for the company name but also for their
supplier number. The supplier number is an identification number to classify
supplier companies. In the CCA tool of Covisint, this number allows to link the
registering person with the organisation he/she belongs to and to put the data in
the right place, also necessary for data verification purposes.
Due to the merger of Daimler and Chrysler, two different supplier numbering
systems still existed in parallel. As this issue occurred, DCXnet started a small
feasibility study as they were well aware of the problems this would cause for
portal registration. The study should find out: where those two supplier
classification systems were used, if it were theoretically possible to have just
one classification system for the whole DC, who should be involved, and
finally, how much such a harmonisation would cost.
It emerged that a harmonisation of both systems would be beyond the GSP
project, that too many systems and business managers would have to be
involved, and that no-one would accept the costs related with the classification
change. Consequently, another solution had to be found. In parallel, Covisint
was checking the extent to which their technology could be changed to offer a
workaround solution. Eventually the DC project management decided that they
needed two different services, and that a supplier could decide which service
he/she would like to register to (depending on the DC location he had business
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with). Covisint then found themselves in a position where they simply were not
able to respond to their customer's needs.
With regard to registration issues Covisint suffered from a lack of expertise and
experts. Only two US-based experts who were familiar with the CCA tool were
working on all portal projects of Covisint. This situation did not change during
implementation. Although most of the Covisint employees came from the three
OEMs, there seemed to be misunderstandings and a lack of knowledge
regarding the requirements concerning the implementation of the registration
processes. As already mentioned in 6.5.2, different XML messages had to be
adapted to match the relatively high security levels ofDC. Therefore, IBM was
not only involved in the conceptual and development phase of the standardised
registration processes but also in the implementation phase. IBM took over most
of the necessary work that should have been done by Covisint and supported,
for example, the XML message exchange programming necessary to get the
messages properly into and out of back-end systems. A DC manager
commented this fact:
"With regard to registration, Covisint was not really prepared to
support us in this area because they were less experienced than expected
and did notfully understand our requirements. The purpose ofthe portal
was to shift access control and user management to Covisint and to the
suppliers, and to create and utilise industry standards for the process
integration across enterprise boundaries. A registration interface to be
reachable via the Covisint was needed. As Covisint had no experts, we
all agreed to let IBM do the programming necessary to get the messages
properly in our back-end systems ".
To safeguard itself, DC asked the suppliers to a sign a portal agreement (T&Cs)
in the case the portal would not work, or not be available. DC intended to
protect themselves in case Covisint would not be able to operate their portal
service properly, and DC did not want to be responsible for possible related
damages at the supplier side. The American suggestion was to have a one-pager
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which would pop up in the portal and would have to be ticked as acceptance.
The German approach, by contrast, was to have a written document (not too
long and detailed) to be sent out to the suppliers and returned signed (but this
had to be linked somehow with the portal). Each approach was based on the
respective commercial legal regulations ofEuropean and American trade and
warranty laws.
The portal T&Cs were ready for the pilot start of the GSP. Due to cultural
differences and different commercial laws, the US side opted for the "just-tick"
approach. Suppliers entering the old portal for the last time should just tick the
T&C acceptance field of the portal page. After having ticked and acknowledged
the T&Cs, the supplier then was transferred automatically to the GSP. The
European approach was totally different. An eight-page document had been
created out and two copies were sent via mail to each supplier. They first had to
sign and to return it before registration or migration. The T&Cs included, for
example, access authorisation or duties of the administrator. But they also
included statements regarding the non-availability of the Covisint-hosted GSP.
6.6.2 Migration of user data
The migration of existing user data from old DC portals was another huge
challenge within the portal administration deliverable, from a technical as well
as an organisational point of view. DC did not accept Covisint's quite general
standardised migration process and identified several cases which had not been
taken into consideration, as well as security issues which were not covered to
the extent IT would have liked it. Covisint's counter argument ran along the
well-known lines "this migration process reflects the industry standard". In
particular, the people from IT argued against that. They wanted to be treated as
a customer and stakeholder; they felt they did not get as much attention as
expected. DCXnet had to jump in as facilitator and set up several workshops, in
Germany and the US, in order to support the discussion between IT and
Covisint to find a way of not losing still more time.
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One of the big issues which was discussed quite intensively was the question of
how the user data could be securely moved from the databases ofDC to the
Covisint database for the GSP (the portal was hosted by Covisint). Covisint
proposed to just get access to the user data and put them in their own database.
But this was not what IT, at least IT Germany, wanted to be done with their
data. DC US took a more or less neutral position during discussions. Here, IBM
was assigned to support DC in working out, once again, different technical
alternatives and the related costs. These alternatives were rejected by IT with
arguments that could not be understood by the project managers and DCXnet.
They seemed to be quite valid and logical, but in the end no one really could say
whether or not the arguments against the options given by IBM were valid.
Eventually, IT got what they wanted, which was one of the alternatives worked
out by IBM.
As IT promised DCXnet to share the costs that were higher than the GSP budget
would have allowed, IBM started to develop the technical solution. This
solution consisted ofmoving the user data securely from the DC database to the
database of Covisint on a case-by-case basis upon a user entering the old portal.
Again, XML-based message handlers were used to support these processes.
Regarding the point in time of the migration of existing users and their user
data, two alternative options were worked out. The American way, a 'big bang',
and the German way, i.e., being smoothly shifted when entering the old portal
(for the last time). Both approaches were quite heavily discussed in the sub-
project group responsible for migration. Eventually, DC US went for the 'big
bang' approach where they told their registered users of the old portal to use the
GSP from a certain point in time onwards. In contrast, DC Germany persisted
on its viewpoint that their supplier-users would not be amused at all and decided
on the smooth way.
Technically, the Covisint portal services and business processes had to be
mapped onto the existing old portal and their related services and processes.
200
Relevant user data had to be transferred via XML messages and it had to be
ensured that the right user data were transferred to the right Covisint service.
During the implementation phase, it turned out that user data from both old
existing portals to the GSP could not be migrated automatically to Covisint. One
approach considered by the IT managers was the manual option to transfer the
supplier-user data from the old portal to the new one. GP&S managers were
more in favour of a solution where every existing supplier-user should register
once more again in the new portal
Due to cultural reasons and a different relationship to their corresponding
supply base42, DC US decided to transfer their suppliers automatically from the
old portal to the GSP as soon has they had acknowledged the T&Cs. After a
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Figure 33. Implemented standardised migration process for Europe
In contrast, the European side finally decided on another way of communicating
the change to their suppliers, as illustrated in Figure 33. The user of the existing
old portal would receive an email with a migration, link to follow and
information about the new portal. This would be supported by a kind request to
first register with Covisint if not already registered. In this context, one of the
discussion points between the two responsible GP&S managers and one
DCXnet manager was the content of the email notification to inform suppliers
about the forthcoming migration event. Whereas the IT manager could not
42 One observation included that although there was one global supplier policy handbook, obviously,
supplier relationships were 'lived' differently in the daily business in US and in Europe/Germany.
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understand why this was a discussion point during one of the weekly meetings,
the US-based GSP project manager had no understanding at all of this issue. In
the end, a supposedly adequate wording of the email notification was found, but
it took more than a week. As the old portal had been fully integrated into the
GSP, the user migration benefited from the additional programming and
suppliers could work with their DC applications as usual.
Apart from the UI and the deliverables related to the portal integration and the
set-up of the portal administration, the organisational aspect ofwho should be
responsible in the future and lead a portal organisation as a functional
department became a point of discussion. This had been started by the leaders of
business units not directly involved in the GSP project, but who had indirectly
been asked for their content. They wanted to get involved somehow and
therefore brought the question to the portal sponsor group to think about the
establishment of a functional portal organisation.
6.7 Portal governance
During the difficulties experienced in the development phase of the standard
content management procedures, the sounding board asked the steering
committee to assign the DCXnet manager to draft a future portal governance
structure. This deliverable had not originally been taken into consideration. It
turned up after the sub-project group had started to compile content for the GPS
in the GP&S business units which created some concerns to which the sounding
board members listen attentively. Portal content management needed to support
and manage different types of content, as well as to coordinate different groups
of regional and global authors.
Another reason for thinking about the portal ownership was the fact that the
portal project organisation was built for only a limited time, and that the next
step would be to integrate the portal team as an organisational unit either in IT
or GP&S. As the sounding board was mainly a representation ofGP&S
business unit leaders, they pushed for a portal governance proposal and a
decision until the end of the first phase of the project. From their point of view,
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the portal should be part of the GP&S department because the GP&S
department was responsible for supplier relationships. In IT, they saw the
support of procurement processes with IT, nothing more.
With the global approach of the GSP, this would change completely. The new
integrated global portal would need more and other standards than the existing
portal structures provided at this time. It was clear to the DCXnet manager that
the implementation of an integrated portal would introduce standard processes
and would require procedural changes. This could only be achieved by
coordinated effort in a separate organisational structure in order to guarantee
that standard processes received attention and were not disregarded and by¬
passed by workarounds44. Another reason was the management of applications
that should be integrated into the portal. For example, although application
development and support were primarily regional, application integration
processes and procedures had to be managed globally and executed locally. And
eventually, according to the IT and GP&S managers, the hosting of the portal at
Covisint presented a new challenge requiring centralised management,
coordination, oversight, and control.
For a Sounding board meeting in the end of July 2002, the DCXnet manager
had to present a draft of the future portal governance model illustrated in Figure
34. The intention of this model reflected the global nature of the portal while
including appropriate levels of both global and regional aspects. The model
consisted of three major different layers: the governance layer, the portal and
the application layer.
43 This happened easily in a highly decentralised managed organisation where only some topics were
monitored centrally.
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Figure 34. The implemented portal governance model (Project presentation, 2002)
On the governance layer, the Global Procurement Board (GP Board)44 had to
make strategic decisions and to set the objectives for the further development of
the portal. As on the portal layer, the global portal management team
represented the central node between the GP Board and the application layer,
represented by application owners. Responsibilities for the portal management
should include the definition and development of global portal standards,
processes and procedures. Second, the portal team should coordinate the
development and management of the portal content. In addition to the daily
portal management, the team should constitute the central contact point for
application owners, other DC functional departments, the IT departments and
Covisint. The portal team should be supported by the editorial group, the GP&S
communication specialists and expert teams from company business units
involved.
The application layer should be represented by the different application owners
who in turn would be responsible to provide ready-to-integrate applications,
define localised communication requirements and develop local content.
Apart from some minor remarks, and the need for future cost estimate, the
sounding board accepted the portal governance model. However, the
44 The GP Board consists of a representative of each procurement division (higher manager) plus two
representatives of the IT department.
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governance structure had the focus on GP&S. IT, which played an important
role in terms of the operation of the portal, was totally ignored. This led to some
fierce discussions between the leaders of the IT department and the DCXnet and
GP&S managers. Finally, mutual consent was achieved with GP&S being the
portal owner, having in place a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with the IT
department which would operate the portal technically.
Today, the portal is managed by the GP&S department. But this internal
working relationship is characterised by a constant battle related to budget
issues and unclear responsibilities.
6.8 Conclusions
In this chapter the development and implementation of standardised business
processes were portrayed. Both phases were tightly intertwined in the project.
This is the reason why considerable interaction between the GSP project team
and other business units (and their managers) had taken place and had led to
dynamics in terms of changes of Covisint's offered 'best practice' standard
processes.
The different options available were emerging through the collaboration
between the main actors, the different departments ofDC, Covisint and IBM, in
the context of the development and implementation of the portal technology in
DC's organisation. In the GSP project, those developments were patterned by
the different deliverables to be produced as outcome in the project.
To develop and implement a supplier portal in a large organisation is a very
complex undertaking. It is becoming increasingly complex because of the
different business units involved: the procurement department which is the
owner of business processes; the IT department because they were operating the
IT infrastructure and ensured the integration of the portal into a corporate IT
architecture and in this case, an e-business organisation which was in charge of
the budget and the entire project - not to forget the external parties Covisint and
IBM.
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Compared to electronic auctions, the standardisation of other supplier processes
was more complicated. Each of the Covisint stakeholders claimed to adopt the
industry "best practice" processes. However, in reality each stakeholder wanted
to develop and implement a solution that suited their needs. The statement of
the former Covisint manager confirmed the situation:
"After the successful development and operation of auctions, in a next
stage, the development of standardised procurement and engineering
processes embedded in a portal environment did not gain the same
momentum like auctions and turned out to be difficult and tough for
everyone involved".
Overall, the development of the standardised portal was much more complex
than expected by DC. By and large, the implementation was characterised by
several major aspects. IT managers had a great say compared to other project
team members because they were more experienced in architectural
implementation matters than all the other team members. Sometimes some of
the solutions were not clear to the other team members but they had no choice
and had to have confidence in what the IT department presented as solution45.
The IT department used their expertise and knowledge to shape the portal
project to their benefit. For example, during the development of the SoW, IT
always emphasised their technical skills and portal experience as strengths
which gave them the right to critically evaluate the content of the SoW
elaborated by Covisint. In contrast, from a political point of view, DCXnet
knew that they did not have the IT experience but the overall overview and the
connections to the TM, as well as the budget.
Second, during the implementation phase, tensions appeared between the IT
staff of the project team and the business units regarding the inclusion of
45 Even the DCXnet manager admitted, in terms of trust, that in some cases he was not sure if
everything presented by the IT department was correct or if there would not have been a better
solution. On the other hand, he had no choice and had to believe them because he had a limited
technical knowledge in what concerned the implementation of portals.
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organisational specific functionalities into the standard. The negotiations, as
well as the solutions, were triggered and approached based on budget
restrictions on both sides. Therefore, the implementation of the standardised
portal involved "work around solutions" to fit the users needs while at the same
time observing the limitations in the budget. However, such a pragmatic
approach called into question the vision about the 'best practice' solutions of
Covisint.
Third, the coordination of a cross-departmental project team was a challenge.
Most of the issues occurred centred around the recruitment of project staff, the
integration of people into the team (different cultures, different business units
and expertise and backgrounds). Each team member represented his/her
business unit and had different interests and a different understanding of the
facts or issues to solve.
Fourth, each of the four deliverables changed during the development and
implementation phase, either for organisational reasons - as in the case of the
SoW or the portal administration - or for technical reasons which had not been
fully anticipated in the development phase, like for example in the case of the
portal integration. Tight deadlines might also have been a reason for the
frequent changes in the implementation of the standard46. In retrospective, in
judging the overall project situation an IT manager stated:
"I think, we could not hold project times because the time period of
specification had been simply to short. Although extended they were too
short. To really have something serious, it would have taken us longer,
but management was against this approach. We got pressure from
management: 'You have time until April and then it must be ready.' This
was definitely too short in terms offunctionalities and being airtight.
Another huge issue had been the understanding of processes. The
46 In contrast, for example, in the case of BMW, the interviewed manager mentioned that they did not
change during the implementation phase from what originally had been agreed in the development
phase. In addition, there was no time pressure in their portal implementation.
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German side had another understanding ofprocesses than the American
side. And DC in turn another understanding than Covisint. The three
parties had a different perspective on processes and this had been very
difficult to come to an agreement and to work out a homogenous
process. In total, for me, this had been one of the most challenging
topics. Also the behaviour ofCovisint, that they not really behaved in a
customer-oriented way".
Fifth, the technical integration of existing applications was one of the major
challenges in the project, underestimated even by the IT people. Due to the
ambitious timelines chosen in the project plan, the technical integration of the
portal was putting considerable pressure on the portal team. For a huge
corporation such as DC, the implementation of security and corresponding
procedures was/is number one on the priority list. Therefore, DC achieved their
objective to ensure a greater security of Covisint registration software with
additional programming of the SSO. As in the case of the password change, the
discussion was even on-going when the portal went live. IT did not accept the
90 day password change of Covisint, they insisted on their 30 day change.
Interestingly, security always had to serve as the argument, particularly for IT,
to stop each and every activity that would have meant a loss of control over a
process (such as the discussion about how existing user data should be stored in
the future). Other organisational and trust issues, such as the password change,
were always discussed from a technical perspective, a level where the IT people
felt familiar with and where the other project members had limited knowledge
to follow and contribute adequately to a discussion.
Sixth, when the portal would shift from a project status to a more corporate
function, the so-called 'portal governance model' was developed and
implemented. The model consisted of three different layers: the governance
layer, the portal and the application layer. In each of the different layers, the
roles and responsibilities were clearly defined in order to fit the needs of all
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participants, either directly involved in the portal project or indirectly involved,
like, for example, the functional departments.
This deliverable was unplanned and came on the table only at the end of the
development phase. During the course of the project it had turned out that some
internal processes were not really existing or unclear. Furthermore, for some
senior managers the portal could mean a further step in their career. Therefore,
as some of them were part of the sounding board, they pushed really hard for a
portal governance structure. The main 'battle' took place between the GP&S
department and the IT department. Both departments claimed to have a bigger
stake in this project and pretended to have more knowledge: the IT managers in
terms of their IT skills and experience, the GP&S people in terms of their
genuine right of the supplier relationship47.
Finally, from a Covisint perspective, the difficulties in defining standardised
business processes for supplier management stemmed from the fact that they
only had piecemeal processes in place that they called 'best practice' in the
industry ('industry standard'). Supplier management turned out to be more than
just the auctioning process, and the corresponding processes were much more
difficult to model and to map onto existing company processes. With Covisint,
first three competitors had commited to work together in the long term. But in
the end, the commercial auctions that delivered short term benefits had been
followed pretty straightforwardly. With all other supplier management related
processes, Covisint and the participating OEMs had serious difficulties in
working out acceptable standard processes that suited all participants and were
accepted and implemented at least by Covisint's stakeholders.
During the implementation phase, Covisint had to compromise in what was sold
by them as standardised business processes - not only due to technical issues
but also to the power the three OEMs were exercising. To satisfy the
requirements of the stakeholders, Covisint had to invest in technlogy and effort
47 The different GP&S departments were responsible for the supplier contracts. Only suppliers with an
existing long-term relationship were asked to work with the portal.
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which had not originally been planned, and which tightened the budget. IBM's
role in the project was ambiguous. On the one hand, they were the strategic
partner ofDC on the other they had sold their Websphere product to Covisint.
The detailed description of the context, the strategy, the development and the
implementation phase of the standardised portal project in the previous three
chapters provided in-depth insights into the efforts to set up a so-called
'industry standard' within the automotive industry. In the next chapter, the
analysis of the case study will be started with the development of a framework




The goal of this chapter is to develop a framework to analyse the empirical data
presented in the preceding chapter. This chapter is structured as follows. A new
analytical framework is developed in the first section which is applied to the case in
the empirical analysis in the following section. In the first part, the empirical analysis
discusses the project, the key actors and the configurations patterned by history,
context and organisational factors. The second part of the empirical analysis section
discusses the dynamics occurring during the development and implementation of the
standardised portal technology. The expected and unexpected outcomes of the
project and their effects on the sector are examined in the final two sections.
7.2. Theoretical analysis - development of a new framework
The review of relevant existing literature offered little in terms of analytical
frameworks to address and analyse the complexity of the case at hand. For
methodological, practical and theoretical reasons, many socio-economic studies on
standardisation have included case studies of particular platforms for negotiations
about, and agreements upon, a particular standard - typically focusing on the
interplay between the various interest groups such as standard setting bodies
involved. These cases were typically studied in isolation from their specific context
and the surrounding politics. The result had been a markedly static conception of the
standardisation process. The interaction between and during the various stages of
standard development and implementation, and its influence on the outcome, had
been largely ignored.
Initially, ANT seemed to be a good approach to redress this theoretical and analytical
limitation. Although the actor-centred perspective provided tools for exploring
internal dynamics to depict the interactions between the key players of the study, it
frequently had been criticised for not taking into consideration hierarchies, external
effects, and for neglecting structure as well as history. To tackle the much more
complex setting of the case, not only the actor-centred element ofANT had to be
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taken into account but also the achievement of stability of the network, the history
and the context within which the network was embedded. Consequently, Jorgensen's
concept of arena (1999), an account based on the extension ofANT, offered a better
concept for analysis. In addition, a micro and meso level of analysis was needed to
replace the 'free of hierarchical level approach' ofANT in order to capture both the
focused view on technological change of a particular company and the industry
context that this company operates within. Such a micro-meso view is offered by the
Whipp and Clark's 'firm-in-sector' framework (1986) which was selected to provide
the structural frame to study the unfolding of technological innovations along time
lines and through institutionalised mechanisms of the structural repertoire of a
company, including a historical, structural, and processes dimension.
The combination of these concepts - the arena of development and the firm-in-sector
framework - informed the core concept used (and presented in chapter 3) to develop
the new framework of analysis: a Multi-level Space of Innovation Dynamics (MSID)
framework to capture the dynamics of standardised portal technology and its
outcomes on two levels. Namely, at a micro level focusing on individuals and groups
in the adopting organisation, and at the meso level, addressing the effects that the
dynamics have in the broader context of the sector.
The idea was to develop an analytical tool to capture not only the actors in a space
(that underlines the important role of locations) but also include elements such as
relations, networks, artefacts and innovation activity - which allow the analysis of the
dynamics in standard setting (Jorgensen & Sorensen, 1999). The objective of the
framework was to identify these dynamics and to analyse how they pattern the
outcome of a particular local project that was a vital part in a wider industry context.
The strategy, development and implementation of standardised technology cannot be
seen as separate stages or phases, but as an integrated process, affected by an
underlying set of dynamics which clearly shape the final outcome. The framework
developed did benefit not only from the inclusion of an actor-centred account
embedded in the industry context, but also served as a flexible tool enabling a
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simplified presentation of the case that was essential to answer the research
questions.
In regard to analysis of a multi-level space, information systems researchers have
identified the benefits of approaches that enable the zooming in and out of contexts
and actors to study analytical linkages between local (micro) and global (macro)
(Ciborra et al., 2000).
The MSID framework addresses some of the above mentioned analytical challenges
evident in existing literature. It includes the strategy, development and
implementation processes in both the local and the industry context; also taking into
consideration politics of change that shape the decision-making of the actors. The
challenge in analysing those (standardisation) processes is to produce an adequate
evolving account, which covers the complex organisational setting and the
interaction between the actors in this setting. Consequently, the MSID framework
gives a language to discuss contradictions, for example the global - local
phenomenon.
The case study presented a unique opportunity to not only actively accompany a
longitudinal and multi-spaced project but also allowed for new theory building. To
analyse the different units of analysis of the case being part of different levels of the
multi-layered structure, a certain type of flexibility in terms of granularity (Bowker
& Star, 1999) of the analysis was indispensable (Monteiro, 2000). Granularity is
understood as scope, depth and level of detail of a case. On the one hand, a detailed
view of the adopting organisation within its context was necessary to understand the
shaping factors of the outcome (zoom in). On the other hand, it was also
indispensable to keep the bigger picture and to focus on the adopting organisations'
ties with other business partners; particularly, the supply chains networking the
industry and the related IT solutions supporting them electronically (zoom out). In
the following both perspectives - the 'zoom in' (micro level) and the 'zoom out'
(meso level) - are developed and explained.
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Zoom in - the micro level of analysis
In Figure 35 the micro level perspective of analysis, the arena of portal
standardisation, is illustrated in a schematic framework.
On the micro level of analysis, the arena of portal standardisation includes key
players - active actors - and actors indirectly influencing the arena, artefacts and
processes and their relations. Consequently, the standardisation arena frames the
structure of the standardisation project outset on a micro level and includes other
locations of development of the sector on a meso level. The creation and the entry in
the standardisation arena were driven by the management of e-business innovations
of the central actor (DC). As depicted in Figure 35, DC occupied several roles at the
same time, as a type of central 'Meta actor' with regard to the other actors populating
the arena. In parallel, within DC, the different departments such as DCXnet, IT, and
GP&S, were playing active key roles. Other departments as well as the top
management were also actors, but they were influencing the arena and the course of
the project indirectly. Further, other actors, such as the intermediary Covisint (of
which DC was a shareholder, together with Ford and GM, which were competitors),
the IT vendor IBM, suppliers, other OEMs, associations and other electronic
marketplaces configured the standardisation arena.
In summary, the micro level of analysis allowed the studying of the arena
configuration and the course of the entire portal project from a very detailed and
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close perspective, without losing the relation to the overall picture and the meso level
of analysis.
Zoom out - the meso level of analysis
The schematic framework in Figure 36 depicts the meso level of the multi-layered
networks and supply chains supported by IT within the sector.
IT Supply
Figure 36. Schematic framework of the meso level of analysis
The framework tried to address the aspect of competition and co-operation between
different actor worlds within the standardisation arena. The 'zoom out' perspective
allowed the framework to address a particular project in the broader context of the
industry and beyond. Whereas the micro level of analysis had only pointed to a
broader perspective, this part of the model addresses the specific situation of the
central actor (DC) within the arena of standardisation and its industry context
The central actor is engaged in different sorts of relations, for example in
shareholding (e.g. an OEM is shareholder of an intermediary) or in strategic alliances
with business partners (e.g. suppliers) or competitors (other OEMs). Those linked
supply chains of key players in the sector are based on existing relationships
(procurement contracts). These relations are represented through inter-organisational
processes between at least two different actors. These processes, in turn, are based on
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supporting IT systems, i.e., inter-organisational systems and software such as portals
or e-marketplaces. Consequently, the standardisation arena is populated by the actors
(OEMs, suppliers) and their supply chains, competing or cooperating, linked via IT
solutions. This new type of parallel competition and negotiation may lead to the
construction of networks of companies and other actors trying to settle the
controversy between competing technologies and standards by creating new,
integrated solutions. This involves the moving between locations and the assembly of
new integrated locations (Jorgensen & Sorensen, 2002). In this context, standards
and standard setting play an important role. Standards enable cross-company
interoperability of supply chains. Standard setting may be the decisive factor
regarding success or failure in the case of competing supply chains.
The arena - a space of surprises?
Introduced in Chapter Three, the participant observer perspective and the
ethnographical approach of the research had drawn the attention to a connection of
the gap between plan and outcome and the difficulties in managing change with
complex intra and inter-organisational systems. Seeking to develop conceptual tools
to explain this phenomenon, I encountered (at a rather late stage ofmy study) the
concept of 'drift' in the work of Ciborra et al. (2000), particularly chapter one of the
volume.
As discussed in the theoretical background chapter, Ciborra et al. (2000) were
studying the dynamics of corporate information infrastructures. The authors
specifically addressed the phenomenon of the variance between initial goals set by
management and eventual outcomes "to support a more general discourse on the
dynamics of global infrastructures" (Ciborra & Hanseth, 2005: 2). To explain this
process they proposed the concept of "drift". Thae concept is defined by drawing
from key concepts ofmanagement literature, globalisation, strategic alignment and
the economics of infrastructure and information. In their studies of organisations
pursuing the implementation of corporate information infrastructure, Ciborra and
Hanseth recognise "driff'as a change from the original objectives to the final
outcomes. The organisations' objective in their implementation projects is to
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streamline an existing infrastructure through integration of different infrastructures in
order to achieve a higher level of efficiency and control of a complex and expensive
resource that is often critical for the organisation (ibid). In addition, existing
infrastructures are frequently "embedded" in a "contextual collage" consisting of
intertwined systems, processes and actors (ibid). Furthermore, the authors note that
implementation often involves the alignment of diverse actors' interests and the
patching and customisation of technology (ibid). Consequently, the authors argue
that in such a complex organisational environment control is difficult to achieve, and
that the dynamics of the interplay between the sheer complexity of technological
integration, the changing business environment and the organisation itself lead to a
'drift' in outcomes (ibid).
The authors propose that 'drift' happens because of the individual and organisational
limits which characterise the process of information infrastructures implementation.
The implementation happens within what they call a formative context - where both
the individuals and the organisation as a whole are characterised by the belief that
"management is control". This belief enforces the formation of a 'vicious circle'
which collides with the dynamics of an infrastructure characterised by openness and
being partly out-of-control (ibid: 4). Therefore, Ciborra and Hanseth claim that the
process of'drift' occurs "often outside of anyone's influence" (ibid: 4).
Consequently, the development and implementation of such IT infrastructures
follows its own conformities, "follows its own set ofrules " (ibid: 3) which may then
lead to delays, unintended consequences, sudden opposition, or a doomed attempt to
align all stakeholders (ibid: 7). Furthermore, in explaining the concept of "drift",
Ciborra and Hanseth focus on the forces, feedbacks and self-reinforcing actions that
shape the outcome. They argue that because the shaping factors are intertwined and
too complex for any model to capture the dynamics, the final outcome is difficult to
predict and remains open and highly dependent upon local circumstances (ibid).
Besides the introduction of Ciborra and Hanseth, the volume ofCiborra and
associates (2005) incorporates a number of alternative views on the dynamics of
global information infrastructures implemented within the corporate context of
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global companies. For example, Hanseth and Braa (2000) place the intra-
organisational into the global context and claim that organisations can be
characterised as 'learning, but also dynamic and unpredictable' entities (Ciborra and
Hanseth, 2005: 7). In an increasingly globalised world, this leads to unpredictable
and potentially massive side effects such as higher risks and less control (ibid). The
authors focus on whether companies can control their global operations and whether
IT infrastructure facilitates such control (Hanseth & Braa, 2005: 41). With respect to
the control issue and to the argument that no-one has an influence I would argue that
organisations to a certain extent exert control over their operations and
infrastructures. Firstly through their organisational matrix structure globally
operating in parallel with experienced functional departments. As Monteiro (2005)
states, the development and implementation of an information infrastructure can be
characterised as a socio-technical process of negotiation. The alignment of actors is
indeed a "tortuous and fragile" process (Ciborra & Hanseth, 2005: 5) that may lead
to delays and unintended consequences, but it is not completely outside the control of
the actors involved. Control is obtained through the ability of the actors involved to
contribute their knowledge and experience, from different areas of expertise, often
forming coalitions to reinforce control, and accordingly guide drifts in a particular
direction. These negotiations may, of course, provoke changes from originally
planned objectives, but those drifts are not undirected. Rather, these changes can be
conceptualised as a "directed" drift through the interests of the actors and the
subsequent compromise.
Hanseth draws the attention to the important aspect of openness and the dilemma
companies face when integrating their internal infrastructures with public ones. A
pre-requisite of this type of integration is the use of standards. In the case of
integrating large-scale information infrastructures Ciborra and Hanseth argue that the
alignment of diverse stakeholders plays an important role, as do local circumstances.
Particularly when integration is based on standards supposed to be "best practice'
leading to a tension between local (adopted) solutions versus the 'best practice'
(global) solution. As local solutions are understood to provide a higher level of
control, negotiations and alignment of actors lead to a drift in the implementation of
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global, standardised best practice solutions through compromises. It is a matter of
fact (as described e.g., by Cordelia and Simon (2005)) that the development and
implementation of standardised infrastructure is the outcome of interaction between
global design and local requirements rather than the result of a straightforward
implementation of the best practice processes (ibid: 192).
One avenue of grounding the model in the "real world" of practitioners is by
expanding the concept of drift proposed by Ciborra and Hanseth (2005). A more
detailed (and practically grounded) concept would allow researchers to analyse the
phenomenon on a much more detailed account, while offering practitioners a term
they can use to manage the process of IS implementation / development. The process
of drift can be characterised in terms of:
• The different levels ofdrift - Jorgensen and Sorensen (2002) suggest that the
standardisation arena is a terrain of transformation. Those transformations are
taking place on different levels closely intertwined: the intra- and inter-
organisational level, the interconnectedness of intra- and inter-organisational
worlds and processes.
• The direction ofdrift - In contrast to the portrayal of drift by Ciborra and
Hanseth (2005) as being essentially random and outside anyone's influence,
the analysis suggests that the direction and character of drift are shaped by
certain factors: these include for example the key actors who control
relationships and networks; their strategic choices and alignments, based on
their insertion in the organisational nexus, the span of control, their particular
perspectives rooted in their roles and experiences. Moreover to the extent that
drift is directed (or shaped), it is predictable to a certain extent. It can be
analysed, and actors can seek to channel the direction of drift.
• The circumstances - under which drifts occur and shape the intensity of drift,
for example the complexity of a project configuration such as context and
pre-project history playing a very significant role; the network of actors and
their links to external actors or networks; the co-existence of competition and
cooperation within the standardisation arena expressed in the parallel actions
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of collaboration in alliances and the competition of supply chains; the role of
IT vendors and their solution offers to support the former or the latter; the
aspect of temporality, recognition of time aspects, for example external and
internal time pressures.
As a result, with this it can be argued that drifts are 'directed' by the discussed
different levels, the direction and the circumstances. 'Directed drifts' are occurring
during an event (for example a project) and are understood as incremental or radical
changes from the intended course in other directions and on different levels due to
shaping factors. Those factors are based on external influences such as market
requirements or on internal influences such as event-driven needs. 'Directed drifts'
consist of transformations from a given status to another status, resulting in
qualitative changes.
The MSID framework developed is understood as an analytical device that flexibly
allows for zooming between the different analytical levels. The strip of layers from
the seemingly complex socio-technical setting showed the phenomenon of 'directed
drift' and the different related paradoxes patterning the outcomes. Therefore, the
framework provides a language to discuss the complexity that Ciborra et al. (2000)
were noticing, for example the global - local paradox.
The subsequent empirical analysis of the study is based on the MSID framework.
The use of flexible granularity of the framework allowed for analysis of the complex
multi-layered structure of the case by separately studying the different units of
analysis. Moreover, the framework was extended by the concept of 'directed drift' to
study and enhance the understanding of how dynamics of ICT innovations is
patterning expected outcomes and being the source of unintended outcomes.
7.3. Empirical analysis of the case
In this section, the framework developed is applied to the case. The MSID
framework allowed for an examination of the very complex socio-technical setting of
the case study. The language of the framework enabled a discussion of the different
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emerging aspects of the large amount of empirical and information-dense data.
Chapter three introduced the concept of 'arenas of development' as spaces that imply
new actors, new configurations of networks, settings, re-configurations of
technologies and visions involved in the process (Jorgensen and Sorensen, 1999).
Here we are paralleling the analysis of Jorgensen and Sorensen (1999). The analysis
of the Global Supplier Project (GSP) project has shown that the planning,
development and implementation of an ICT innovation, such as the standardised
portal technology, is shaped by spaces and their configuration and re-configuration,
by actors and their relations, and by artefacts. The "standardisation arena" space is
configured of actors included in the project and from outside, the networks of the key
players, and their visions and knowledge translated into the technology. As
introduced in chapter three - the methodology chapter - my participant observer
status allowed me to also explore the pre-project phase which is normally excluded
from socio-economical research due to the researcher's lack of prior involvement and
access to information. This led to the unique opportunity to analyse the significant
importance and influence of context and history on the dynamics and outcome of the
planning, development and implementation of standardised technology.
Furthermore, the analysis revealed three important key findings tightly related to the
research questions: the identification of the project as a vehicle for technological
change, the dynamics produced by the negotiations and shaped by the configuration
of the arena and the project (within and outside the project) and, eventually, the
expected and unintended outcomes patterned by the dynamics and the configurations
of the standardisation arena.
7.3.1 The project as vehicle for achieving change
In this subsection the 'static' elements configuring the standardisation arena, actors
and their relations and networks are analysed across both levels of analysis. The
actors were differing widely in their expertise, context, commitments, and perceived
interests. Consequently, each of the key players as well as the more passive acting
players pursued their own strategy and tactics in the following negotiations regarding
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the options to set up a global standardised solution that is examined in the next
section.
The analytical focus on the micro and the meso level within the model helped with
the formation of networks of actors, their locations and the transformations of their
strategies into the standardisation arena. The project configuration on the micro level
is a significant element of the broader meso level of analysis, the sector
configuration. Therefore, as the initial initiative of the project was started at a key
player, the project can be accounted as vehicle for change and is analysed on both
analytical levels.
The description of the standardisation arena of standardised portal technology
involved a number of locations. For decades, geographically, the automotive sector
has operated globally and is represented throughout the world. The same is valid for
IT solution providers such as IBM. However, both have very strong roots in the
respective regional and local markets which are reflected in their organisational
matrix-driven structure. This has important implications for the development of
standardised, global IT solutions and their implementation in a socially local
embedded environment (see subsection 7.3.3 and 7.3.4). Other, smaller actors, such
as Covisint who are new in the market started to develop their solutions in the US.
This was based on the fact that the US offers not only a vast market for ICT
innovations but also facilitated technology development. Again, this had effects on
the implementation of the standardised technology incorporating standardised best-
practice processes in a European context. Apart from the Covisint headquarters, on a
project level, the local US facility in Detroit and the various locations in Europe were
important regarding the configuration of the arena and the networks of actors.
The idea to network and collaborate across different industries by implementing
standardised solutions made the IT software market less stable. In addition, the big
OEMs started new ventures such as the foundation of Covisint by Ford, GM and DC.
Competition and cooperation reached a new level of re-definition in the automotive
industry compared to the former clear cut of competitors or allies.
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The sector configuration
As illustrated in the context chapter (chapter 4), the automotive sector is
characterised by intense market pressures and an increasing concentration of the
market. Key actors in the market are car manufacturers (OEMs), suppliers
historically depending on the OEMs, automotive associations supporting the industry
on a local and global level, and consultants and intermediaries such as electronic
marketplaces. Although the few very large OEM organisations dominate the
relationships with their suppliers (e.g. by exercising their trading power), they fight
for survival as independent brands. Consequently, the foundation of Covisint by
Ford, GM and DC was to take advantage of being the first mover in the market to set
up an electronic marketplace and significantly shape the needed closer collaboration
with suppliers and other business partners. By attracting other OEMs, the founders
hoped to set a flag and introduce electronically mediated standardised processes. The
transformation involved was to include software providers in the Covisint business
and to cooperate with competitors in the alliance Covisint. In parallel, another
important move was the push of strong brands not only of the founders of Covisint
but of every OEM in order to attract and retain customers. In summary, the
automotive sector followed a strategy ofexpansion and differentiation, resulting in
an unsettling re-configuration of the sector, incorporating competition and
cooperation within a heterogeneous standardisation arena.
The configuration of the DC arena
The configuring elements of the DC arena played a major role in respect to the GSP
project configuration. DC was the central 'Meta' actor in this study where other key
actors from the different departments were directly and indirectly involved in the
portal project. The start of the GSP project was to transform the entire e-business
history ofDC. Across all business units and corporate departments, all single e-
business-like supplier applications were supposed to be technically linked with the
new portal. Further, the outsourcing of the development and implementation to
Covisint instead of realising it in-house aimed to reduce cost and risk of IT. The
standardised technology offered by Covisint was supposed to harmonise the IT
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architecture and the internal multifaceted processes. The standardised technology
was understood to partly replace existing technology as well as to technically
integrate with existing solutions via technical interfaces.
The transformation process vividly presented in the project and its configuration
involved the recruitment of key actors of the IT, the GP&S and the DCXnet
department. This established sophisticated project organisation included not only
internal but also external actors such as Covisint and IT service providers disposing
different levels of knowledge and expertise. First, the IT department that was driven
by engineers with considerable technical IT expertise who had already been
operating two different supplier portals; one in the US and one in Europe for two
years. Second, the GP&S department was representing the business side being
responsible for all supplier relations as well as for procurement and logistic
processes. Finally, DCXnet assumed the role of a change agent for e-business
strategies and facilitating the project. As a result, DC was changing both the network
of actors and the technological-organisational vision manifested in a strategy of
resettling and inclusion.
The configuration of the Covisint alliance
As already discussed in the context of the configuration of the automotive sector, the
transformation in the automotive sector was triggered by the emergence of a new
player in the market: the intermediary connecting buyers and supplier in order to
collaborate or exchange information. Covisint represented the species of
intermediaries based on the business model of a cooperation by the biggest
competitors and supported by internet-based IT. The founders of Covisint wanted to
enhance their power and started to construct an overarching network of companies
and engage other actors to settle the controversy between competing technologies
and standards by creating a new, integrated platform. This involved multiple
locations of development and implementation of the integrated platform and the
creation of a new company while staffing it with managers coming from the
founding companies. Therefore, the Covisint alliance could be called a strategy of
reduction and ordering.
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The configuration of the IT vendor arena
Finally, the configuration of the IT vendor arena illustrated the power and influence
of the global players in that area, for example IBM. They dominated the market with
their solutions even against new players in the market such as Commerce One. The
large IT vendors were not only engaged in the development of technology but also
had established their presence in many locations of user organisations in supporting
them with consultancy. As all large corporations across different industries were
adopting their solutions, IT vendors were well aware of all benefits and downsides of
either the in-house or the outsourcing option of, for example, electronic
marketplaces. Therefore, technical solutions were offered in a range between
completely standardised and completely adapted to user needs (legacy). In short, the
large IT vendors followed a strategy ofextension oftheir business and ofmultiple
engagements.
These actors, networks, and artefacts led to the emergence of the standardisation
arena and represented its configuring elements. The subsequent analysis of the case
revealed that the project configuration was shaped by three factors, (1) the pre-
project phase (history of past experience), (2) the market context and (3) the
adaptation to corporate organisational structures.
(1) The historical perspective - the Pre-project phase
Traditional technical or corporate change case studies exhibit the shortcoming that
the researchers arrived after the case was initiated (and in some cases after it had
been completed) and therefore received a retrospective account of how and why the
programme was initiated (McLoughlin et al., 1999: 57). A number ofwriters have
pointed to this weakness, and argued for the need for studies to address the 'pre-
project phase' though there remain very few instances that succeed in researching
these (one exception being Gallacher, 2004). This partly reflects the practical
exigencies of access by external researchers to a case-study company. This illustrates
the importance of longitudinal studies which give access for example to the pre-
project phase and how it was shaped by the prior organisational history. The
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researchers' involvement in DC provided an exceptional opportunity to include into
an analysis the pre-history of a programme of technological change and in particular
what we may call the pre-project phase.
Analysed from a historical point of view, the study unveiled the strong influence of
past experiences on the subsequent course of the project. For the top management -
the TM - the role of IT in general, and the Covisint portal technology in particular,
was to achieve significant cost reductions concerning DC's IT infrastructure while at
the same time harmonising cross-company systems and applications. Their decision
to outsource the solution to Covisint was based on tactical and strategic reasons.
First, outsourcing was expected to lead to economies of scale in business areas where
standardised business processes could be implemented. Second, the implementation
of a standardised technology was part ofDC's corporate IT strategy which
emphasised B2B collaboration strategy across the supply chain based on "a single
point-of-entry". This was more likely to be achieved through an industry-wide
initiative (e.g. collaborating with others OEMs) rather than by an isolated initiative.
Consequently, the TM considered the lessons learned from the past experiences and
established the change agency DCXnet in order to acquire legitimisation within the
corporation and to eventually demonstrate authority and power:
■ Avoid failures of the past; GP&S had already started an e-business
48 • • • •
programme which had failed due to lack of communication and acceptance,
as well as a lack of clear commitment of the top management and designated
technically experienced resources.
■ Gain acceptance of all future e-business activities within the entire
corporation. Officially get the buy-in of for example from opinion leaders or
critical managers who may otherwise exercise a negative influence on future
projects.
■ Demonstrate the power of the TM through a particular centrally managed
department; nail your colours to the mast and send this message of power to
other departments; in this particular case to the key players ofGP&S and IT.
48 Electronic Extended enterprise (eEE)
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The second important factor that was shaping the project configuration was the
contextual factor.
(2) The external contextual perspective - market considerations
As claimed by Whipp and Clark (1986), there is a relation between the development
of a technological innovation and the work organisation, including not only current
assumptions, knowledge and expertise but also history and context (Whipp & Clark,
1986). Therefore, project configurations involving technological innovations are
tightly linked with the structures of a company, the organisational repertoire and the
context within which this company is embedded. In this case, economic-technical
motivations in the automotive context triggered the start of the global supplier portal.
Summarised from this point of view, first of all, DC was a huge corporation which
had invested heavily in an increasingly complex IT infrastructure; partly due to the
historical growth ofDC (see in section 4.6 of chapter 4). Additionally, the
organisational structure equally favoured decentralised and centralised decisions.
This led to a variety of uncoordinated business activities, not least in e-business. For
example, within the GP&S, business units and central departments, in US as well as
in Europe, had launched a number of single e-business activities which required
consolidation49. By then, the Internet and e-business were out of their infancy, and
serious applications holding the promise of closer collaboration and ofmoney to be
saved were on the market. Consequently, DC did what most big corporations had
done late by late 1999/early 2000: in order to gain legitimisation for seriously doing
e-business, a top down decision was taken by the TM and a centrally managed e-
business department, DCXnet, was founded.
Secondly, within the automotive sector, DC wanted to play an active and visible role
in the market with regard to e-business; not least pushed by the pressures described
in section 4.3 of chapter four. As an important player well established in the
automotive industry, the foundation of Covisint (by DCXnet) was a strategic step to
underline the seriousness of the e-business approach. The financial investment in
49 The reasons for a harmonisation and standardisation of IT infrastructure were manifold. Budget
aspects played a role but also unclear IT architectural issues as well as complaints of globally working
suppliers.
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Covisint was manageable and also meant sharing the risk with other big players, GM
and Ford. In addition, forming an alliance with two major competitors was a
demonstration of power to the entire automotive industry; to initiate a huge industry
network and to set the subsequent industry standards. The foundation of Covisint was
seen as a natural step to increased efficiency in the industry through a collaborative
effort that distributes risks and costs across the players, and ensures standardisation
of business processes and information exchange.
(3) The intra-organisational perspective - corporate structures
Finally, the intra-organisational angle - the corporate structures as well as the intra-
organisational repertoire had significantly shaped the project configuration. To gain
legitimacy within DC and to capitalise on the divergent expertises and experiences
regarding the GSP project, TM and DCXnet started recruiting existing competences,
expertise and experience formerly gained in the individual e-business projects. The
TM aimed at an equal representation of all relevant groups to be considered for two
major reasons. First, to get them actively involved in the project and related activities
in order ensure that any decision taken in the project was based on a consensus of all
team members. These tactics should guarantee that no one defected from the decision
responsibility. The decision of the TM to involve everyone in the GSP project who
should be involved was translated into the phrase of "those concerned should be
actively involved".
To get the full acceptance of the project within the DC organisation, which was
characterised by a very high degree of business unit autonomy ('decentralisation'),
the active involvement was seen as crucial for the success of this global and highly
significant project. DC is a multinational corporation with a matrix structure. This
organisational structure combines centralised and decentralised decision-making.
Due to historical developments, the focus within DC is on brands which are
represented through business units (BU). Some of the decisions related to the
respective brand are thus made at the level of the individual BU. Other decisions,
such as human resources or procurement and logistics, are centralised at the
corporate level. This mixture between centralisation and decentralisation has led to a
number of inconsistencies in decision-making. For example, each production plant
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that belongs to a brand (a particular BU) runs its own logistics department in order to
ensure the production flow. This means that the corporate procurement and logistics
department has only limited influence on the procurement at the level of the
production plants that is under the responsibility of the functional procurement
departments. This fact played an important role in terms ofmanaging IT adoption,
for example the replacement ofEDI systems with an e-marketplace, which affected
both functional and corporate procurement departments.
This rather complex socio-technical setting had driven and shaped the dynamics of
decision-making during the course of the project.
7.3.2 The dynamics patterning the outcomes
The standardisation arena configured by key actors and artefacts presented in the
previous section had driven a cascade of interactions related to the process of
standardisation, and influenced an array of decisions during the negotiations of the
standardised technology:
■ The decisions in the planning/strategy phase were shaped by context and
history and the pre-project phase.
■ The decisions in the development and implementation phase were shaped by
the project configuration (structure) and the negotiations of the key actors
(action).
As suggested by Jorgensen and Sorensen (2002), the listed and related configuring
elements of the arena were held together by various linkages and inter-dependencies
of cooperating and competing actor networks and artefacts. As a whole, they led to a
cascade of various complex decision-making processes regarding the standardised
technology and were shaped to a large extent by organisational politics. A process of
competition and negotiation can lead to a tenacious struggle and centres on the
controversy of accepting a standardised technology as it is or adapt it to company's
needs and strategies.
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This research finds that the complex decision-making during the process of
negotiating innovation processes is shaped by dynamics, driven by actors and their
networks. On the micro level of analysis, decision-making in large organisations is
the preparation of a proposal (or agenda setting) by key actors. Multilateral
negotiations (bargaining) by vested interests fit the actor's interests. Personal
interests may outweigh departmental interests in terms of the project goals that are to
be achieved, which in turn can lead to a shift in those goals.
The project configuration analysed earlier framed the structure where the key actors
translated their visions, interests, and expertise during negotiations of the
standardised best practice technology. Personal participant observations during those
negotiations, and the subsequent analysis of those negotiations, led to a processual
understanding of the unfolding power, subtly carried out by the actors and ultimately
affecting the negotiations' baseline. These negotiations were characterised for
example by tensions between the key actors caused by conflicting departmental
objectives on the one hand, and individual interests such as career advancement on
the other.
At the micro level, the negotiations surrounding the planning, development and
implementation of standardised technology evolved around the three internal active
actors DCXnet, IT, GP&S, and Covisint as the external provider of the portal. Those
negotiations created strong tensions between DCXnet, IT and GP&S as well as
between the different departments and Covisint itself due to the varying types of
power executed during the course of the project. The complex decision-making
during the negotiations was strongly influenced by the alliances of power between
the main actors DCXnet, IT, GP&S and Covisint. As shown in chapter 2, any
negotiation process is crucially influenced by the balance of power between the
participants (Lawler & Bacharach, 1987). Consequently, power is not an attribute of
the actor, but of the relations between social actors (Emerson, 1962) which is
approved by this research. As such, it depends on the social context that the actors
operate within. According to Bijker (1995), actors use their respective type of power
to limit the range of possible meanings of a technology, ideally to a definition that
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best serves their particular interests. In the study, the four main reasons for tensions
and conflicts forming the dynamics of the portal development and implementation
were all inter-related and in line with existing research.
First, the GSP project created strong tensions between DCXnet - in charge of the
coordination of the project - and the IT department with respect to the development
of the project plan and the objectives of the project. While the DCXnet claim of
ownerships over milestones and the overall project was based on the support of the
higher management within the organisation (namely the TM), DCXnet grounded
their power on the hierarchical power of authority because they were not only
situated close to the TM but also had control over the budget. In contrast, the claim
of the IT department was based on the fact that it possessed unique IT skills and
knowledge that enabled them to critically evaluate the project.
Second, the GSP project created strong tensions between the IT department - which
considered itself the rightful owner of the project due to the its technical expertise in
e-commerce - and the GP&S department which wanted to maintain ownership over
the relationships with suppliers. Ownership over Covisint was seen as being
strategically important for both departments as it would bring both new
responsibilities and budget. Yet, a new organisation - DCXnet - was in charge with
coordinating the project and mediating the change, as well as being the owner of the
project budget. This created significant conflicts within DC as the leaders of both IT
and procurement considered it unacceptable that an organisation so young should be
responsible for such an important project. Procurement managers also felt that they
were bypassed and feared loss of influence and power as the responsibilities for
procurement application were to move to DCXnet and Covisint. IT managers
understood the supplier portal as a piece of IT involving activities such as integration
within the DC IT architecture and security, and hence belonging to the IT
department. The creation ofDCXnet was hence seen as a threat that was robbing the
IT department of control over IT activities. All claims of ownership were justified
since all were based on the control over key organisational resources (Emerson,
1962). DCXnet's claim was based on control over financial resources, DC IT
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department's claim was based on control over IT knowledge and expertise, while
GP&S claim was based on control over procurement knowledge and access to
suppliers. The conflicts between these different but balanced power sources
translated into poor compromises resulting in significant project delays. Had the
power relationship been less balanced, one actor might have taken control over the
negotiations and the project might have succeeded sooner.
Third, the GSP project created tensions between the application owners (the various
functional GP&S departments within the organisation) and the project team in charge
of the supervision of the project. The application owners were not only losing
functionalities by migrating to Covisint, but they were also supposed to cover the
additional costs involved in this migration. As the project suffered significant delays
in reaching its milestones, due to the many adaptations to the initially defined
objectives, the Covisint project team was losing support within the organisation. The
ability of these secondary actors -the functional GP&S departments - to significantly
influence the outcome of the project can be explained by the weak position of the
coalition formed by the principal actors - the Covisint project team - which was
consumed by internal tensions and conflicts which led to time delays and
compromised objectives. Without the significant power struggles between the actors
involved in Covisint project team, the functional procurement departments would
have had a much harder time to maintain their strong position during the
negotiations.
Finally, the GSP project created significant conflicts between the project team itself
and the Covisint organisation since the best practice solution offered by Covisint
concerning all deliverables were contrary to the requirements and interests of the
various DC actors. The standard user interface was different from GP&S existing
interface, the standard portal architecture was different from the solution preferred by
IT, and the standard Covisint applications offered different functionalities than those
used by the functional procurement departments within DC.
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Such constant conflicts between the different DC actors and Covisint have
significantly delayed the adoption of the Covisint procurement solution. At the same
time, significant compromises had to be made over the original objectives in order to
reach consensus. These have led to disappointment in the Covisint project, and an
overwhelming feeling of failure within DC. At the same time, there was little left
from the best practice solution originally proposed by Covisint as each and every one
of its objectives has been adapted to DC requirements. In the end, what was
originally considered to be a global, industry-wide portal that would link all industry
players together turned out to be a 'glocalised' - a localised global solution - version
that was adapted to local needs ofDC. In the next sub-section, the outcomes
patterned by those dynamics are examined.
7.3.3 Expected arid unexpected outcomes - the 'directed drift'
Drifts in a project are closely intertwined with the outcomes of a project and
consequently may lead to surprises; that is to say unexpected, not anticipated,
outcomes. According to Ciborra and Hanseth (2000), a drift happens in an
uncontrollable way, cannot be anticipated before and obey their own principles. In
consequence, the drift may lead to delays, unintended consequences and surprises.
The open question to clarify what those principles are or, at least, in what
circumstances drift, is more likely or occurs than in others.
The MSID framework is open and allows to identifying both expected and
unexpected outcomes - surprises (Jorgensen & Sorensen, 2002). Surprises may
appear in different shapes, one of them are paradoxes. Paradoxes occur as results of
trade-offs between different active and passive actors in the negotiations and re¬
negotiations of the shaping of a technological innovation representing different
interests restated in the negotiations, the distribution of power, the context and
history, as well as of the configuration and re-configuration of the arena by those
negotiations or by unexpected effects.
As shown in chapter 2, trade-offs have been studied by a number of researchers (e.g.
Ciborra et al., 2000; Jacucci, 2006) in the context of the development and
233
implementation of large-scale information infrastructures. However, those studies
have not looked in detail into the exact circumstances in which paradoxes and trade¬
offs occur. There is evidence in this study that there is a existing link between the
dynamics, the negotiations where actors decide and make choices, and the related
outcomes.
Drifts are occurring during the course of a project and are understood as incremental
changes from the intended course in other directions and on different levels due to
shaping factors. Those factors are based on external influences such as market
conditions or on a project-inherent dynamics, for example the negotiations of IT
functionality. Drifts consist of transformations from a given status to another status,
resulting in qualitative changes. Transferred into the project world, this concretely
means, for example, gradual changes of concrete milestones, deadlines, and so on.
The development of the idea of 'directed drift' has led to a more detailed account on
the characterisation of this phenomenon regarding:
■ The different organisational levels of drift - the standardisation arena is a
terrain of transformation (Jorgensen & Sorensen, 2002); but on different
levels. The transformation is taking place on both levels, the intra- and inter-
organisational level. However, both levels are interconnected worlds and
processes and shaped each other. For example, from an internal point ofview,
the complex organisational structure ofDC called for a sophisticated project
management that was difficult to handle for the external actors, Covisint and
IBM. Covisint had limited resources and could therefore not satisfy the needs
of all DC actors in the same way which led to frustrations within DC. From
an inter-organisational perspective, the immature technology of Covisint
limited the technical needs of DC. Consequently, within the project team, the
search of a solution that fitted the needs ofDC took more than time and
delayed the project progress.
■ The direction of drift - the drift from original goals in this project is directed
by certain factors such as the strategies of the participating actors; their
vested interests and organisational role. For example, by the key actors ofDC
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who controlled relationships and networks and shaped the direction of drift in
a way that sought to ensure that their concerns and needs were addressed.
Influence was not just exercised by strategic management. For example, the
IT department was able to exercise influence insisting on its technical
integration requirements for the portal by deploying arguments about
technical security and dependability.
■ The circumstances - under which drifts occur and their intensity; first, the
complexity of the entire project configuration where the internal and external
context and the pre-project history ofDC played a very significant role.
Second, the network of actors and their links to external actors or networks
such as the co-existence of competition and cooperation within the
standardisation arena formed, for example, in the parallel actions of
collaboration in the Covisint alliance and at the same time, the competition of
the diverse OEM supply chains. Third, the IT vendors and their standardised
solution packages such as the Commerce One software used by Covisint, not
matching the DC and Covisint needs and requiring significant customisation
effort. Fourth, the aspect of temporality expressed by the recognition of time
aspects, such as external pressures on the project due to a fashion at a given
point of time (e.g. the e-business hype end of the 1990s); also time pressures
in terms of integrating DC needs into a technical solution and meeting project
deadlines.
This much more detailed account of the drift phenomenon helped to broaden the
understanding of the existence and character of the paradoxes and trade-offs that
underpin it, the levels on which they occur, their direction and, most importantly, the
circumstances under which they are more likely than in others. The unfolding of
expected and unexpected outcomes of this research consequently pointed to the
analysis of shift. In this context, the dynamics in the standardisation arena also held
surprises that emerged through the two major elements, the complex configuration
and the complex interactions between the actors. As already suggested by Jorgensen
(1999) and by Ciborra et al. (2000), the analysis of the dynamics in the project have
shown a shaping of the project, and led to both expected and unexpected results.
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These include, for example, a significant redistribution of the flow and control of
information within the organisation. At the same time, this created new
responsibilities over business processes and budget control. In their study of the
dynamics of corporate infrastructures, and in contrast to the proponents of
mainstream management literature who understand by 'strategic alignment' the top-
down approach 'action follows strategy', the authors claimed that alignment is a
long, tortuous and fragile process whereby multiple actors and resources try to
influence each other to constitute a socio-technical order. Moreover, forces,
feedbacks and self-reinforcing actions are at play shaping the outcome which is hard
to be predicted (Ciborra & Hanseth, 2000).
The findings of the study confirm the findings of Ciborra et al. (2000) with regard to
a drift created by the project dynamics as a consequence of the negotiations of the
standardised technology. The distributed decision-making led to complex outcomes
that were both intended and expected as well as some that were unintended and
unexpected. The conflicts and power struggles over the 'Best Practice Industry
Standards' observed between the different DC actors, including the Covisint
organisation, had significantly led to shifts on the intra- and inter-organisational level
and on the direction of the project based on the circumstances where the project was
embedded.
Nevertheless, at no given point of time did the project go out of control or did the
outcomes result in total chaos. For example, the difficult and long negotiations
between the key players delayed the development of the portal. At the same time, in
order to reach consensus, significant compromises had to be made over the original
objectives. These have led to disappointment in the GSP portal project within DC
concerning the standardised technology. Concurrently, there was little left from the
best practice solution originally proposed by Covisint, as each and every one of its
objectives had been adapted to the DC requirements. In the end, the originally
perceived global, industry wide portal that would link all industry players turned out
to be a 'glocalised' version that was adapted to local needs ofDC. The standard user
interface was different from the DC existing interface, the standard portal
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architecture was different from the approach of the IT department, and the standard
portal applications offered different functionalities to those used by the existing
application owners within DC.
Another unexpected outcome on an intra-organisational level, but that was certainly
under control of the top management, was influenced by the directed shift from the
control of power over IT processes and ownership executed by DC's IT department
to Covisint. The IT department feared to lose control over processes, IT hardware
and software, and IT security. The outsourcing of the IT processes to Covisint had
driven the shift of intra-organisational control and power of resources to an external
provider. Strongly related to the loss of control over technical resources is the aspect
of technical integration of external software, very much related to the aspect of
technical security. At DC, with its enormous complex global IT infrastructure,
security was on the top of their priority list. Inter-organisational collaboration
between an OEM and its suppliers was based on the assumption that both parties
open up interfaces while granting the other side (limited) access to their own
systems. Accordingly, the OEM as well had to abandon some control over processes;
a loss of power which represented a potential source of uncertainty and insecurity.
The findings of this study support RuppeTs findings (2004) that a low level of trust
in an open inter-organisational system means that the company will attempt to
protect itself by introducing technical security measurements. In this case study, DC
also attempted to compensate for its lack of trust in Covisint with an increased
emphasis on technical security. Hence, technical security was sought to replace trust.
Interestingly, security always had to serve as the argument, particularly for DC IT to
stop each activity that would have meant a loss of control over a process. Other
organisational and trust issues, such as the regular change ofpasswords, were always
discussed from a technical perspective, a level where the IT department felt familiar
with and where the other project members had limited knowledge to follow and
adequately contribute to the discussion. In summary, the drift of control over IT
processes from DC IT to Covisint led to a very complex IT architecture and was far
from being the harmonised and cheaper solution envisaged at the beginning of the
project.
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At the technical level, the IT architecture became significantly more complex and
more expensive than was originally envisaged. Technical complexities, particularly
in the area of security, shaped most of the GSP. Due to the high level of security
required, and due to the fact that DC IT did not trust Covisint and constructed a fall¬
back solution in case of a breakdown ofCovisint, the harmonisation of the IT
infrastructure could not be achieved. This was underpinned by organisational issues
such as the maintenance of two existing supplier classification systems; an issue that
after a short analysis was classified as too expensive and organisationally too
difficult to accomplish. However, at a later stage this considerably contributed to the
non-acceptance of the supplier portal by suppliers.
Furthermore, the re-configuration of the standardisation arena during the project led
to its destabilisation, which had a huge effect on time and quality of the project
outcomes. The directed re-configuration of the standardisation arena patterned the
outcomes in two particular cases: the passing of the ownership of the project to
GP&S, and the reintegration of the change agency DCXnet into the hierarchical
organisational structure ofGP&S. Both events occurred out of the blue for the
project team but certainly were guided by the top management and the pursuing of
their strategy. Strongly related to those events were the personal career agendas of
key actors, which in turn influenced the further course of the case. These aspects will
be further reflected upon in chapter eight.
Firstly, the circumstances in which the portal ownership was discussed was due to
issues of content management processes and their responsibility. Various competing
concerns and priorities were unresolvable. Knowledge claims and expertise were at
play and the main negotiation 'battle' took place between the GP&S department and
the IT department. Both departments claimed to have a bigger stake in this project
and pretended to have more knowledge: the IT department in terms of their IT skills
and experience, the GP&S people in terms of their ownership of the supplier
relationships. The IT department still claimed to be the portal owner because a major
part of the activities surrounding the portal were IT-centred; most technical
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integration issues were too. But GP&S only had staff with procurement skills and
knowledge. Therefore, their rationale was comprehensible. Eventually, after several
months of debate, mutual consent was achieved with GP&S being the portal owner,
having in place a service level agreement with the IT department which operated and
maintained the portal technically. Today, the portal is managed by the GP&S
department in the proposed governance structure, although this internal working
relationship is characterised by a constant conflict related to budget issues,
ambiguous defined responsibilities, and a lack of IT expertise at GP&S.
Secondly, the reintegration of the change agency DCXnet into the hierarchical
organisational structure ofGP&S represented a very large re-configuration of the
arena. It caused a significant - yet unexpected - drift of the outcome compared to the
planning of the project start. The cascade of interactions that led to the complex
decision-making was mainly driven by the DCXnet's managers' career advancement
plans. Over a time period of nine months the events shaped not only the course of the
project but also the individual career paths of portal team members, particularly of
those who were part ofDCXnet. Already the start of the new central department
DCXnet and their role as change agent, and the fact that they were even located in
the same building as the TM, triggered envy and rumours within DC. Unofficially,
managers questioned the reputation and work ofDCXnet in informal meetings or
during phone calls.
DCXnet was seen as springboard for a further step on the career ladder; its managers
aimed for a further step in their personal career. Projects of such size and complexity,
and change agent departments such as DCXnet, in fact had the reputation of being a
sort of catalyst to an individual career. DCXnet as an organisational unit had gained
an excellent reputation as a broker between IT and GP&S, and as bridging the
expertise gap of both of the departments. For example, due to the facilitating role of
DCXnet, GP&S team members broadened their technical expertise and skills in IT,
and consequently gained a better acceptance within the company.
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In addition, numerous difficulties and personal changes hampered project progress. It
thus became very obvious that the project would not reach a very high reputation
within the corporation. Consequently, the project did not offer the prospective of
boosting a personal career. At a later stage of the project, evidence for this
observation was supplied by the frequent change of the portal manager; during
several intervals it was even an open position that was not assigned to anyone.
However, upon re-integration ofDCXnet into GP&S, the project lost part of its
acceptance and history started to repeat itself when GP&S and IT were again on their
own in the project. It would have been helpful for all parties involved ifDCXnet had
continued to be in place, at least until the project had shifted from the pilot phase in
the second phase. DCXnet also should have been the portal owner responsible for its
management. This would have avoided the constant battle on budget issues between
GP&S and IT.
The unexpected re-integration ofDCXnet into the functional department GP&S
harmed the project and stopped the individual career options ofDCXnet managers.
Due to the fact that they did not identify themselves with GP&S culture, and since
they knew GP&S very well from reviews and evaluations taken, they left GP&S not
long after the re-integration. Related to the break-up ofDCXnet, the individuals
working there experienced a decline of respect from IT and GP&S, and started to
look for other jobs outside GP&S. Therefore, useful and valuable knowledge left
GP&S and for the IT department it became even easier to pursue their own interests.
7.3.4 The outcomes for the key players of the sector
The outcomes of the micro level of analysis have also shaped the outcome at the
meso level, particularly with respect to the key players of the portal project but also
part of the sector such as IBM, Covisint and the part suppliers.
Covisint and affiliated stakeholders
The idea behind the development and implementation of Covisint - an e-commerce
platform for the automotive industry - was to connect a sector via an e-market in
order to improve collaboration between buyers and suppliers. Traditionally the
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relations between players in the same market have been based on competition.
Normally, cost-benefit considerations, the enhancement of competitive position in
the market and/or the improvement of organisational knowledge are the motivations
to join a network. The idea was not particularly new, occurring first with the
implementation ofEDI networks, and had been studied widely - unfortunately often
only from a technical oriented perspective (e.g. by Emmelhainz et ah, 1991; Pfeiffer,
1992). One of the studies that included the 'social' aspect of networks was carried
out by Graham et al. (1995). The authors suggested that the shaping of network
technologies required coordination across a user community, for example to agree on
business practices and standards. Further, they identified the political element of the
actor coordinating those types of activities and that the network itselfwould have
effects on the different players (Graham et al., 1995).
However, the network approach supported by standardised technology has provided
new insights into collaboration between competitors within the value chain. The
competitors Ford, GM and DC enrolled and aligned their interests in the Covisint
alliance as standard-setting coalition because they wanted to demonstrate their
power. Covisint as a business was founded by these three competitors. Although
each of them was fighting very hard for market shares, they built an alliance to push
forward e-business with standardised processes. This raised the question about
whether there had been a trade-off related to standardisation of business processes
versus the differentiation in the market. IT in general and supplier portals in
particular, were not seen as differentiators in the industry. All funding OEMs were
operating and maintaining vast IT architectures within their organisations.
In addition, supplier portals were seen as part of the communication tools used to
improve the buyer-supplier business relationship. Apart from that, the supplier
community was pretty much the same for the three big OEMs. Consequently, there
was no need for differentiation and no competition between them. Thus, joining
forces in standardising supply chain processes and setting a de facto industry
standard in the sector was an objective to achieve and to demonstrate power.
Although the e-market vision allowed for integration of all suppliers (their marketing
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slogan was "everyone with everyone"), the case has shown that still only those
suppliers who already had a working relationship with DC were connected. For new
suppliers, even if they were prepared to register with Covisint and to participate in
the GSP, it was very difficult to get access to DC due to the fact that DC first wanted
to know the supplier personally.
The IT supplier IBM
Consultants in the automotive sector offer a wide range of services. Whereas some of
them only do strategic consulting, others, such as IBM, offer a complete service
package around their technologies, including IT outsourcing services, or being a
strategic technology partner of large corporations. Depending on their customer
relationship, some consultancies shape a company's strategy to a large extent or are
just a company's extended work force. As shown in subsection 7.3.1 of this chapter,
in the project configuration of the standardisation arena, IT vendors followed a
strategy of expansion and multiple engagements on a global basis and consequently
influencing their clients. In the project, IBM adopted the role of the strategic supplier
ofDC and therefore forced Covisint to change the technology platform from BEA
Systems to IBM Websphere technology. Therefore, IBM contributed to the dynamics
aspect while shaping the negotiations of the standardised technology, particularly in
the technical area. In the end this effectively meant that every participating company
involved in Covisint and operating a supplier portal had to change their integration
architecture for their own systems and applications. During the project, they
delivered not only technology but were also active at the technical implementation
level.
Consulting is a business based on a certain level of trust between the consulting
company and the client (McKinsey, 2003). During the course of the project, trust
issues occurred between IBM consultants and DC. For example, they were not
involved in the evaluation phase of the portal options during the strategy phase.
DCXnet only started to talk to IBM in a later stage of planning of the portal project.
Prior to that, IBM only was allowed to contribute to some special technical
questions, such as the future data base design for user management data, or
242
alternatives for content management solutions and their evaluation. The reason for
that was that IBM as strategic partner for IT already worked very closely with the IT
department. Consequently, as an evidence of distrust between the project members,
DCXnet feared they could share confidential information they got at DCXnet with
DC IT, perhaps even deliberately.
Component suppliers
The outcomes for part suppliers were as they expected: business as usual, because
the inconsistent strategy of the OEMs with respect to the implementation of the e-
collaboration tools significantly affected the suppliers' negative perception of portals
in general. Whereas some of the OEMs preferred the standardised industry solutions
such as DC others, such as the VWGroup, voted for the in-house option. As for the
supplier portal ofDC, suppliers were not really involved in the decision-making. The
choice ofDC to act as a stakeholder of an e-marketplace, and to adopt the
standardised portal technology offered by Covisint, affected suppliers at an
organisational level, and at the level of the broader industry context. Consequently,
those outcomes were responsible for further dynamics in the broader context of the
industry.
Car component suppliers were barely included in development and implementation
phase of the portal project and were not asked to give feedback until the pilot phase
of the portal began. As this study has shown, some of them were not too concerned
by this, while others wanted to be more included. However, using the new portal
meant organisational changes for DC's suppliers. Resistance was not shown directly,
but suppliers were nevertheless reluctant to embrace the new portal which was seen
as 'another portal', an additional burden from a powerful OEM. For tier-1 suppliers,
the GSP required them to make organisational changes in their company which
would use resources in terms of time and money. For instance, one difficulty with
far-reaching consequences was the supplier registration at Covisint. Suppliers had to
register before they could migrate or register for the new portal. Yet procedures and
the cost of this service were unclear to suppliers. Suppliers were also confused about
the registration at the supplier portal which was hampered by the two different
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supplier registration processes for Chrysler and Daimler. Supplier users and
administrators were not only concerned but also very frustrated. Overall, the GSP did
not achieve the acceptance that DC had aimed for. However, the GSP at least gained
attention as the portal was the trigger to bring the entire industry to one table. The
reason for that was that tier-1 suppliers had to work with up to 30 different internet
portals run by their various large customers. This created opaqueness on both sides
and caused inconsistencies in user data management. For each portal, the tier-1
suppliers had to register separately. This led to an initiative to standardise the process
of portal access. OEMs and suppliers met in order to come to an agreement to
improve the portal user administration. For the benefit of everyone, a unified user
data set of registration information was clear and therefore the concept of a unified
user data management was worked out pragmatically and led to an industry standard
in portal registration.
The technical platform change that was pushed by DC had direct implications on the
supplier portals of other participants at Covisint (GM, Renault/Nissan, Ford, etc.) but
has also significantly derailed the financial situation of Covisint. The GSP project
seemed to be the peg to impose DC's best practice processes on Covisint rather than
the other way round. Shortly after the start of Covisint, tier-1 suppliers, as well as
powerful actors in the automotive arena, built up a large standard-setting coalition.
Whereas Covisint was envisaged by its founders to "streamline" business processes
and to enable participants to "collaborate seamlessly", this was not necessarily the
perception of tier-1 suppliers. There were two reasons for this:
1. Firstly, most suppliers were excluded from the early development process.
Only a few of the largest and most powerful tier-1 suppliers were involved in
a limited way during a later stage of development. The decision-making
remained almost entirely with the OEMs. As a result, by and large suppliers'
requirements were neither part of the "Covisint vision", nor included in the
development of the standardised technology. Therefore, Covisint mainly
addressed the requirements of a few OEMs.
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2. Secondly, suppliers already struggled with a number of such "standardised"
portals, and the suppliers who had been approached at an early stage showed
mixed feelings about the OEMs' approach to volume bundling and pricing.
The shortcomings of Covisint triggered the tier-1 supplier community to set up
"SupplyOn," counterbalancing the OEMs' obvious power consolidation and the
"Goliath" marketplace Covisint. The vision for SupplyOn was the same as for
Covisint, namely to join forces, to bundle know-how, and to set up an industry wide
standard platform for e-commerce. But the target audience was different. SupplyOn
was marketed as an e-marketplace operated by suppliers for suppliers, expressing the
underlying argument that only a supplier understands the need of the supplier
community, not an OEM. Additionally, the founders of SupplyOn made it explicitly
clear from the beginning that they opposed the "quick and dirty approach" of doing
business, opting in contrast for an approach based on smaller but concrete step-by-
step efforts and results rather than big visions which, they argued, were often
impossible to implement. SupplyOn thus positioned itself in direct competition with
Covisint, representing the suppliers' approach to the development of a standardised
industry wide portal.
7.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter the MSID framework and a number of specific concepts were
developed to discuss, analyse and eventually present in a simplified way the very
complex socio-technical setting of the empirical case study. First, the framework was
applied to the project configuration and identified the areas shaping it from the
beginning. The final DC portal strategy appeared to be largely patterned by its
history, which we traced from the pre-project phase, and the context within which the
portal was embedded. Elence, the decision based on corporate history and context to
'outsource' the supplier portal to Covisint subsequently shaped the whole project and
led to a dynamics and additional influencing factors. For example, the lock-in of
existing practices and technologies at DC and the diverse strategies of the key actors
negotiating the 'Best practice industry processes'. Negotiations and the distributed
decision-making were influenced by interpretations and transformations of ideas,
visions and interests on departmental and individual levels. This led to a shift of the
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project goals and had both expected and unexpected effects on the outcomes for all
actors of the standardisation arena.
This chapter has developed and applied a theoretical framework to explain the
dynamics of standard development and implementation. The application of the
framework to a specific case study - the development ofCovisint in the automotive
industry - has allowed the researcher to explain the way concepts can be applied to
understand complex information systems dynamics via empirical research. The
theoretical and practical implications that accrued from this analysis are explored in




This thesis has examined the socio-technical dynamics and outcomes of an ICT
innovation, a standardised portal technology. The complex socio-technical setting of
the empirical case represented a highly challenging analytical endeavour. The
analysis drew upon Jorgensen's arena concept (1999) and Whipp and Clark's firm-
in-sector framework (1986) to develop a new framework to explicate the influence of
the socio-technical setting over the life cycle of standardised portal technology as
well as the Social Shaping of Technology (SST) perspective. The model attempts to
expand the understanding of the socio-technical dynamics which pattern both the
decision- making processes and the outcomes of complex ICT innovation projects.
The thesis has a number of important findings that are both theoretical and empirical
and concern the nature of ICT innovation dynamics in the context of a complex
multi-spaced setting.
The major challenge in analysing the portal standardisation process was to produce
an account which included interaction between the actors in the particular setting.
The model that was developed assisted by enabling an actor-centred account
embedded in the industry context, and also served as a flexible tool to simplify the
presentation of the case and to answer the research questions.
The research presented in this thesis sought to answer the three research questions
proposed in the introduction:
■ What are the factors that shape the emergence of an inter-organisational
portal strategy?
■ What causes the dynamics in developing and implementing a standardised
supplier portal?
■ How do these dynamics pattern the outcomes? How does local change take
part in the wider context of the sector?
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The study proposed that the organisational politics of decision-making processes
between the actors involved in standardised portal development and implementations
patterned the dynamics and the subsequent outcomes of the standardisation process.
To support this argument a single case study of the development and implementation
of standardised portal technology in the automotive industry was presented. The
study highlighted the role that misunderstandings, the pursuing of various interests,
the conflict and power struggles between the actors play in shaping their actions, and
ultimately the outcomes of standardisation process. The analysis showed that the
unfolding outcomes are shaped by the dynamics taking place in the distinct phases
before and during the project. These dynamics explain the trade-offs and the partial
failure of the portal standardisation process both to achieve an industry-wide
standard and to benefit the companies involved.
The aim of this final chapter is to present the implications of the findings for practice
and theory. The chapter will proceed as follows. The next section will discuss the
contribution of the analytical model developed to theory. In the subsequent section,
the dynamics in portal standardisation is reflected upon in the light of the theories
that were used and consists of a discussion about configurations and the management
of expertise. Subsequently, the complex trade-offs of the project, including the global
versus the local aspect of a global solution and the role of 'best practice industry
processes' are discussed, followed by a short reflection on actor's individual career
advancement through projects and their effects. The limitations of the study which
arise mostly from the research design as well as the areas for further research are
identified are then discussed. Finally, implications for practice drawn from the case
and some closing remarks conclude this chapter.
8.2 Findings and contribution to knowledge
The findings of this thesis have both theoretical and practical implications. The next
sections present the theoretical and practical implications of each of the three
research questions.
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8.2.1 Theoretical contribution - the MSID framework of analysis
The analysis of the dynamics of the standard lifecycle and the complex socio-
technical setting presented in the previous chapters required to develop a framework
- the Multi-level Space of Innovation Dynamics (MSID) framework.
However, an analytical framework has to fulfil a number of criteria due to the fact
that dynamism and complexity of standardisation set specific challenges for theory
building. According to Fomin et al. (2003) these criteria should address the openness
of the framework and its ability to capture the essential features of the
standardisation process and its outcomes. Also, the concepts used within the
framework should take into consideration the standardisation agreements related to
technical artefacts, the involvement ofmultiple activities (including decision-making
and technical construction). Furthermore, a framework should include the change of
the standardisation process over time and space and across a set of diverse actors
who do not necessarily share the same interests (Fomin et al., 2003). In the following
subsection, I will therefore reflect on these criteria, an analytical tool has to fulfil,
and the degree to which they were included in the analytical framework developed in
this thesis.
A number of different analytical frameworks have been used in the standardisation
literature to address the development and, less often, the implementation and use of
standards (e.g. David & Steinmueller, 1994; Schmidt & Werle, 1998; etc). However,
as previously discussed in the methodology and in the analysis chapter, most of these
frameworks employ a static perspective and address the development process in
isolation from the context of standards use. The challenge in analysing the
standardisation process is to produce an adequate evolving account of the complex
dynamics surrounding the standards; an account which includes the standard
planning, development and implementation. In addition, most of the existing
frameworks offer a rather narrow and restricted account which did not match the
complex socio-technical setting of the study and therefore called for the development
of a new framework. Consequently, the development of a new analytical tool
combining the strengths of different existing frameworks was the approach to cope
with the above mentioned challenges.
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The new model developed, illustrated in Figure 37 and Figure 38 was already
described in the analysis chapter (section 7.1)
'Zoom in' - The micro level of analysis
Figure 37. The micro level of analysis of the framework developed
'Zoom out' - The meso level of analysis
IT Supply
Figure 38. The meso level of analysis of the framework developed
The MSID framework draws upon Jorgensen's (1999) concept of "development
arena", the firm-in-sector framework ofWhipp and Clark (1986) and the concept of
drift of Ciborra et al. (2000). Fomin et al's (2003) criteria list mentioned above was
useful as it enables the researcher to check whether the developed model fulfils the
criteria for theory-building to tackle the dynamic aspect in a standard lifecycle.
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The new model developed in this thesis serves as an analytical device to support and
extend the understanding of the course of events that take place in a complex socio-
technical setting during the entire standard lifecycle. The novelty herein consists of
the interlinkages between structure and action and a micro and meso level of
analysis. These interlinkages represent the principal strength of the model. Mapped
to the list of criteria enumerated by Fomin et al. (2003), another strength of the
framework is that it benefits from the application of the notion of "development
arena" to explain the evolution of standards as a result of competition and co¬
operation between different networks of actors (Jorgensen & Sorensen, 2002). This
concept fulfils simultaneously most of the criteria, for example openness or different
levels of analysis.
Mirrored with the requirements for theory-building, the arena concept is
characterised by openness and is able to take all necessary aspects into consideration;
it encompasses not only the whole standardisation process taking place in one space
but allows for different spaces and configurations as well as diverse actors pursuing
divergent interests, visions and knowledge. Additionally, the concept addresses the
evolution and change of a standard throughout the entire lifecycle shaped by
configurations which can be re-configured as well as influenced by decision makings
of the actors patterning the outcomes. To apply the concept of Jorgensen (1999) is
useful because it spans an innovation space holding together the settings and
relations that comprise the context for product or process development. However, the
concept can be criticised for two aspects. First, there is an uncertainty in terms of the
correct level of analysis if there are a number of different development spaces of
innovation at the same time. Therefore, the identification of the innovation space
depends on the time the research is done. Furthermore, to include the entire life cycle
of a standard may change the biography of the standard because different sorts of
actors in different spaces shape the decision making in terms of the choices
concerning the implementation of the standard (for example, whether and how it is
implemented). These choices might in turn decide if a standard takes up or not.
Decision-making during the implementation phase can be far removed from the
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standard setting context (VoB et al., 2002). The actors involved may not see
themselves as acting in relation to standards systems insofar as these aspects may be
ancillary to their main concern to build systems (and may indeed be bundled up
inside the choice of particular artefacts and systems). As a result, it was important to
develop a language that can more effectively capture the multi-level analysis needed
to do justice to a dynamic analysis of standards.
In addition, I would like to add to the 'list of requirements' for theory building the
'flexible granularity' in order to enhance the perspective of analysis. The concept of
granularity has been applied to standardisation and classification by Bowker and Star
(1999), who note that classifications need to allow for change and permeability on
different levels of granularity, but also can impose restrictions (Bowker & Star,
1999). Flexible granularity can be explained as giving the framework an appropriate
level of granularity to create a language analysing the information of the case. Events
driven by the dynamics on the micro level, such as in a project on company level,
have effects on the industry community on the meso level. This in turn affects events
on the sector/meso level, such as directives worked out by associations influence
supplier organisations on the micro level. Consequently, the flexibility to zoom in
and zoom out on a micro and meso level allows for a better understanding of
complex configurations and interactions and therefore increases the degree to
identify issues on both levels.
The flexibility in the granularity of analysis is indispensable in the exploration of the
case. Applied to the planning, development and implementation of standardised
technology, it is thus understood to facilitate the analysis of the micro phenomenon
(e.g. patterns of local requirements of the standard) and the macro phenomenon (e.g.
a standard as cutting across inter-organisational contexts within on a wider scale of
the sector or even on a global scale).
'Zoom in' and 'zoom out' on both of the levels enabled the researcher to flexibly
focus either on a particular event or a chain of events on the micro level or on the
meso level to identify and follow the dynamics and the subsequent outcomes.
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Furthermore, the new criterion ofmapping the 'global-local' argument and the two-
way direction of dynamics had brought in the 'firm-in-sector' perspective ofWhipp
and Clark (1986). In their study, they analysed the process of innovation in the
automotive industry from a product, process and work organisation perspective.
Their research found that an organisation disposes of an 'organisational repertoire'
consisting of company-specific knowledge to coordinate everyday activities,
activities associated with change and activities undertaken in response to special
situations such as the development and implementation of a new standard.
Depending on the standard, the organisation will adopt differing 'poses'. The
adoption of a new standard may transform the existing basic operational pose of the
repertoire. However, change in the repertoire through a new standard is linked to a
certain degree of uncertainty. The new standard may be compromised due to
resistance, or be problematic because of the absence of necessary technical
knowledge or expertise.
This, in turn, might shape not only the outcomes but also points to the fact that some
configurations and re-configurations in the standardisation arena are more likely to
happen than others. Configurations in this context might not be compared to large
scale technical systems in which elements are tightly coupled and where the coupling
is imperfect and contradictory (Russell & Williams, 2002). The company-specific
repertoire includes a mixture of organisational and technical expertise and
knowledge gained in former projects. In addition, the context in which a company is
embedded influences and drives the actors and their decision-making. As a
consequence, the decisions taken pattern the outcomes, and might differ from the
desired outcomes envisaged at the beginning of the process.
The exploration of the dynamics of standard setting - including a global and local
perspective - enabled the discovery of a drift between the expected and unexpected
outcomes. The increasing network of single organisations supported by global IT
infrastructures has stimulated research on the dynamics of large information
infrastructures, as Ciborra et al. (2000) have shown, for example. A number of
researchers have looked on the complex process of linking large-scale information
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infrastructures of single organisations within a global web characterised by
externalities and interdependencies. In context with this research, most notably with
regard to an increasing globalisation and strategic alignment of actors, the idea of
drift, formulated in the dialectics between local moves and macro outcomes (Ciborra
& Hanseth, 2000) has been enhanced by this study. In looking in detail at the nature
of drift, its different levels, its direction and the circumstances in which drifts occur
we are able to get a better understanding of the phenomenon and the related
paradoxes.
The MSID framework developed in this thesis allowed us to incorporate paradoxes,
which are the results of trade-offs, as the framework attempted to explain the
circumstances shaping the dynamics of standardised technology on a micro level.
Those circumstances may lead subsequently to a directed drift in the outcomes on
both of the analytical levels. Moreover, the framework explained the importance of
recognising history of pre-project phases and contextual aspects. This is important
because both pre-project phases and the context of the standardisation project guided
the actors in their decision-making choices which subsequently pattern the outcomes
of the standardisation project process.
In the next subsection, the key findings of the study are reflected upon in relation to
the theories used in the framework developed.
8.2.2 The organisational politics of decision-making processes
The previous subsection laid out the theoretical argumentation justifying a new
theoretical framework to present the standardisation arena and to understand the
dynamics within the different phases of the life cycle of standardised technology.
Within the study, the dynamics issue of standardised technology was addressed,
particularly with a focus on the entire life cycle including planning, development and
implementation. The discussion in chapter two has shown that existing research on
standardisation has largely ignored both a life cycle-based approach on standard-
setting as well as the integration of the dynamics aspect in and between the various
stages in a standard life time. The developed theoretical framework captured the
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complex socio-technical setting and combined both the structure and the interaction
in order to identify the unfolding of organisational politics of decision-making
related to socio-technical processes.
The findings in the analysis chapter (section 7.3.1) answered the first research
question concerning the factors that shape the emergence of an inter-organisational
portal strategy. The study revealed that besides the historical factor (the pre-project
stage) and the context factor (external and internal), the configuration of the
standardisation arena is a significant factor in shaping an inter-organisational portal
strategy. Therefore, in the subsequent subsection, the role of configurations as an
element of the MSID framework is reflected upon.
The role of configurations (structure)
In Chapter Two, different studies focusing on the aspect of structure as element of
organisations have been presented with regard to change and innovations (e.g.
Staunton & Clark, 1989; Edwards, 2000). The concept of structure highlights the
stable aspects of company organisations incorporating individuals that learn a
collective repertoire of cognitions, normative frameworks and behavioural patterns
(Clark & Staunton, 1989). Therefore, organisational structures pattern and influence
innovation processes depending on the configuration of actors and artefacts. As the
standardisation process in the study occurred at the intersection of structures of
signification, legitimacy and domination, and was embedded in the network and
social relations within and across organisations, it was necessary to examine the
configuration aspect of the elements which patterned the process.
The analysis of the GSP project has shown that, as suggested by Jorgensen and
Sorensen (1999), the planning, development and implementation of an ICT
innovation such as the standardised portal technology, is part of an innovation space.
Within this innovation space, a configuration and re-configuration of actors, their
relations, networks and artefacts occurs. The 'standardisation arena' space in this
study includes actors within and outside the standardisation arena, the different
networks of key players, and their visions and knowledge which are translated into
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the standardised portal technology. Jorgensen's concept of the "development arena"
idea has been useful in this respect as it highlights the complexity of the spaces in
which standards development and implementation processes are worked out, and the
possibility that developments will set off radical re-configurations of the
relationships between players and of the overall arena itself.
However, the "arena" concept, though offering a step forwards from more simplified
conceptualisations of the spaces where actors interact (as for example in early ANT
analysis), does not wholly resolve the conceptual and epistemological issues that
such actor-centred explanations face (see chapters two and seven). The arena concept
is therefore limited in its analytical level. To overcome these shortcomings, the
framework developed here has been enhanced by including two levels of analysis to
explain the innovation space.
The MSID framework that I have applied to the case suggested different alternative
configurations of actors and relations. The micro level of analysis represents the
project level of the study and points to a variety of conceivably alternative project
configurations in the standardisation arena. For example, the inclusion of selected
actors or network present in the standardisation arena; or, a configuration where
some players are only included for special tasks and excluded for others. The former
may well delay project timelines, whereas the latter is difficult to implement in
practice. In addition, the aspect of temporality also shapes configurations. A
particular configuration first may pay more attention to what temporary
contingencies and later (through re-configuration) may focus on a long-term
structural change.
The findings of the study, however, indicate that some configurations are more likely
to happen than others. More specifically, the project configuration as it was set-up in
the project was largely patterned by the three factors of pre-project phase and the
external (market) and internal (organisational structure) context. In general, projects
are drivers of change and their initiation reflects the goals that the project sets to
achieve. The global supplier portal project was not a conventional project but a Meta
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project consisting of different sub-projects. Consequently, the sophisticated project
configuration was beyond usual project set-ups and mirrored not only the complex
organisational structure ofDC but also had to consider the structures of Covisint.
The project configuration that I have studied reflected the experiences of previous
projects made in the pre-project phase.
The temporality aspect seemed to play an important role. History and context-based
experience of internal key actors were configured with external actors in order to get
a solution for business and technical requirements on a short-term basis. This
combination, however, was the first action to meet deadlines exposed by the top
management. In a long-term perspective, external actors would be excluded after
certain objectives were reached and the standardisation arena was re-configured.
The top management intended to profit from lessons learnt in avoiding failures and to
gain the legitimacy that was important for the project's success. One step was to
include all key players and to 'be' key players to capitalise from their expertise and
know-how, and to get their commitment to the project to make it a success.
Additionally, top managers were aware of the fact that the global supplier portal
project was a strategic project because, for the first time, an IT project of this
dimension has been outsourced to a third party. Top management expected
considerable resistance from some of the key players. Their resistance to the project
was explained based on their fears of losing power and control as the outsourcing of
the project, which meant that they were losing ownership over critical resources.
Their discourse, however, was expressed in terms of technical expertise rather than
in terms of their desires to maintain control over resources (which is reflected upon
in the next subsection of the role of power and management of expertise).
Nevertheless, applying the enhanced analytical framework allowing for a flexible
zoom in and zoom out on both levels, some difficulties were encountered during the
analysis. As with the 'development arena' concept of Jorgensen (1999), it still
remained unclear whether the nexus of standards development to be analysed is
Covisint (that originally was supposed to deliver standardised best practice
processes) or DC; equally is there a single development arena or are there multiple
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parallel histories of development. The solutions presented by Covisint were far away
from being mature and did undergo significant changes during the course of the
project. For example, the portal registration process was adapted to the requirements
ofDC, although the original version developed successfully by Covisint began to be
implemented by other participating OEMs. Another example appeared to reverse the
nexus of development from DC to Covisint. The technical platform change driven by
DC underlining their interests in security forced Covisint to re-develop some of their
original offered best practice procurement processes. Thus, a quasi-standard software
platform developed by DC led to a re-configuration of the nexus of development. In
addition, due to the fact that development and implementation of the standardised
technology was blurred, it seemed that multiple centres were shaping the arena. The
supposed to be industry standard developed by Covisint was adapted to DC needs by
the programming of IBM. Therefore, analytically it was difficult to detect where
development ended and implementation started and what really is understood in the
term 'best practice'.
The discussion in the next subsection reflects on the role that the power and expertise
of the key players has played in shaping project configuration.
The role of power and expertise of key actors
Apart from the configurations in the standardisation arena, the analytical framework
enabled the identification of the interaction of key players in translating their visions
and knowledge into artefacts. Herein, power and expertise turned out to play a
significant role in the study. Power and expertise were found to be critical variables
that shaped the decisions made by actors, thereby explaining the reasons why some
decisions became more likely and important than others, and also explaining why
some other decisions are never taken. Their role is discussed in the following
paragraphs.
As the study revealed, DC as an organisation acted as kind of a 'Meta actor' and the
participant departments such as DCXnet, GP&S and IT were the key actors shaping
the decision-making during the course of the project. The micro level of analysis
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allowed for a processual understanding of the unfolding power in decision-making
processes during the negotiations of the standardised technology. As analysed in the
previous chapter, these negotiations were characterised by tensions between the key
actors caused by conflicting departmental objectives, such as power over resources
or technical expertise on the one hand and individual interests such as career
advancements on the other.
At this point, on a micro level of analysis that seeks to understand the behaviour of
key players during the negotiations, it is useful to examine the job position of key
actors within the organisation. Closely linked with the aspect of a particular job
position is individual expertise or the expertise of a group of individuals (e.g.
technical experts), which is related to that the power of that individual or group.
According to the project configuration reflected upon in the previous paragraphs, the
project team included a balanced mix of actors with technical and non-technical
skills and expertise. Due to the lessons learnt in the pre-project phase, the
management of skills and expertise indicated the professionalism of the TM: the key
actors included IT with significant technical expertise, the GP&S department with
the procurement know-how and the DCXnet - which coordinated the project as
change agent on behalf of the TM and had significant expertise in change
management and e-business implementation. However, as described in chapter 7,
during the negotiations and the decision-making of the best practice processes strong
tensions occurred between the key actors, due to technical issues.
As discussed in chapter two, researchers have found that knowledge, power and
politics play a very significant role during the process of innovation. For example,
Hislop et al. (2000) revealed how hierarchical power and politics shaped a wide
range of issues such as the scope of change, issues of agenda formation, type of
people involved in (and excluded from) the decision-making processes, the value that
was attached to particular bodies of knowledge, and the way meaning was managed
to justify the decisions made and therefore the whole pattern of the process of
innovation (Hislop et ah, 2000). In the same line of argument Fleck and Tierney
(1991) claimed the concept of technical expertise and its management in terms of
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power and knowledge: expertise is situated and embodied, continually renegotiated
amongst social groups (Fleck & Tierney, 1991).
In exactly this context, the research findings suggest that different sorts of power
patterned the course of the project and were identified as key factors of the dynamics.
Although the IT department was the most experienced department from a technical
(power of expertise and knowledge) point of view, the TM (power of authority)
pulled the strings within Covisint (via DCXnet) and provided DCXnet with the
budget (economic power) as well as with the official leadership of the project
(transferred hierarchical power from the TM). Further, most of the issues were of a
technical nature, which explains the large degree of involvement of the IT
department as well as the number of tensions during the negotiations based on a
multiplicity of power sources. IT could therefore not use its large technical expertise
to increase its power.
The efforts of IT to use its technical expertise to maintain its power have failed. In
the end the vision ofTM to outsource the project succeeded, despite the opposition
of the IT department - although the exact shape of the project was not as TM
originally intended. The decision to outsource the portal to Covisint weakened the
position of the IT department. Outsourcing of IT meant that systems appeared to be
developed by a third party. The role of the IT department within an organisation had
changed from designer to implementer. Especially after 2000, the significant
reduction in the IT budgets coupled with the trend towards IT outsourcing led to
significant erosion in the power held by IT departments both in terms of lower
financial resources and lower responsibilities and control of IT development and
design activities. The DC IT department was the owner of the entire IT architecture,
technical security, solutions (software and hardware), related budget and manpower.
For them outsourcing meant a re-distribution of power over processes, solutions and
resources to Covisint. Consequently, outsourcing weakened their power position
within DC. Technical knowledge and expertise no longer counted as an asset for the
IT departments and the effects of that were reflected back in the outcomes. The
industry-wide e-commerce platform Covisint was supposed not only to manage
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procurement and supplier relationships, but it also replaced company specific IT
systems. As such, the introduction of Covisint led to changes in the distribution of
power between the different departments within the organisation such as the
procurement and the IT department. These changes in intra-organisational power
relationships ultimately explain not only the tensions during the negotiations, but
also the shifts in expected outcomes and the occurrence of unexpected ones.
In the next section we discuss the extent to which the organisational politics and the
decision-making embedded between standardisation arena configurations and the
power and expertise of key players patterned the outcomes of the study.
8.2.3 The complex trade-offs of the study
Intermediary results - contradictory outcomes
The study revealed some interesting findings in the attempt to answer the last two
research questions (which address the aspect of how dynamics pattern the outcomes
and how local change takes place within the broader context of the sector). In
applying the model to the empirical case, the research was confronted with
paradoxical and contradictory outcomes related, in the first instance, to the micro
level of analysis - the portal project and the deliverables. As shown in chapter two,
paradoxes have already been studied in the context of the implementation of global
large-scale infrastructures, for example by Ciborra et al. (2000). Williams (1997) had
also explored the tensions and contradictions in the mutual shaping of technology
and work organisation linked with universal solutions and local contingencies.
A closer inspection of these contradictions showed the existence of trade-offs
between the original project objectives and the outcomes and enabled the research to
uncover the circumstances in which they occurred. It seems that there is a link
between the dynamics driven by the shifts, the trade-offs and the final outcomes.
The trade-offs were caused primarily for two reasons: first, by a number of
competing concerns about portal functionalities on an organisational and on an
individual level and, second, by the interconnectedness of an intra- and inter-
organisational world, incorporating collaboration and competition and a mixture of
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both. Those complex trade-offs patterned the outcomes or were at least providing
surprises (as, for example, in the case of the organisational re-integration ofDCXnet
in the GP&S department). Thus, apart from the paradox observed of one nexus as
centre of standardised technology development versus multiple histories discussed in
the previous subsection, the following reflections focus on the global - local and
intra - inter-organisational paradox as a result of globalisation.
Globalisation is characterised by expanding markets, global acting companies and
cross-boarder investment and technology transfer. This raises questions about where
it comes from and what the dialectics are between local moves and macro outcomes
(Ciborra et ah, 2000). In studying the dynamics of corporate information
infrastructures, the authors unveiled unintended "management games" that govern
the adoption of infrastructures in large bureaucratic corporations as well as "the
assessment of the role technology played in reinforcing existing power structures"
(ibid: 1). The authors suggested that the complex process of IT networking in an
organisation cannot be understood by applying traditional approaches for mechanical
companies because IT is highly configurational and bureaucracies are also
decomposed in hierarchical layers. Corporate IT architectures are embedded in larger
"contextual puzzles" where patching and alignment of heterogeneous actors, and
"bricolage" were used frequently regardless ofmanagement strategies (Ciborra &
Hanseth, 2000).
The management strategy aspect is exactly the point where I want to take up the
discussion to bring in another perspective and reflect upon the strategic choice of an
organisation: the adoption of a global solution which inherently is built upon
standards while in parallel, to collaborate with its competitors in order to develop and
implement further this global solution in the standardisation arena.
The role of strategy - the choice of standardised technology
The answer to the first research question had revealed the factors leading to the
emergence of an inter-organisational strategy. One of the roots of the contradictory
outcomes identified can be found in company strategies, both at a corporate and at a
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departmental level. The findings indicated a strong importance of the pre-project
phase, context and history and were discussed in the section above. These findings
are strongly related to the contradictory aspects and tensions discussed here.
Before ICT gradually emerged in organisations, the business world provided two
alternative options for companies regarding managing the relationship with their
business partners: either to develop tight, collaborative relationships with a buyer /
supplier organisation or engaging in competing, arm's length relationships with
another organisation.
In the automotive industry, the OEMs-supplier relationships were historically
characterised by significant power imbalances against suppliers. For example, the
adoption ofEDI in the automotive industry was in general forced by OEMs on their
dependent suppliers (Ratnasingam, 2000; Webster, J., 1995). However, since the late
1990s, relationships in the automotive industry were reshaped by tremendous
technological changes and by enormous market pressures (McKinsey, 2003). Tighter
collaboration between OEMs and suppliers were replacing the traditional arm's
length relationship. There were two major drivers behind the Covisint vision. First,
each OEM had an extensive network of suppliers. They, in turn, frequently supplied
more than one OEM. In this situation, bi-lateral standardisation of the complex
processes and technology that enable the co-operation both between OEMs and
suppliers and between different suppliers is less than effective, as it would leave
suppliers with the need to maintain one system per OEM.
The buy-in ofDC in the vision of Covisint as an e-marketplace that aimed to set a de
facto standard with best practice industry processes seemed very attractive. For
several reasons it was a strategic option ofDC to be a shareholder of Covisint. First,
it represented a financial engagement (along with other financial participations in
Internet companies) which could pay back high interest rates and represented a very
strong commitment in this affair. Second, it was a demonstration ofpower for the
entire automotive industry to build an alliance with two major competitors; in a sense
to indicate directions. In line with the corporate strategy of being a technology
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leader, DC wanted to demonstrate that it had understood the innovation signals of the
Internet and its technologies. DC found itself in the same situation as the other OEMs
in terms of improving the supplier relationship and cutting down cost, so why not an
alliance and join forces with competitors? Third, when Covisint as an idea emerged,
the promise of Internet technologies was to help DC to reorganise internal and
external business processes. Consequently, Covisint was a means to an end,
supposed to enforce process harmonisation through the introduction of best practice
processes and standardisation of ICT infrastructure across the corporation.
In the end, however, it can be argued that the management strategy was taken into
consideration and played an important role in the choice of the positioning ofDC
within the sector. However, the strategic choice to collaborate with competitors
aimed to benefit from the incentives of sharing cost and risk and to solve internal IT
issues. Those IT issues then were significantly hampering the implementation of the
standardised portal and were driving the dynamics. The reason for this was that the
collaboration strategy chosen by DC led to compromises instead of a demonstration
of power (in setting a flag with an industry standard). First, DC had not anticipated
before the real effort of being involved in the development processes themselves.
Secondly, top management had not foreseen that the implementation of the
standardised solution would collide, for example with security concerns of the IT
department, and would consequently lead to tough negotiations of single security
aspects ending in compromises that were forced upon DC by the IT department. The
causes of those compromises are considered in the next subsection.
Global solutions and the local adoption of best practice
In reference to the global best practice processes, an alignment of divergent interests
was found to have significantly hampered the project progress. Associated with the
cumbersome negotiations of single deliverables was the loss of control over
resources and consequently over power experienced on the intra-organisational level
(DC IT) in favour of an external player (Covisint). Triggered by negotiations, the
various competing concerns with regard to the standardised solution were causing
tensions between the key players. According to Ciborra and Hanseth (2000), apart
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from the globalisation aspect, the strategic alignment of key actors is responsible for
the drift of planned and actual outcomes as well as for surprises: delays and
unintended consequences, sudden oppositions and the imperfect attempt to align all
stakeholders (ibid: 7).
The findings from the study suggest that the idea of a "best practice" solution to the
development and implementation of a standardised technology should be reassessed,
as the development and implementation of standardised portal technology depends
on the individual situation of an organisation, and it is difficult to extrapolate a
generic "best practice". Furthermore, the findings align with existing literature
related to best practice processes such as Sorensen and Williams (2002) who argue
that 'best practice industry processes' constitute of a 'technology developed around a
template ofwork practices from the context of their early development and use'.
These processes become confronted with user organisations and 'often proved to be
stable where methods of operation become entrenched in working and management
practices and in the cultures of organisations' (Sorensen & Williams, 2002: 226).
This very strong evidence calls for a rethinking of the whole concept of a 'best
practice industry standard' propagated by Covisint and the proponents within DC.
An argument against 'best practice' is that the context in which such standardised
processes are developed and implemented (e.g. pressure for collaboration in the
automotive industry and cost reductions), the characteristics of the organisations
involved (e.g. strategy and people involved) and the nature the technology itself (e.g.
technical characteristics such as functionality) are linked together to determine a
particular avenue that the technology development and implementation process
follows. As Williams (1997) stated, the decisions and the choices vary as technology
moves across social settings and across barriers of'colliding' institutions of suppliers
and user companies (Williams, 1997).
In this case, the best practice industry processes were taken as a sort of basic
processes but adapted to the needs ofDC. In what concerns the role of Covisint, they
did not stop DC and during the course of the project overtook the altered processes
which in turn had consequences for other members of Covisint. However, without
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the offered best practice standard solutions of Covisint the final 'glocalised' versions
of those business standards would have never seen the light of day. Perhaps other
shareholders of Covisint benefited from them?
Additionally, it has to be questioned whether best practices industry process
standards offered by e-marketplaces such as Covisint really support organisations in
their objectives to re-build their supply chain business processes. In the case
presented, none of the deliverables of Covisint's standard solution were accepted
without any change. From a technical point of view, this led to a much more complex
technical architecture than it was before, which runs counter the original goal of a
standardised IT architecture.
At the local level, the adoption of Covisint's best practice processes led to the
occurrence of another phenomenon: the loss of control over internal resources. A
consequence of the interconnectedness between the intra-organisational and the inter-
organisational level led to a loss of control over resources and consequently of power
originally controlled by the IT department.
Global solutions and the local adoption - the role of loss of control
According to mainstream economic literature, as well as to the case studies published
by the IT vendors, IT is supposed to deliver substantial gains when linked into larger
networks, as well as leading to a greater level of control over business processes.
Furthermore, most of the management literature consists of concepts that deal with
enhancement and extension of control over processes. However, control is difficult to
achieve not only because of the globalisation and the vast complexity of the
infrastructures, but also due to individual and organisational limitations and to the
contextual power relationships. Finally, these aspects lead to a drift in outcomes
envisaged at the outset of the project (Ciborra & Hanseth, 2000).
Particularly, the standardisation of infrastructure is claimed to incorporate network
externalities which means that control over an infrastructure can be only partial. The
diffusion of an infrastructure has its own accelerations and slow-downs, in a way that
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is only indirectly correlated to the decisions made by the resource-owners. At this
point the findings of this study align with the findings of Ciborra et al. (2000).
However, although the level of control certainly was a big issue in the project and
was translated in the negotiations between the different key players, it was
particularly limited to one important key player: the IT department.
The drift of control over IT processes from DC IT to Covisint led to a very complex
IT architecture and was far from being the harmonised and the cheaper solution
envisaged at the beginning of the project. On the technical level, the IT architecture
became significantly more complex and more expensive as before. Technical
complexities, particularly in the area of security, patterned most of the outcome. Due
to the required high level of security, and due to the fact that DC IT did not trust
Covisint and constructed a fall-back solution in case of a breakdown ofCovisint, the
harmonisation of the IT infrastructure could not be achieved.
As described in subsection 7.3.3., the portal led to a re-distribution of power and
control between the different departments on an intra-organisational level in favour
of the inter-organisational level - control of IT processes and facilities was shifted
from DC to Covisint. In the end, the competition over control and power led to the
partial failure of the technology change. Finally, the global supplier portal was much
more expensive than the solutions before and the goal to achieve a harmonised and
standardised infrastructure led to a very complex IT architectural monster;
Furthermore, Covisint failed to establish a de facto industry standard in the
automotive industry.
As already reflected upon in the previous subsection, control was strongly related to
the power aspect of negotiations and shaped the dynamics of the standardised portal
technology. Power aspects in particular play a significant role when the ICT
innovation such as the portal is developed and partly operated by a third party.
However, in terms of ownership of control and the level of it, a pressing question in
this context remains: who are the actors who control the project? How is control
distributed amongst the key actors in a global network? And what are the
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consequences related to a shift in control (for example, the impact of control over
access to and ownership of resources)?
The character of directed drift
As the framework implies and the analysis in the previous chapter have illustrated, a
directed drift such as a change in the project goals does not automatically lead to
chaos. In this study, the drift was directed by the circumstances and meant a shift
from the original planned outcomes to the outcomes reached, either expected or
unintended. In addition, the drift-triggering elements patterned the final outcomes,
but did not determine them. In consequence, this meant that outcomes did not
completely differ from the original plans. The reason for this is well-founded in the
configurations, events and actions of the key players which were more likely to
happen than others. This was largely based on the fact of the pre-project phase and
the context in which the project took place had driven the decision-making of the
actors.
However, the size of the project in this case and the volume of complex expertise
that was partly outsourced showed a large amount of responsibility and control for
the change project. Although DC had chosen a very professional approach to
introduce a very sophisticated project management, trade-offs and the directed drifts
within the project were unavoidable. One reason certainly was the large size of the
global project and the overarching socio-technical complexity. Another reason was
that drifts can be considered as a normal part of every project occurring during the
course of events which can not be anticipated before.
What the MSID framework can and cannot achieve
The MSID framework could have been developed from different perspectives. In
order to limit the analysis I introduced the DC perspective. From a Covisint
perspective, a totally different picture, for example in terms of the nexus of
technology development, would have been illustrated. The exclusive DC perspective
was one limitation of the research design and the analytical framework, which had
significant consequences, such as a limited explanation of the role played by other
actors.
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In studying drift and dynamics as a phenomenon during the diffusion of information
infrastructures, Ciborra et al. (2000) suggest that the "interplay between the
interveningfactors is too complex and no model can capture the dynamics and their
final outcome which remain open and highly dependent upon local circumstances "
(ibid: 7). The development of the model applied to the empirical case aimed for two
goals. First, it was understood as an attempt to structure the sheer complexity of the
socio-technical setting. The mapping out of different levels allowed for a better
understanding of the political processes within the standardisation arena patterning
the outcomes. Secondly, the model provided a language to discuss the complex
trade-offs as part of the outcomes; for example the global - local paradox. The model
was not developed to solve the complex system of drift because the fix of one of the
shaping factors of dynamics would have started another set of problems. This clearly
was beyond the scope of this study and will be a topic for further research.
Summary
In a very detailed way, the study highlighted these contradictions as a vital part of the
outcomes. They were grounded in the pursuit of various interests, underlying
conflicts and power struggles between the actors. They all played an important role
in explaining the partial failure of the standardised portals 'best practice industry
processes' both to achieve an industry-wide standard for standardised portal
technology and to benefit the companies involved. In the end, there was nothing left
of the global solution of best practice processes originally offered by Covisint. They
were completely adapted to the local needs ofDC which underpins the claims of
Ciborra and Hanseth (2000) that the goal to search for 'best practice' "is an illusion "
(ibid: 5). Any implementation of IT produces trade-offs; the trick is to balance the
extremes.
Within this chapter I have already deepened our understanding of the dynamics of
ICT innovations, while recapitulating the findings of the case analysed by applying
the framework that I have developed. The model flexibly allowed moving back and
forth between the micro and meso level of analysis. The zooming in and out revealed
that within the complex socio-technical setting a multi level game is at play. So far,
269
the study has found that apart from inter-organisational alignments between the key
players, intra-organisational alignments were taking place and were patterning the
subsequent outcomes. However, there is evidence throughout the entire study that
there is another level of alignment - the individual one. As Hutchins (1995) claims,
an individual is simultaneously involved in multiple histories. Human conduct is part
of the unfolding of a task, the development of the individual doing it, the
development of the work organisation, and the development of the professional
practice. Accordingly, no different layers or contexts exist because they all take place
in one and the same activity (Hutchins, 1995 cited in Hyysalo, 2004: 12).
When translated to the case this means that being part of a change project opens the
opportunity to acquire knowledge and build a certain reputation which then may well
be traded at a later point of time as expertise. As the individual alignment and the
trading of professional experience turned out to be an important finding of the study,
it will be analysed in the next subsection with a focus on personal career
advancement on change projects.
The actors' personal career advancement through projects
Over a time period of nine months the events shaped not only the course of the
project but also the individual career paths of portal team members, particularly for
those who were part ofDCXnet. Studying socio-technical change projects involves
not only new technologies that are shaped within the local context in an adopting
organisation, but also an awareness that these projects are subject to vulnerability and
need a more contextually-based understanding. In large organisations such as DC,
besides every day work, a number of projects are underway. The creation of a project
team is a specialised exercise in matching expertise as well as personalities to deliver
a service or design or to improve a product. Project-based teams are usually involved
in new knowledge creation or in the application of existing knowledge to a particular
situation. Often, project teams involve key individuals called 'change agents' who
are a legitimised group or persons who implement corporate strategies and change
programmes to drive organisational change. Within companies, change agency
usually has a very good reputation and is attractive for individuals because they
qualify for a better position after the change project and may advance their career in
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the case that the project had been successfully implemented. Within the development
and implementation of a socio-technical change programme, a change agent has
access to resources and often has the chance to advance his or her personal agenda.
This career advancement can either take place by getting access to new communities
of interest and new actors with influence, or by increasing knowledge and expertise.
In general, the change agent is concerned with managing organisational change in a
proactive way. This makes him/her an individual who is seen as the driver for change
in the organisation in contrast to those who are neutral or even actively resist change
(Buchanan & Storey, 1997). The challenge of a change agent is to 'unfreeze' existing
attitudes and behaviour which restrains change while executing a particular change
programme (McLoughlin, 1999).
However, the concept of change agency can be criticised for a number of reasons.
First, one question to answer is whether every actor involved in a socio-technical
change project can be the change agent. This question fundamentally implies the
underlying line of argumentation of the existence of a particular department dealing
with change. Secondly, it remains unclear if the individuals designated to fill-in the
change agents' role are really the right persons to do the job. As outlined in chapter
two, the role of a change agent requires a special skill set incorporating, for example,
communication skills to initiate, coordinate and facilitate change (Buchanan &
Storey, 1997). Thirdly, as Pettigrew et al. (1992) claimed, it is necessary for the
organisation in a broader contextual and historical sense to possess the 'capacity to
change' (Pettigrew et ah, 1992: 6 cited in McLoughlin, 1999: 77). Thus, the question
draws attention to the way in which change agents secure legitimacy through
political action. For the actor to gain legitimacy, intervention in the political and
cultural systems of organisations are required in order to engage in the 'management
ofmeaning' (McLoughlin, 1999: 78). These engagements include mobilising
aspects. However, these engagements are interpretative processes whereby change
agents construct their own vision of internal and external context (ibid).
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Nevertheless, despite the discussed pros and cons, change agency and the individuals
working as change agents are surrounded by a prestigious reputation within
organisations. Consequently, the reintegration of projects and the project team
members previously part of a change agent department in a departmental hierarchical
structure causes problems for the actors of both sides. The project team members
particularly change agents, experience difficulties in adapting to the hierarchy and
the everyday work in a formal structure as they have lost their prestigious status, for
example the proximity to the legitimated power in the corporation. From an
individual perspective, the reintegration of a project in a company's hierarchical
structure means loss of reputation and loss of access to power and resources;
including career advancement opportunities. For the individuals working in the
department, the situation is also very difficult. They have to work now on a daily
basis with former change agents who are supposed to be part of the elite of the
corporation. Personal integration of the change agents is difficult because they are
supposed to compete with departmental individuals for further career options and
positions in the hierarchy. In addition, reintegration of change agents in the formal
structure may lead to a serious slow-down of project progress and therefore the
success of the project might be in danger. Due to the fact that no further career
advancement is likely, former change agents completely lose their ambitions related
to the achievement of project objectives.
Existing literature points to the fact that expertise in relation to functional roles is not
only a result of individual's functional roles, but also in management strategy.
Moreover, it found that roles are constructed both through bottom-up and top-down
strategy as individuals pursue their own occupational and organisational interests
(Williams & Procter, 1998). The findings of the study partly confirm with this
research and suggest that although often large organisations use projects and project
champions to drive organisational change, their management may be problematic -
for example where top management suddenly changes their agenda and the project is
stopped or - like in the portal case - halfway through the complete project
organisation is reintegrated in the organisation's hierarchy. Expertise and the related
reputation is not only constructed but also validated through a two-way interaction in
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hierarchies and may lead to an expert reputation or higher status as well as to
conflicts of access to power and resources (Williams & Procter, 1998: 197). The re¬
integration of the change agency DCXnet decided by the TM was an unforeseen
event in a very early phase of the project. This decision was a political one and solely
reflected the TMs own agenda: due to the course of the project, the top management
decided that they could not advance their own personal agenda with the project and
therefore re-integrated the DCXnet department in the GP&S organisation.
As an immediate effect, this led to the slow-down of the project because the
individuals who were formerly change agents left the departments where they were
integrated - perhaps due to unhappiness about a different culture and a loss of
reputation to advance their own personal career. However, those types of people
have special knowledge and skills which also left and subsequently harmed the
project in the sense of achievement of deliverables. Heimer (1984) specifically
explored the issue of individual control over career development in project work
because in these settings, control over careers is particularly problematic. According
to Heimer, control over a career means control over a series of elements such as the
development of personal ability or recognition by top management. She claims that
no one can control a career as such and that career development depends on a series
of factors, some ofwhich facilitate individual control and others ofwhich are
constrained by organisational policies and larger forces (Heimer, 1984). Here
observation is confirmed here insofar as the expertise of the change agents of
DCXnet was locally constructed through the interplay between managerial strategies
(the decision to re-integrate the project within GP&S) and the occupational structures
(the project until a certain point), which, in turn, is enacted through political
economy of expertise within an organisation (ibid).
8.3 Implications for practice and closing remarks
The picture I have found was far removed from the simply technical or economic
rationalities envisaged by economic, strategic management or technocratic accounts.
The case-study highlighted instead the close interplay between the unfolding
standardisation effort and the complex socio-technical setting in the array of firms
involved, including supply chain relationships, the array of existing installed
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technologies, attendant relationships between technology supply, and the
complexities of inter-departmental and inter-organisational politics. These shaped
and moderated the processes of the entire lifecycle of standardised technology, its
evolution and outcomes within the course of the project.
Apart from the theoretical contribution, the case study has shown a number of
lessons learnt for practice regarding (1) standardisation and the so-called 'best
practice standard processes' in general, and (2) projects as drivers for technical
change as well as individual career advancement in particular.
(1) First, standardisation efforts are triggered by a complex array of technical and
organisational-political considerations. The standardisation process itself and
consequently the range of actors involved and their manner of involvement in the
process changed due to a re-configuration of key players and the solution within the
standardisation arena. Furthermore, standard business processes appear to suffer
significant transformations during implementation. Such transformations occur as a
result of the effort of the adopters of standards to fit the standards and consequently
the standardised technology to their specific needs and requirements. The most
immediate factor that appears to influence the nature of such transformations in the
character of the standardised technology during implementation is organisational
culture and the organisational repertoire (Whipp & Clark, 1986). The embedded rules
and procedures and the specific working practices within each organisation shape
and transform the best practice standard processes during the implementation stage.
The strong influence of the user organisations' culture and competing goals of the
actors during this process could be explained by the change in the locus of
standardisation process: whereas development takes place within the specific
standard development consortium, implementation takes place within the settings of
each individual organisation.
As suggested by Jorgensen and Sorensen (2002), as well as in this study, this may
lead to the result that technological fixes incorporate technological expectations and
visions and play an important role in terms of priorities assigned to development
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strategies and configurations of technical solutions. The number of competing goals
has led to compromises. Consequently, related to standardised business processes,
depending on a company's strategy, best practice can fit better or even not at all but
there is no 'one size fits all'. In addition, a clear allocation of responsibilities within
the organisations involved in the project has appeared as strong facilitator and/or
inhibitor of the success of standards implementation. Personal relationships facilitate
communication and understanding between actors, which ease the implementation
process. The lack of clear allocation of responsibilities within the participant
organisations was found to impede progress during implementation. Other factors
that have contributed to the delay or even failure of the implementation process were
the users' perception regarding technologies' benefits: if they are not clear, or were
perceived as distributed in an unbalanced way between actors, then progress is
hampered.
(2) Second, in today's organisations projects are a legitimised organisational form to
driving organisational and technical change. Due to technical advances in ICT and
market pressures caused by globalisation (such as business process outsourcing, or
'BPO'), the development and implementation of networked systems in large
organisations are increasing but are also remaining increasingly complex due to
social, political, economic and technical factors; for example a patch-worked IT
infrastructures or complex supply chain relationships. Although large organisations
are used to implement complex large-scale technology projects, they have to rethink
their strategy in terms of the normative project approaches applied to complex
project configurations. They might be sophisticated but they are only one component
to successfully achieve project goals defined in the beginning. Moreover, it had
turned out to be important to include into the project configuration a second
component: experiences and lessons learned from a pre-project phase or from similar
projects.
The adoption of new technologies is often characterised by the sheer complexity of
change management (taking into account divergent individual and departmental
goals) and leads to a drift from the original goals defined. The pursuit ofpersonal
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career goals can hamper project timelines or even the success of a whole project. To
limit the personal agenda setting, the introduction of an incentive system to align
vested interests with project objectives could be a solution.
Finally, the above mentioned differing individual and departmental goals are evident
and are interesting managerial problems. A change in the company's strategy in the
middle of a project is leading to undesired side-effects in terms of stabilisation of a
project configuration, including all the related consequences in terms of delays and
project quality of outcomes. Project members should stay on a project during the
entire project duration because those people manage transition of knowledge and
expertise to others in the team and beyond. Further, the project should be used to
develop individual careers as well as to let project members acquire capabilities and
expertise.
Based on many years of experience in different industries as well as in consultancy, I
gained insights into various mostly technology-driven, projects. In a wide range of
situations, the issues were very similar to those experienced in the portal case.
Organisational politics pattern decision-making instead of rational economically
driven considerations, and often the 'technical' is taken as a pretext to hide behind
uncertainty. However, in the subsequent everyday project work, at least half of the
problems were of a technical nature where most of the project team had no answer
due to either lack of skills, knowledge or experience. Consequently, this led to the
unwanted leadership of technically skilled people.
However, amongst others in the project team, this leadership created an atmosphere
of uncertainty based on the lack of technical knowledge compared with mistrust and
doubts towards issues and decisions shaped by more skilled and experienced people.
Related to this fact, generally, functional departments tend to employ only staffwith
a single education, for example in a purchasing department they only employ those
with a purchasing background. However, in the project reality, multidisciplinary
skills are required in order to progress in the course of events. Functional
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departments should give up the one-way politics in staffing and focus more on a
multidisciplinary mix of staff with different skills and expertise.
Through the knowledge and experience I gained in this study, I think social sciences
should play a far greater role in projects than they are at present. In a company, top
management should accept the fact that innovation projects are not only driven by
technical challenges but also by social and cultural ones which constrain or enable
the success or failure of adoption of emerging technologies.
8.4 Limitations of the study and further research
Conducting a longitudinal single case study, underpinned by the unique opportunity
to engage as a participant observer, have been helpful in order to explore the
different types of social aspects in shaping the outcomes of standardisation. For
example, the case has highlighted the importance of access to the pre-project phase
and the significant role power and networks play in patterning the outcomes of
standardised ICT innovations at company and industry level. However, while power
might have been relevant in the Covisint global supplier portal case, other relational
characteristics such as trust might prove more relevant in other cases.
This study has a number of limitations that provide suggestions for future research.
First, the case provided "thick descriptions" (Stake, 1995) enabling the researcher to
gather useful insights into the rich social processes that underline technology
development and to explain the way in which actors' choices were made and the
conditions under which a particular outcome was produced (Russell & Williams,
2002). On the one hand, the position of a participant observer offered the unique
chance to gain unlimited access to a vast amount of information and enabled the
research to follow the adoption of a standard from the beginning to the end of the
process. On the other hand this perspective simultaneously served to limit my
objectivity. As someone involved in this story I am part of particular narratives and
perspectives. This had two downsides. First, the study was directed by the very
special viewpoint of an 'insider', personally influenced by the course of events and
the active involvement in the project. Within the project, I was part of the DCXnet
team and therefore at least partly responsible for the achievement of some results.
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My physical presence in meetings or workshops and the continuous work with most
of the project team did not necessarily help to increase objectivity during writing.
However, to fix this issue of this very personal view of the DC organisation, a
number of interviews have been conducted with Covisint, IBM, part suppliers,
SupplyOn, other OEMs and naturally with some people of the project team after the
pilot went live. These interviews helped the research to uncover the perspectives of
the other participants in and outside of the project.
Secondly, as already mentioned above, my long track record of professional
experience and expertise led to the same level of involvement in the project as other
team members. Therefore, I had access to information other project members had did
not have access to and this shaped my perspective on on-going action and
configurations. Finally, all this practical expertise and experience turned out not to be
a real asset for theoretical deliberations. Decades ofworking experience in a
technically oriented environment encouraged a practical engineering and solution-
oriented way of thinking. Another closely related factor is the fact that my
engineering education and work expertise hampered my ability to express the
findings in the appropriate sociological language.
A single study might be descriptive, but nevertheless delivers useful and in-depth
insights. A single case study helps to explain the particular way in which choices
were made, and the specific conditions which pattern a particular outcome. Such an
in-depth view allows the single case study research design to tackle questions such as
what would have been required to produce a different result or what changes would
have shifted the outcome in what direction (Sorensen & Williams, 2002: 89).
The single instrumental case study design was useful at this stage of the research to
allow the researcher to gather an in-depth understanding into the phenomenon under
study so as to build-up a very detailed view of a single sector. In order to obtain such
a detailed picture, a generic overview of the variety of factors shaping its formation
and how they imposed upon success or failure were sacrificed. This means that the
generalisability of the findings is limited. Therefore, future research could
concentrate on different aspects. One could be to do an exploratory research
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approach and to verify the robustness and generalisability of the findings of this
research; or to conduct a multi case study research design to compare and contrast
portal developments and implementations in different settings. To identify the social
aspects relevant to the development and implementations of standardised portal
technology a large scale survey of developers and users of portals should be
conducted. Further research should include other industries such as the chemical
industry or the energy sector where portal coalitions have been formed. Such a
qualitative approach to the empirical research could be aided by the use of
quantitative methods such as surveys of industry portal users to confirm the results
through triangulation.
Finally, future research could address the role that trust and power play together in
shaping the development and implementation of standardised technology of industry
consortia. The emergence of standards coalitions often depends on the nature of
existing relationships among potential members (Foray, 1994), with coalitions often
forming around existing structures within the sector, such as user associations
(Graham et al., 1995). To research the role that trust and power play in shaping the
emergence of standard coalitions would need a larger scale set of surveys to map the
different dynamics of supply chain interactions in different sectors. Despite these
limitations, this study has been important because it allowed for the development of a
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Appendix 1: Interview guideline for interviews at DC
DC Questions Notes
IT, Business
Can you give an overview of
your business/IT strategy and
where the portal fits in?
History behind
Challenges, benefits
What were the major factors that
you think influenced the
development/implementation of
the portal strategy?
Factors (i.e. i.e. costs,
business - i.e. business
strategy, customer demands),
organisational (working
practices) and social (politics,
resistance to change), =>
identify the people that
shaped the portal strategy
What departments are these
people representing (=>
identify different interests)?
What is their expertise
(maybe it explains their
participation, or the way in
which the strategy was
developed)?
What (reasons) /who (actors)
drove the development and
implementation of the portal?
Who are the people (actors)
who played a central role in
the IOS strategy?
Description (technical










Did the original portal change
during implementation? If so,
how? What were the reasons for
such a change?
Influence of single stages,
which actor was
responsible/influences, what
factors led to a change?
Individual perception of
outcomes. How do these match
the expectations? If gap, what




users/context => identify if
different users have had a
similar experience of the
portal
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Appendix 2: Interview guideline for component suppliers
Supplier Questions Notes
■ Have you actively
participated in supplier
portal projects? If so, what
was your personal
perception in terms of
implementation process &
outcomes?




■ Who was in charge with
the decision for you to
participate?
Any benefits (for the project or
for the department or for the
individual?) perceived for
participation?
■ Can you give me an
overview of a typical
portal project and your




■ Can you discuss the
facilitators & inhibitors of
implementation (success).
■ Which one in your opinion
is the most significant
one?
Try to identify the
importance/criticality of each
of the different categories of
factors
(technical/social/economic)
Benefits/issues compared to the
situation before
■ Is your company (you)
involved in other portals?
■ How would you compare
this project (in terms of
both implementation
process and outcomes) to
the implementation and
outcomes of the other
portals?
Covisint vs. VWGroup or
BMW portal
Here he might not have direct
experience from being
involved in other portals
implementations ...
■ What are the major
outcomes for yourself/your
company as a result of the
implementation & use of
the portal?
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Appendix 3: Interview guideline for IT supplier
IT supplier Questions Notes
Can you briefly describe your
position/experience within
IBM?
What are the business reasons,
why companies looking for your
support in the area of B2B?
What are you doing better than
others?
Describe a typical portal project
where IBM has been involved.
Stages, resources, etc.
What do you think about
standardisation in this context?
Can you describe the business
relationship of IBM and DC?
When and how did you get
involved in the DC supplier
portal project?
History, background
In a standardised portal,
standardised processes are part
of and have been developed
beforehand.
Can you describe the
development process (of
standardised processes)?
■ Who was involved?
■ For what reasons?
■ Inhibitors, facilitators
Process, challenges
What happened during the
implementation?
In terms of the DC supplier
portal, what is your perception
of:
■ The overall outcome of
the project
■ Covisint




Appendix 4: Interview guideline for Covisint
Questions Notes
Covisint story Overview of Covisint
development.
Where did the resources
(money, people, expertise)
come from?








Can you tell me about a typical
portal implementation at an
OEM?
Challenges and how you
overcame them?
Not only DC but other
OEMs, too.
Technology/systems To what extent does the
technology underlying the







■ On the development and
implementation process
■ On the relationship
between OEM &
Supplier
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